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Abstract
With the increase of both technology push and operational pull of Mini/Micro
Aerial Vehicles (MAVs) within DoD organizations, an understanding of their interactions
and capabilities is necessary. Many MAVs have been developed for specific usage
and much speculation made on future uses. Despite their growth there is currently no
overarching systems architecture to envelop and guide the DoD’s MAV development
efforts. The goal of this thesis is to apply sound systems engineering principals to
develop a MAV architectural model describing their use in three separate but closely
related mission areas: Over-the-Hill-Reconnaissance, Battle Damage Information (BDI),
and Local Area Defense. This thesis focuses on single man-packable/operable MAVs
utilized by small ground units synonymous with special operations forces (SOF). The three
mission areas are combined to define a single overarching Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) MAV architecture. The architecture focuses on the current state of
ISR MAVs and baselines that AS-IS capability. From this architecture, areas of interest
relating to MAVs and their use in the DoD are discussed, focusing on enhancing both
current and future capabilities of the MAV.
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A SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURAL MODEL FOR MAN-PACKABLE/OPERABLE
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
MINI/MICRO AERIAL VEHICLES

I. Introduction
Researching the topic of mini and micro aerial vehicles (MAVs) reveals extensive
examples of their application and use already existing in many organizations including: the
Department of Defense (DoD), research organizations, academic institutions, and private
industry. While the basic MAV concept has been around as long as model airplanes, a
major push for their gainful employment in military operations occurred within the last
two decades. For reasons of troop security, stealth, hazardous terrain, mundane missions,
and vantage point, MAVs have and continue to prove themselves useful. Many organizations have developed and continue to develop MAVs specific to their set of requirements
or emerging technologies. However, only a handful were created with the concept of
integration in mind, and those that have rarely integrate beyond their specific organization.
While interest in MAVs continues to grow, so has the desire by military planners
to seamlessly incorporate these systems into Air Force missions where their utility can
be fully realized. Due to the complexity of integrating individual MAV systems into
their the currently fielded family of systems (FoS), military leaders and system developers
require better methods for defining MAV specifications and how they interact with their
environment. These issues are addressed by the Air Force’s increased emphasis on systems
engineering (SE) and transformation to integrated architectures through use of the DoD
Architecture Framework (DoDAF). While the concept of SE is not new, better methodologies were needed within the Air Force to manage complex programs as evidenced
when Secretary of the Air Force Roche stated “Many of our current system acquisition
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programs are suffering from a lack of attention to or inconsistent application of good
systems engineering principles” [30].
This refocus on systems engineering seeks to relate the functional, operational,
and systems viewpoints together thus providing both descriptive and visual representations of the system under design. These representations of a system are referred to as
architectures. The DoDAF is intended to provide information on how systems are related
to higher level architectures; an example of which is the C4ISR (Command, Control,
Communications, Computer, Intelligence and Reconnaissance) architecture [9]. The use
of sound systems engineering principles and the development of architectures enables a
more comprehensive and effective development strategy for the design of systems. An
integrated architecture allows the developers and users of a system to better plan for a
system’s requirements. If a strategic plan for the use of MAVs, as well as the planning
and acquisition of future MAV capabilities is to be built, the entire system must be defined
using systems engineering.

1.1

Thesis Goal
The goal of this thesis is to apply sound systems engineering principles to develop

an architectural model describing the use of MAVs in three separate, but closely related,
mission areas: Over-the-Hill-Reconnaissance, Battle Damage Information (BDI), and
Local Area Defense. These mission areas are examined and architectures created to
describe current and future MAV capabilities. From these architectures, areas of interest
relating to MAVs and their use in the Air Force are discussed, focusing on enhancing both
current and future capabilities of those MAVs falling within the scope of this thesis.

1.2

Scope and Assumptions
In defining the scope and assumptions for this thesis, it became evident that the

mission areas previously mentioned define, to a certain level, the application of MAVs
for this thesis. Before discussing MAV applications, it is necessary to define a UAV and
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a MAV. As defined by Army Field Manual 34-25-2, Chapter 1 [41], “UAVs are capable
of operating without an internal (human) pilot; are tethered by a radio control link; and
can be preprogrammed for both flight and payload operations prior to launch.” By this
definition, UAV’s cover a multitude of configurations including size, payload, endurance,
etc. This thesis concentrates on a tactical version of a UAV known as the Mini/Micro
Aerial Vehicle (MAV).
As the name implies, MAVs are certainly smaller in size and in many instances, less
capable than their larger counterparts. However, their diminutive dimensions afford faster
deployment times, a much smaller logistic footprint in the field, and eventually, the ability
to be carried by normal ground forces rather than specialized units. Further scoping the
problem, this thesis defines the MAV system to be single-man-packable and single-manoperable. The system also must not require the carrier to sacrifice normal mission essential
gear typically carried into the field.
The products and analysis provided with this research are based on MAV systems
utilized by small units synonymous with special operations forces (SOF). While the scope
focuses on a single-man-packable/operable system, it is understood that the specific user
determines how the MAVs are carried into theater. Another point to remember is that the
MAV system described in this research is part of a family of intelligence gathering systems
available to the unit. As such, the MAV is primarily used for close-in (typically no more
than 3km range) tactical reconnaissance where using larger systems such as the Pointer
(RQ-2A), proves too difficult or time consuming to employ for the given situation.
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II. Background
In order to understand the focus, direction, and results of this thesis, a background
discussion of mini/micro aerial vehicles (MAV) and their operators is in order. First,
an overview of the user community is presented, followed by a discussion of the selected
mission areas. Presented next is a brief overview of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and
the sub-category of MAVs. The final topic is the background of systems engineering and
the role it plays in this effort.

2.1

The User: Special Operations Forces
The user’s background, operating environment, mission tasks, and capability needs

and deficiencies are all important variables to understand when designing a system.
Ultimately, the user must be satisfied in order for the design to be successful. For this
thesis, the primary users are members of the Air Force Special Operations Command
(AFSOC) which is the Air Force component of the United States Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM). The following sections provide an overview of these four
variables (user background, operating environment, mission and core tasks, and capability
deficiencies) which tie directly into AFSOC’s roles and responsibilities within the special
operations community. Due to their similarities the first two variables, user background
and operating environment, have been combined into one discussion.
2.1.1

User Background and Operating Environment.

Special operations forces

(SOF) conduct fast, surgical operations at great distances from established bases by
using state-of-the-art communications, aircraft, and specially trained personnel from each
branch of service. These forces infiltrate and exit areas that are hostile to the United States,
or politically sensitive enough to warrant concealment of a US military presence. Indepth knowledge of the region and its inhabitants can mean the difference between success
and failure in the realm of special operations. Typically special operations involve short
engagements using shock and surprise, or long-term commitments that require patience
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and cultural understanding [26:6]. Since their missions or tactics often require covert,
concealed, or discreet capabilities, the systems they carry into the field must be robust
enough to survive the environment (i.e. small, durable, quiet, etc.) [25:7].
Use of special operations tactics can be traced back throughout human history.
They first appeared in the United States during the early colonial period, when officers
established specialized units to fight against irregular enemy forces. Until 1986, the United
States created and used special operations forces on an ad hoc basis, frequently to the point
of exhaustion of the personnel. The units were then disbanded when the crisis was over.
The scale and complexity of warfare has grown, thus increasing the time it takes to build
a competent special operations force. When the nation needed special operations forces
for a sensitive mission, the capability simply did not exist. It took the strategic failure
of Operation Eagle Claw, which was a response to Iranian students taking 50 Americans
hostage in 1979, to implement the concept of a standing joint capability to conduct special
operations. Although this is a historical example geared toward special operations forces
personnel, the lesson learned also applies to the equipment they use. Not only do we need
to keep these personnel trained for tomorrow’s war but also develop and field capabilities
to ensure that the war of tomorrow is won effectively. One of the goals of this research is,
in fact, to consider future capabilities that MAVs can bring to the field [25:7-8].
MAVs are not widely available, and traditionally special operations forces rely on
manned aircraft, reconnaissance teams, and satellites to provide the needed intelligence
[26:2].

These manned systems and space assets prove very useful as information

providers; however, they are considered high value assets. The term high value asset
is used to refer to those assets that are in high demand by units and commanders but
have limited numbers. One design goal for MAVs is to provide low cost, highly capable
intelligence gathering platforms that take the place of such high value systems.
Why is an architecture for the MAV needed? The answer lies in the fact that
proper information management is the key to modern conflicts. Special Operations Forces
are often tasked directly by political leaders and monitored at the national level [26:
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6]. These operations cross all branches of the armed service community and require
detailed planning and rapid oordination. All joint assets (air, ground, maritime, space,
etc.) must be able to communicate quickly and efficiently. Such efficiency and timeliness
requires responsive command and control networks that interconnect the various services,
commands, and government leaders or offices. The architecture detailed in Chapter IV
illustrates how the MAV system interacts with its external environment to provide the
proper level of communication and control required by battlefield planners.
Given the probability of future attacks, special operations forces continue to
incur increasing pressure to avoid failure meaning they must be prepared to wage war
“everywhere, all the time” [25:7]. To cope with the complexity of these challenges, leaders
of special operation forces need greater capabilities; most notably a greater capability
for observing their surroundings and targets in real-time with immediate availability. To
achieve this desired capability, the SOF teams require a new surveillance, reconnaissance,
and communication asset to deliver near-real-time, full motion video for tactically
significant periods of time [26:1]. This need for near-real-time video surveillance is the
driving requirement for this research and further demonstrates that an MAV could be a
plausible solution. To further expand the MAV solution, other mission and technology
capabilities are explored which demonstrate how MAVs can integrate with tomorrows
joint special operations force.
2.1.2

SOF Mission and Core Tasks.

System design requires an understanding of

the intended operational environment, the mission tasks, background information relevant
to the user and the existing capability gaps or needs. If the system does not address these
four factors, then the system will not fulfill the users needs. While the previous section
outlined the background and general operating environment of the special operations
forces, this section focuses on their mission tasks.
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) plans, directs, and
executes special operations in the conduct of the War on Terrorism in order to disrupt,
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defeat, and destroy terrorist networks that threaten the United States, its citizens and
interest worldwide. USSOCOM organizes, trains, and equips special operations forces
provided to Geographic Combatant Commanders, American Ambassadors and their
country teams. [25:4] Special operations forces are responsible for nine principal missions
or core tasks with additional collateral tasks. Collateral special operations activities apply
special operations capabilities in areas beyond the core tasks [26]. These areas include
security assistance, humanitarian assistance, peace operations, coalition support, counterdrug operations, personnel recovery, and special activities. The nine core tasks identified
by USSOCOM [25] are as follows:
1. Unconventional Warfare (UW)
2. Direct Action (DA)
3. Special Reconnaissance (SR)
4. Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
5. Counter-Terrorism (CT)
6. Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
7. Civil Affairs Operations (CAO)
8. Information Operations (IO)
9. Counter-Proliferation (CP) of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
All of these tasks are equally important to the SOF mission; however, this research
focuses only on the core tasks of special reconnaissance and counter-terrorism. This
allows the current mission tasks to align with current (or AS-IS) MAV capabilities. Taking
MAV capabilities and demonstrating how they aid special operations forces is shown in
Chapter IV.
The special reconnaissance task (also referred to as recon) includes reconnaissance
and surveillance actions that collect or verify significant information complementing or
supplementing national or theater intelligence assets [25]. These special reconnaissance
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teams are often the eyes and ears of unconventional warfare, direct action, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense operations [26]. The ability to broadcast imagery
over long distances is required in order to increase each team’s overall situational
awareness. Another need to increase mission effectiveness is the need for low probabilityof-intercept communication, which in turn complements the need for long range
communications. Based on current technologies as the communication range increases
the probability-of-intercept also increases. This applies to the MAVs design trade-offs in
a sense that the user and system designer will have to choose either long-range or low
probability-of-intercept.
The core task of counter-terrorism requires highly trained personnel that can
preempt or resolve terrorist incidents outside the United States. This is one of the
high-profile tasks of today’s special operations forces [25]. The counter-terrorism task
is extremely dependent on intelligence intensive because it involves such activities as
finding, isolating, and neutralizing or capturing terrorists. If the intelligence can be made
available in a timely manner, then teams of special operations forces will be able to
increase the success of missions such as rescuing hostages, attacking the terrorist infrastructure, and recovering sensitive material from a terrorist organization [26].
While not listed as a core task, re-supplying special operations forces in the field
is implied with certain tasks, such as special reconnaissance. This is often a challenging
process because special operations forces tend to work great distances from base camps,
typically behind or in close relation to enemy lines and far from major supply points
[26]. In most cases, the teams must traverse difficult terrain or parachute into isolated
areas where ground transportation is not feasible or tactically advantageous. Throughout
this research, the requirement for resupplying the forces in the field is assumed and the
architectural products presented in Chapter IV do not reflect the logistic support aspects
required for the MAV system.

2-5

2.1.3

SOF Capability Deficiencies.

The previous sections discussed three of

the four design factors for system design: user background, operating environment and
mission tasks. This section expounds on the fourth factor capability needs. To meet
the numerous tasks facing special operations forces and to ensure that they have the
appropriate equipment and resources, Congress authorized USSOCOM its own head-ofagency authority, program authority and budget for research, development, and acquisition
of special operations unique material and equipment [26]. Using a modernization process,
the USSOCOM begins with a strategy review to determine where the capabilities and
attributes can be incorporated into various joint strategy documents. The process follows
an approach of strategy-to-task, task-to-need, need-to-concept, concept-to-technology,
and technology-to-execution [26]. This modernization process results in the identification
of several capability deficiencies which are broken into three domains: command-controlcommunications (C3 ), intelligence, and resupply. This provides designers with a broad
idea of user requirements. Table 2.1 lists the capability deficiencies, extracted from
Maj Stephen Howard’s Special Operations Forces and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles [26],
that were relevant to this study and MAVs.
Table 2.1

SOF Capability Deficiencies listed by domain
Domain
Capability Deficiencies
Command, Control,
Potential for enemy to monitor or destroy our
and Communications
information systems.
Intelligence
- No real/near-time imagery from national systems
- No real-time interface between aircraft, planners,
and intel systems
- No-real-time imagery for target study
- No all-source threat location data
- Enhanced target identification and marking
capability required
Resupply
Need resupply of expendables (batteries, food, water,
medical, ammo)
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2.2

Mission Areas
The three intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions for this

thesis are Over-the-hill Reconnaissance, Battle Damage Information, and Local Area
Defense. A mission area is simply a more defined or scoped task that relates to one or
more of the core tasks, thus making mission areas a subset of core tasks. Recall that
this thesis focuses on the special reconnaissance and combating terrorism core tasks. The
following discussion scopes these mission areas as they relate to the core tasks.
Over-the-hill reconnaissance enhances a SOF teams situational awareness by
extending their beyond line-of-sight ISR capabilities. This mission area got its name from
the idea that a user could deploy a miniature unmanned system to peer over a hill or to get
a birds eye view of complex terrain in order to assess suspected enemy positions. There
are many systems that possess this capability; however, many are high value assets and
others are simply not available due to mission sensitivity or execution area. What SOF
teams require is the capability to observe the enemy and their surroundings regardless of
obstacles.
Battle Damage Information collects information on the damage inflicted upon the
enemy following an offensive strike. Battle Damage Information (BDI) is similar to Battle
Damage Assessment (BDA), but lacks the ability and/or authority to properly assess
and make a decision based on intelligence gathered. BDA, on the other hand, implies
that the information has or is being transformed into actionable intelligence for further
use by forces. In order to gather the needed intelligence, commanders need access to
reconnaissance platforms. If access is not possible, it may take a significant amount of
time in order to get the information needed for the assessment. Special operations forces,
or other units already in the field, have the potential to provide time sensitive intelligence
information if equipped with MAV systems. The MAV can deploy from a nearby unit to
gather the intelligence needed and route this information to personnel qualified to conduct
the assessment.
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Local Area Defense (LAD) covers any scenario in which SOF or other friendly
forces are defending against an enemy attack or preventing insurgents from entering an
area. This mission area requires rapid response from the defenders if they wish to succeed.
In this case, the MAV can easily serve as a rapidly deployable sensor platform to gather
the needed information.
Though these mission areas are different in execution, they are very similar when
considering the required information exchanges and materiel requirements. As such, the
remainder of this thesis centers on a consolidated view of the mission areas; expounding
on the individual mission areas only when required.

2.3

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
The previous two sections focused on the special operations forces background and

the intended mission areas for MAVs. It was also mentioned that MAVs are a subset of the
larger category of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). This section provides a background
of UAV classification and history of their development and usage in the modern military.
By definition, any aircraft not carrying a pilot can be considered a UAV. Due to
this broad definition, several classifications exist to further delineate UAVs of different
design and capability. The first of these is a remotely piloted vehicle (RPV). RPVs are
those unmanned platforms requiring full control by a ground station or separate manned
aircraft. These systems are exemplified by off-the-self remote control aircraft found in
hobby shops. The second category, known as drones, are a self-controlling platform that
are preprogrammed prior to launch and cannot accept mission changes once dispatched
[20]. The last category of UAVs is capable of self-navigation, in-flight reprogramming
and can perform autonomous take-off and landing if equipped to do so. Though they do
not have a special descriptor to separate them from RPVs and drones, the remainder of
this thesis assumes the term UAV abides by the latter definition.
The use of UAVs dates back to 1887 when Englishman Douglas Archibald
attempted to tackle the problem of over-the-hill observation by attaching a camera to a
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kite and then flying the platform high enough to observe the enemy [44]. Other examples
of early UAVs include the use of explosive laden balloons during the Civil War, by both
Union and Confederate soldiers and during World War Two by the Japanese. The United
States, also during WWII, attempted to use operational aircraft in an unmanned fashion by
flying the aircraft to a specified altitude and then bailing out, allowing the explosive-laden
aircraft to continue to their targets [19].
The war in Vietnam saw the productive use of drones in the area of intelligence.
Ryan BQM-34 Firebee (Figure 2.1) UAVs were used over North Vietnam for day and
night missions using payloads primarily composed of conventional cameras or signals

Figure 2.1

BQM-34A FIREBEE

intelligence equipment [19]. Ultimately, Firebees flew more than 3,400 sorties
in support of American objectives. The QH-50 DASH (Figure 2.2) remotely piloted
helicopter (RPH) was also used by Marines for beach reconnaissance and spotting in
Vietnam [43] but the technology required for this system was not mature enough for the
program to continue.
Although these examples have proven the potential for UAVs to perform
reconnaissance and, in some cases, strike missions, many countries avoided UAV
development due to extensive costs and bulky sensor packaging [20]. In fact, it was
more common to find a UAV serving as a decoy providing anti-aircraft practice for navel
gunner’s or guiding munitions to their targets, such as the German V-Series rockets during
WWII, than it was to find them performing reconnaissance missions [16]. After the mid-
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Figure 2.2

Gyrodyne QH-50C DASH [36]

1960’s, the size and cost of the electronics began to rapidly decrease; however, this did not
create a significant change in interest levels for UAVs.
General interest in UAVs had a noteworthy increase after the Israeli military used
them against the Syrian air defense system in the Bekaa Valley in 1982 for reconnaissance,
jamming, and as decoys [16]. Despite the numerous problems encountered by UAV
systems, the Israelis proved that UAVs could perform valuable combat service in an
operational environment. Countries around the world began to ramp up their UAV
programs by designing systems to perform dangerous and dull missions typically handled
by manned aircraft [20].
During Operation Desert Storm, the Navy and Marines operated RQ-2A Pioneer
(Figure 2.3) UAV systems to provide target identification enabling the engagement of
Iraqi defense forces on Faylaka island [19].
More recently, UAVs have been employed to combat terrorism in both Afghanistan
and Iraq. Predator UAVs have been on the cutting edge of experimentation as this
platform, primarily designed for intelligence gathering, has also been modified to provide

2-10

Figure 2.3

RQ-2A Pioneer UAV [36]

an offensive capability. While UAVs experience more interest and funding, they are
typically built to fill a specific military need and are classified based on their capabilities.
UAV classifications vary depending on military service branches, authors, and
manufactures. Some of the more common classifications are: tactical and endurance;
lethal and non-lethal; very low cost close range, close range, short range, and medium
range; expendable and recoverable. The users’ needs and operating conditions typically
drive which type of UAV is best. In the case of over-the-hill reconnaissance, UAVs are
classified as tactical (short range, field supported), non-lethal, very low cost close range,
and expendable (with the option to recover).

2.4

Mini and Micro Aerial Vehicles
While both mini and micro-UAVs (MAVs) are a subset of UAVs, MAVs are unique

due to their smaller size. This section introduces some of the unique characteristics MAVs
possess and provides a systems perspective for a typical MAV system. From this section
onward, the term MAV refers to both mini and micro-UAVs.
2.4.1

Characteristics.

An MAVs small size brings about many unique

operational, logistic, and acquisition characteristics. Operationally, MAVs can provide
capabilities to smaller units that heretofore were unachievable because UAV systems were
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simply too expensive and complex to be utilized by small military units. Additionally,
these systems were unable to provide time-critical information for the units that would
most benefit from their use in the field. MAVs can also have a variety of payloads that
can be manufactured for a single airframe which enables the concept of reusability by
interchanging payloads in the field. Logistically speaking, MAVs can be designed to have
a relatively small footprint. As for the acquisition side of the house, MAVs present a faster,
better, cheaper approach to their development, procurement, and fielding [27]. These
characteristics are very beneficial, but with every benefit there are challenges.
The main challenges with MAVs are their limited payload weight, aerodynamics,
systems integration, and mission utility. The point here is to recognize, as with every
system, that there are design challenges that need to be considered. To place some significance and to give the reader a better idea of the term small size, the following table
better characterizes a MAVs operational scale. The characteristics shown in Table 2.2 are
averages. A particular mini-UAV or micro-UAV may have values smaller or larger than
the ones presented in the table.
Table 2.2 Sample Characteristics of Mini and Micro-UAVs [18:210]
Characteristic
Mini-UAV Micro-UAV
Weight (g)
4540
49
Wingspan (cm)
121
15
Aspect Ratio
7
3
2
Wing Area (cm )
2096
76
CL (Aerodynamic Lift Coefficient)
0.6
0.6
CL/CD (Aerodynamic Lift/Drag Coefficient)
26
5
Propeller Efficiency
0.8
0.5
Electrical Efficiency
0.6
0.6
Average Power (W)
178
5.1
2
Average Power/Wing Area (W/cm )
0.085
0.068
A general picture of how MAVs stack up to other aircraft based on size is provided
in Figure 2.4. This figure provides a point of reference for mini and micro-UAVs, and
attempts to further define mini-UAVs as fitting somewhere in between micro-UAVs and
small wingspan UAVs.
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Figure 2.4
2.4.2

The MAV compared to existing flight vehicles extracted from [32:3]

Systems Perspective.

A typical MAV system is composed of an air vehicle,

ground control or base station, payload, and data link [16]. Many UAV systems also
include support subsystems designed to aid in launch and recovery, ground handling, and
system maintenance. Due to the MAVs size and weight, these support subsystems will not
be as complex and, in some cases, not required at all. The launching and recovery of a
MAV does not require a system but an operator initiated event (on/off switch, hand launch,
etc.). Although these subsystems or events are important to a MAVs operation, only the
air vehicle, ground control or base station, payload and data link systems are discussed
further.
The air vehicle,as shown in Figure 2.5 is the airborne piece of the system that
includes the airframe, propulsion unit, flight controls, power source, and communications
equipment. The electric motor serves as the propulsion unit in most MAVs but combustion
engines are also a viable alternative. Power sources are typically either batteries or
combustible fuel. Current MAV navigation encompasses a broad range of systems to
include an on-board autopilot, inertial navigation system (INS), global positioning systems
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(GPS), and memory to store mission related data (waypoints). Onboard communications
equipment in most MAVs usually consists of an antenna, transmitter, receiver, and the
supporting hardware and software.

Figure 2.5

Example of a MAV

The ground control or base station plays an important role in today’s reconnaissance
based MAVs because they represent the operational control center for the MAV system.
The ground station typically manages video, command and control functions, and the
processing of telemetry data received from the air vehicle [16]. Key systems that need
to be present include control and display consoles, video and telemetry instrumentation,
signal processing, data terminals, and communications equipment including antennas.
In most cases, the MAV payload is the most expensive piece of the system. For
reconnaissance missions, the payload usually includes video cameras capable of either day
or night (infrared) operations. Other possible payloads include: target designation using a
laser, radar sensors such as a moving target indicator or synthetic aperture radar, electronic
warfare (EW) systems, meteorological sensors, and chemical sensing devices [16]. Due
to size, power, and weight restrictions most of the signal processing is left to the base
station; however, some limited processing may still occur on the air vehicle depending on
the payload. As technology continues toward smaller components and faster processing,
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MAV capabilities will continue to grow providing operators critical tools necessary for
mission accomplishment.
One of the key subsystems for any MAV is the data link. This link provides
bi-directional communication either on demand or on a continuous basis. An up-link
provides vital command instructions to the air vehicle. The down-link contains two types
of information; one for command acknowledgment and status information, and the other
for sensor data such as radar or video feedback [16]. Figure 2.6 helps to illustrate MAV
systems by providing an example of a typical system broken into key subsystems and then
showing how these subsystems are tied together. As new technologies and capabilities

Figure 2.6

A Typical MAV System

are explored, new systems and/or subsystems are needed, particularly in the area of the
various payloads.
From this level, systems integration is straightforward; however, the actual physical
integration of hardware and software presents one of the greatest challenges in MAV
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design. As vehicle size decreases or functionality increases, the integration becomes
more complex [32:7]. Similar to Figure 2.6, Figure 2.7 focuses more on the general
physical hardware integration of a MAV. This MAV system concept helps guide the system
architecture products and future capabilities presented later on.

Figure 2.7

2.5

MAV Hardware Integration [32:7]

Systems Engineering and Architectures
Designing a system such as a MAV to meet the current and future requirements of its

users in a system of systems (SoS) and family of systems (FoS) environment is a complex
problem. Missions and operating environments may change and systems that interface
with the MAV may change. The ability to continue to utilize an existing MAV system
in constantly changing and unique environments while providing a desired capability is
a problem that sits above the component design level. That is why the use of a systems
approach to this problem is needed. The use of architectural views to describe a MAV
system should facilitate its development.
2.5.1

Systems Engineering Overview.

Systems engineering, as a discipline, is

defined in many ways. The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE)
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defines it as “an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization of
successful systems. It focuses on defining customer needs and required functionality
early in the development cycle, documenting requirements, then proceeding with design
synthesis and system validation while considering the complete problem” [7]. More
simply put, “Systems Engineering is the design, production, and maintenance of
trustworthy systems within cost and time constraints” [37].
It can be argued that systems engineering, in some form, has been around since
many of the ancient wonders of the world were built. It is difficult to imagine immense
structures such as the Pyramid of Khufu in Egypt, the Temple of Artemis at Ephesus, or the
Hanging Gardens of Babylon were designed and constructed without “an interdisciplinary
approach and means to enable the realization of these successful systems” [7].
The presence of a systems engineering focus was also evident at other times
throughout history whenever a large and/or complex system was designed and constructed.
Examples include the Roman aqueducts, the Great Wall of China, European castles and
cathedrals, and centuries of ship building. As one will notice, prior to the industrial
and technological revolutions, most large and complex system design efforts were civil
engineering or classically architectural structures. Architects were, in a way, the first
systems engineers. “Indeed, the Greek word architecton means master builder or master
mason. The term describes one who designs and builds structures whose form and function
is both appealing and useful. ...The architect has the special role of eliciting and converting
the needs and desires of the customer that commissions him into a design that will be
especially satisfying to that customer” [31:227]. This is why the discipline of systems
engineering so closely relates its processes and tools to those of an architect.
The Industrial Revolution brought about a major thrust to design and enable
machines to perform tasks that previously only humans performed. The design of these
machines and tools was initially understandable and straightforward. Many of the systems
were relatively small and the tool-users themselves were likely a part of the design process.
There also existed, in many cases, a trial and error approach to the system design in
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absence of more formally defined systems engineering processes [37:6]. As the machines
and tools became more and more complex, single tool-users could no longer design the
system. Teams of designers and technically specialized individuals were now necessary.
With a new host of subsystem and component specialists working on complex systems,
there developed a need to integrate and organize the design process in a more efficient
manner.
Following the end of World War II, the boom of the technological age began to take
off both figuratively and literally. The push of opposing nationalities to develop longerrange missiles, better aircraft, and nuclear capabilities placed large amounts of competitive
pressure on fast and effective design processes. The countries and development teams
with more efficient and productive design processes gained national and military leverage
[29:6]. This pressure to design and deploy systems to meet the users need continued
throughout the past few decades, both in the military and commercial sectors. The
role of the systems engineer could be viewed as the integrator between all of the other
disciplines necessary to design the system. Standardized languages and system representation techniques were developed and used to enable all of the key players of a system to
see their own role in the complete system.
The advent of the information age, through the use of computers and software,
presented a new host of challenges for the systems engineering discipline. In the largely
abstract environment of software development, there now exists the need to have effective
and efficient processes in place that integrate all aspects of the software development.
Developers of different parts of an overall software package need some way of conceptualizing the end result. That end result, and the satisfaction of the users’ requirements, were
more important than the sum of all the individual system pieces. New and tailored ways of
viewing and communicating the system to other key players and being able to aggregate
the subsystems into a whole, were now the focus of systems engineers. This focus, and
the systems themselves, are many times too complex to visualize in simple terms. The
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systems engineer must use tools in the form of a systems architecture to aid the design and
integration process.
2.5.2

Architectures Overview.

One of the more straight-forward, and widely

accepted, depictions of the systems engineering process can be seen in Figure 2.8. The
design of a system starts with the analysis of user requirements, followed by the functional
analysis and allocation of the system, and then the actual design synthesis of the physical
system. The process is iterative, such that each step in the process may to a preceding step
to ensure that the design is meeting the earlier step’s needs and requirements. That is why
there are the requirements, design, and verification loops.

Figure 2.8

Systems Engineering Process

It should also be noted that there is an analysis and control step in the process. From
any of the other stages in the process, the design of the system should be regulated by a
defined process and aided through the use of tools to ensure a traceable and controlled
design. Systems engineering uses architectures as a set of tools for this step in teh SE
process.
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The term architecture is defined by IEEE Std 1471-2000 as “the fundamental organization of a system embodied in its components, their relationships to each other, and to
the environment, and the principles guiding its design and evolution” [28:3].
Three fundamental views create an architecture description: the operational view
(OV), systems view (SV), and technical standards view (TV). Although the fourth view,
the all-view (AV), provides information pertinent to the entire architecture, it does not
represent any of the aforementioned architectural views. As seen in Figure 2.9, each view
plays a special role in describing the system. The operational view identifies what needs
to be accomplished and who does it. The systems view relates systems and characteristics
to operational needs. The technical standards view prescribes standards and conventions
used to develop the system. As can also be seen in Figure 2.9, each view provides elements
to the other views that allow the resulting architecture to be integrated [24:2-1]. These
views and their components are covered in more detail in Chapter III.

Figure 2.9

DoDAF Views and their Integration [24:2-1]

While architectures are of evident value to the systems engineer, they also play
a vital role in communicating with the key operators/users of a system. Without many
of the architecture products, key users may have difficulty understanding aspects of the
integrated system. The architecture provides the necessary documentation of the systems
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operating environment, requirements, functions, subsystems, inputs, outputs, etc. The
documentation also provides the traceability necessary to enable the realization of the
entire system.
2.5.3

SE and Architecture Policy.

Beyond the practical benefits of architectures,

they are also now required by law and high-level policy for acquisition programs within
US government agencies. The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 requires all executive-level
departments to use architectures to develop, maintain and facilitate integrated IT. In the
DoD, it also requires architectures for National Security Systems (NSS). A NSS is any
telecommunication or information system operated by the US Government, in which
the function, operation, or use involves intelligence activities. The activities can be
cryptologic activities related to National Security or the command and control of military
forces. Activities may also require the use of equipment that is an integral part of a
weapon or weapons system, or be critical to direct fulfillment of military or intelligence
missions [1]. This description of a NSS relates directly to the role and missions of MAVs.
The mission areas for MAVs this research develops deal directly with imformation systems
that involve intelligence activities. The information that they collect can also influence the
command and control of military forces and be an integral part of the employment of
weapon systems. Therefore the Clinger-Cohen Act requires an architecture for MAVs.
In response to this act, executive-level departments and agencies also updated
and changed many high-level policies to include Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) Circulars A-130 and A-11. These circulars directed that all federal organizations
have formal frameworks for developing architectures and demonstrate how their capital
planning and budgeting link to, and support, those architectures [2] [35].
Within the DoD, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided instruction
through CJCSI 3170.01, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(JCIDS)” to require integrated architectures as a formal part of the DoD acquisition system
[3]. The Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), Capability Development Document (CDD),
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and Capability Production Document (CPD) each support key descision milestones in the
process. They also all require specific architecture products to support those milestones.
Figure 2.10 shows how these documents and milestones are a part of the DoD’s acquisition
process.

Figure 2.10

DoD Aquisition Process [13:3]

With these major organizational and policy changes in the last decade, architectures
are now important not only for the successful development of the actual system, but also
for the effective operation of the organizations that develop the system. For these reasons,
an integrated architecture is necessary to document, develop and lay the ground work for
a successful MAV system. Currently there are no architectures for MAV systems, their
current mission areas or future mission areas. In order to efficiently implement MAVs in
the DoD, a baseline architecture representing current MAV capabilities is imperative and
is the impetus for this thesis.
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III. Methodology
The area of systems engineering, its principles and tools have been selected to examine the
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) mini/micro aerial vehicle (MAV). This
approach is ideal given the variety of systems that must interact to make the MAV useful
in its missions. Systems engineering relies heavily on its architectural products to promote
overall system understanding. This chapter discusses the importance of traceability
in the Systems Engineering (SE) process, gives an overview of DoD development of
architectures and then closes with an in-depth description of all pertinent architectural
products. Since the products are numerous and form many perspectives, traceability
is vital to keep the architecture understandable and tied back to the original system
requirements.

3.1

Providing Traceability
Throughout any effort to produce an integrated architecture, traceability is key.

Traceability progresses from the identification of a capability gap to the assignment of
system components to perform specific functional tasks.
“Traceability requires the establishment of an unbroken chain of comparisons to
stated references” [33]. This reference describes traceability in the way that a crime
scene investigator handles evidence in a criminal case. There must be that unbroken chain
such that a case, or in this thesis a conclusion, can be well-founded and understandable.
“Requirements traceability is the ability to describe and follow the life of a requirement,
in both a forward and backward direction, i.e. from its origins, through its development
and specification, to its subsequent deployment and use, and through periods of ongoing
refinement and iteration in any of these phases” [22:94-101]. Not only does traceability
tie a system design back to its requirements, but it also allows the designers to step
forward and backward through the design while still understanding all of the defined and
standardized pieces.
3-1

Traceability is a characteristic of an architecture that allows the reader/user to
understand the progression of a thought throughout the entire architectural design process.
It is the description of understandable links between various views and can be used
to assess how the original capability needs are being met by the designed architecture.
Without traceability, potential exists to ignore original capability gaps and once the
architecture is designed, it may be only a set of detailed views; not an integrated
architecture.
The traceability of a capability gap begins the system design process providing
the links, during concept exploration and eventually the chosen system design. Once a
concept has been selected, the high level measures obtained from the applicable tasks that
relate to the capability gap are used to develop lower level measures of effectiveness and
performance that will be used to evaluate system requirements. Thus, when looking at the
ISR MAV, key parameters are identified that will help determine the level to which ISR
MAVs fill the gap. Architectures provide a powerful tool that can be used to help define
parameters throughout system design.
In this thesis, traceability efforts started at the top of the DoD capability hierarchy.
To facilitate understandable requirements decomposition, two parallel approaches were
used to determine where the capability gaps existed. The first approach looked at the
organizational mission areas of the using commands. Starting at the national level, each
organization’s mission statement was reviewed and traced to its sub levels; leading to
the primary ISR MAV mission areas. The concurrent approach looked at the Air Force
Task List (AFTL) to determine which tasks that the ISR MAV would support through the
AFTL hierarchy. Since the ISR MAV missions, described in Chapter IV, describe Air
Force focused missions, AFTL tasks were used in lieu of tasks from the Universal Joint
Task List (UJTL). However, the AFTL resides at the tactical-level of the UJTL.
Once the operational scenarios were linked to identified capability gaps and
missions, the next steps were to review the given scenarios and corresponding AFTL’s for
a tailored list of measures. These measures represent the characteristics that an accepted
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concept must embody as a solution to the capability gap, and that would be necessary to
effectively evaluate the system’s performance. While the AFTLs provide some top-level
measures for comparing different concepts, further refinement must be accomplished in
order to provide that would be useful in describing a tactical MAV system. Therefore,
several other specific measures were developed for the ISR MAV.
This chain of decomposition from national-level missions to scenarios, to measures
now provides traceability to the ultimate system’s testable configuration.

From the

scenarios and measures, an integrated architecture can be produced to facilitate that
testable design. The integrated architecture will also aid in developing the necessary
system requirements to develop the actual system that will be evaluated by the list of
system measures. Throughout the architecture design, traceability plays a key role.
Many parts of the architecture must relate to and trace similar objects to other parts of
the architecture. The next few sections describe an integrated architecture in detail and
traceability is a present and a necessary attribute to validate the final architecture.

3.2

Architectural Views
While traceability describes the connections that should be maintained while

describing a system in many different views, an architecture is a way of organizing those
views.
“An architecture is the fundamental organization of a system embodied in its
components, their relationships to each other, and to the environment, and the
principles guiding its design and evolution” [28].
A well understood system depends not only on comprehending the information contained
within each view, but also the framework in which the view was created. The system
designer and user of the various architectural views benefit from first understanding what
a specific architectural view is designed to present and how the specific system should be
instantiated from that view. Then both parties can read the information together and also
understand the context in which the system has been placed.
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An architecture can only be defined as integrated when its products and their
components are developed such that the components defined in one view are the same
(same names, definitions, and values) as those referenced in another view [24:1-1]. In
terms of the three architectural views, an integrated architecture refers to an architecture
description that has integrated the operational, system, and technical standards views.
With a properly integrated architecture, complex systems are better understood by the
users, engineers, designers, maintainers, etc. This increased understanding ensures that
the system properly integrates with other systems or external systems (external systems
are those systems that are outside of the design boundary but are needed in order for the
designed system to function properly).
3.2.1

DoD Architecture Framework.

As with many major written products,

guidelines or style guides exist to frame the architecture. Several sets of guidelines are
available detailing how to architect a system. In the 1950’s, the Structured Analysis and
Design Technique (SADT) was created. A combination of several separate but related
techniques; it was a process-focused approach and works very well with the design of
physical systems. The SADT was used initially in the formation of a Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)
architecture framework by and for the development of C4ISR systems in 1997.
Through the past few decades, a different architecting construct also emerged from
the software development community. The Object-Oriented (OO) method, which viewed
systems in more of a data-centered approach, showed that it was very useful with the
growing use of software-dependent systems within the DoD. In an effort to correlate
both the SADT and OO approaches, [8] a DoD working group built upon the C4ISR
Architecture Framework to form a DoD-wide standard for architecture development. It is
called the DoD Architecture Framework 1.0 (DoDAF). It gives descriptions, examples,
and templates from both the SADT and OO approaches in producing the neccessary
products for an integrated architecture. For this thesis, DoDAF was used as the guiding
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instruction for producing architectural views. DoDAF gives the following description of
architectures.
An architecture description is a representation of a defined domain, as of a
current or future point in time, in terms of its constituent parts, what those
parts do, how the parts relate to each other and to the environment, and
the rules and constraints governing them. Within the DoDAF, architectures
are described in terms of three views: Operational View (OV), Systems
View (SV), and Technical Standards View (TV). An architecture description
is composed of architecture products that are interrelated within each view
and are interrelated across views. Architecture products are those graphical,
textual, and tabular items that are developed in the course of gathering
architecture data, identifying their composition into related architecture
components or composites, and modeling the relationships among those
composites to describe characteristics pertinent to the architecture’s intended
use. [24:1-1]
DoDAF is composed of over 26 specific products, each product serving a separate
purpose with different perspectives and layers of detail. As mentioned above by the
DoDAF, the products are grouped within three main category views: Operational View
(OV), Systems View (SV), and Technical Standards View (TV).
“The OV contains graphical and textual products that comprise an identification of
the operational nodes and elements, assigned tasks and activities, and information flows
required between nodes. It defines the types of information exchanged, the frequency of
exchange, which tasks and activities are supported by the information exchanges, and the
nature of information exchanges” [24:2-1]. The specific views within the OV represent
the operational functionality of the system. Its views concentrate more on the functions
and tasks that a system must perform in order to meet the overall user requirements.
“The SV associates system resources to the OV. These system resources support
the operational activities and facilitate the exchange of information among operational
nodes” [24:2-2]. The specific views within the SV begin to give the system a form. It
builds on the functions designed in the OV’s and assigns actual systems to perform those
tasks.
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“The TV includes a collection of the technical standards, implementation
conventions, standards options, rules, and criteria organized into profile(s) that govern
systems and system elements for a given architecture” [24:2-2]. The specific views within
the TV give the reader the lowest level of detail when it comes to the actual specifications
that the system design will either be built to or need to adhere to. Figure 3.1 shows how
the views are linked.
Understanding how the views cover their respective areas and interact with one
another helps in understanding the specific views. When one is looking at an OV, they
should be thinking what is or needs to be done, but also that an SV and a TV will tell them
what will do it and in what detailed way it will be done respectively.

Figure 3.1

Fundamental Linkages Between Views

3.2.2 Modeling Languages.

Now that the general makeup of an architecture is

understood, their creation and languages can be discussed. Modeling languages used for
architectures are similar to spoken languages. Two people speaking in different languages
can compose and speak a sentence communicating the same thought. Regardless of
the form that each word takes, there still needs to be basic elements represented (i.e.
nouns, verbs, articles). Similarly, modeling languages may appear different and use
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different approaches, but they can represent the same system through use of common
elements. Within the systems engineering community DoDAF, there are two sets of
modeling languages that are generally accepted in producing architectural views. These
are the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Integrated Computer Aided Manufacturing (ICAM) Definition (IDEF).
UML employs the object-oriented (OO) approach which is “a general-purpose
modeling language for specifying, visualizing, constructing and documenting the artifacts
of software systems, as well as for business modeling and other non-software systems”
[34]. UML is widely accepted within the software development community it originated
from. By focusing on the data elements and rule modeling needed to perform usecase scenarios, UML products work relatively easily into the executable software realm.
Initally not included in the development of the C4ISR architecture, Doctors Michael
Bienvenu, Insub Shin, and Alexander Levis showed that UML could be used to produce
the required products for that architecture [8]. It is evident in the fact that DoDAF now
includes UML as an accepted method of producing its products.
IDEF uses the structured analysis (SA) approach to produce its views. The SA
approach uses the system’s activities and functions being performed as the building blocks
of their views. The SA method builds upon two types of architecture constructs: the
functional architecture and the physical architecture. “A functional architecture is a set of
activities or functions, arranged in a specified partial order that, when activated, achieves
a set of requirements. Similarly, a physical architecture is a representation of the physical
resources, expressed as nodes, that constitute the system and their connectivity, expressed
in the form of links” [31:228]. To create these two architectures there are several IDEF
variants that focus on different areas of systems analysis. IDEF0 is a function modeling
method that focuses on the activities of a system. IDEF1x is a data-modeling method
that looks at a system as a collection of interacting data packages. IDEF3 is a process
description capture method that focuses on how the system operates through actions and
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events [4]. There are a few others as well, though they will not be used in the architectural
products produced in this thesis.
Since the ISR MAV is a physical system and the UML language does not work
ideally outside of the purely software environment, the SA approach through IDEF
languages is used to produce the required architectural views. The SA approach and
its functional and physical architectures relate very well to the DoDAF standard. The
SA functional architecture and the DoDAF operational view are related in their role and
representations. The SE physical architecture and the DoDAF systems view are also
closely related in how they convey a system design in the integrated architecture.
3.2.3

Architectural Products.

An integrated architecture is composed of several

views, each represented by several distinct products. The DoDAF contains over 26
types of products, each with its own viewpoint and types of elements represented. In
the DoD, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process
directs integrated architectures and provides guidelines on what architectural products are

Product
AV-1
AV-2
OV-1
OV-2
OV-3
OV-4
OV-5
OV-6C
SV-1
SV-4
SV-5
SV-6

Table 3.1 JCIDS Required Products
Title
Overview and Summary Information
Integrated Dictionary
High-Level Operational Concept Graphic
Operational Node Connectivity Diagram
Operational Information Exchange Matrix*
Organizational Relationships Chart
Operational Activity Model
Operational Event Trace Description
Systems Interface Description*
Systems Functionality Description
Operational Activity to Systems Functionality Traceability Matrix
Systems Data Exchange Matrix

required and when. Treating this research in much the same as a Capability Development
Document (CDD), the architectural products required for it were reviewed for a baseline
[14:E-A-6]. Then looking ahead to the requirements for the next milestone, the minimum
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required products for the CPD were used. These minimum products required by JCIDS
policy for systems with top-level information exchange requirements in the Capability
Production Document (CPD) [14] are listed in table 3.1.
In addition, the OV-7: Logical Data Model was developed because this product
gives the best understanding of the actual data elements that pertain to the system. Each
of the aforementioned products are explained below, including their DoDAF definitions,
examples, and reasons why they are important for understanding the system.
AV-1 - Overview and Summary Information. The AV-1 (Figure 3.2) provides
executive-level summary information in a consistent form that allows quick reference
and comparison among architectures. The AV-1 includes assumptions, constraints, and

Figure 3.2

AV-1 - Template

limitations that may affect high-level decision processes involving the architecture [24:31]. This product is considered the title page of the architecture, and gives the reader a
high-level overview of the following architecture.
AV-2 - Integrated Dictionary. This product contains definitions of terms used in the
given architecture. It consists of textual definitions in the form of a glossary, a repository
of architecture data, their taxonomies, and their metadata (i.e., data about architecture
data), including metadata for tailored products, associated with the architecture products
developed. Metadata are the architecture data types, possibly expressed in the form of
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a physical schema [24:3-9]. This product is critical for traceability between all of the
architecture products.
As the name dictionary infers, one should be able to use the AV-2 as a reference to
understand the other products. Every data element or object found in each of the products
should also be found defined in the AV-2. As an integrated dictionary, it also needs to
relate the objects and the products so that the architectural products are tied together.
Objects found in more than one product should have the same definition. An integrated
dictionary can take many forms, but basic information about the data elements within
should be consistent and as complete as possible to aid understanding of the element. The
goals of this product are to document the architecture’s contents, show their relation to
one another, and, if necessary, serve as a textural representation of the entire architecture.
OV-1 - High-Level Operational Concept Graphic. The OV-1, an example of
which is shown in Figure 3.3, describes a mission and highlights the main operational

Figure 3.3

OV-1 - Example

nodes and interesting or unique aspects of operations.

It provides a description of

the interactions between the subject architecture and its environment, and between the
architecture and external systems. A textual description accompanying the graphic is
crucial. Graphics alone are not sufficient for capturing the necessary architecture data [24:
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4-1]. This product gives the reader a very basic, but operationally complete view of the
system and is typically used in presentations to introduce the system and promote initial
understanding. The OV-1 is particularly useful in communicating the unique aspects of
the system to individuals unfamiliar with the system or architecture being discussed.
OV-2 - Operational Node Connectivity Diagram. This product, and example of
which is shown in Figure 3.4, graphically depicts the operational nodes (or organizations)
with needlines between those nodes that indicate a need to exchange information. The
graphic includes internal operational nodes (internal to the architecture) as well as external
nodes [24:4-7].
As one of the first products to be created in constructing an architecture, this product
helps to shape the system model. It breaks the system into its most basic major players so

Figure 3.4

OV-2 - Template

that needlines of information, major interfaces, and areas of responsibility are broken out
early. Much of the rest of the architecture is based directly on how the nodes and needlines
interact.
OV-3 - Operational Information Exchange Matrix.

This product details

information exchanges and identifies “who exchanges what information, with whom, why
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the information is necessary, and how the information exchange must occur” [15]. There
is not a one-to-one mapping of OV-3 information exchanges to OV-2 needlines; rather,
many individual information exchanges may be associated with one needline [24:4-16].
Figure 3.5 shows representative column headings for a typical OV-3 table. The
rows list the OV-2 needlines and their sub information exchanges. The column headings

Figure 3.5

OV-3 - Template

are generally tailored to the specific system type being modeled. For example, a template
for a complex communication system will have more columns than a simpler system with
few information exchanges. For this research the column headings with their meanings as
defined by DoDAF [24] has been provided in Appendix F.
OV-4 - Organization Relationships Chart. This product illustrates the command
structure or relationships among human roles, organizations, or organization types that are
the key players in an architecture [24:4-27]. Many times this is a hierarchal organization
chart illustrating the levels and layers of command interacting with the system. It is useful
not only to understand the players with respect to the actual system, but also with the
architecture itself. Many times this product has few, if any, direct links to other products;
however, it is a valuable perspective of the organizational environment in which the system
is designed, acquired and operated.
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Figure 3.6

OV-4 - Template

OV-5 - Operational Activity Model. The OV-5 describes the operations that
are normally conducted in the course of achieving a mission or a business goal. It
describes capabilities, operational activities (or tasks), input and output (I/O) flows
between activities, and I/O flows to/from activities that are outside the scope of the
architecture [24:4-31].

Figure 3.7

OV-5 - Template

This product shows the functional interaction of the system. It gives insight into
what the system, and its subsystems, takes in as inputs and controls, and what mechanisms
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it uses to produce outputs. This product is produced in hierarchical form, meaning that
each view can be decomposed into children views to show sub function interaction. The
product is represented in either its hierarchal form or its flow diagram form in which the
inputs, controls, outputs, and mechanisms (ICOMs) show their interaction. This product
is important for original capability decomposition, and also in understanding how the sub
functions and activities interact. For this research, the language IDEF0 was used to create
this product. Many times the ICOMs serve as a basis for system requirements generation.

Figure 3.8

ICOM Notation

Figure 3.8 shows the standard notation for using ICOMs in an operational Activity
Model. Inputs are depicted as entering the function box from the left, Controls entering
from the top, outputs exiting the function and going to the right, and mechanisms entering
the function from the bottom. ICOMS that enter or exit the function box at one level
should also appear on any higher or lower level decomposition of that function. For cases
where readability is an issue and a certain ICOM is not required for understanding at
another level, it may be tunneled. This is indicated by parentheses placed around the head
(entering) or tail (exiting) ICOM to be tunneled.

3-14

OV-6C - Operational Event Trace Description. The OV-6C provides a timeordered examination of the information exchanges between participating operational
nodes as a result of a particular scenario. Each event-trace diagram should have an
accompanying description that defines the particular scenario or situation [24:4-55]. It
essentially takes the major nodes from the OV-2 and turns them into swim lanes within
which the actions of the scenarios are played out.

Figure 3.9

OV-6c - IDEF3 Example

The purpose of the OV-6C is to show the critical path(s) through a given scenario.
While in other products the connector lines many times represent communication, info, or
needlines, in this view they are only precedent links that allow subsequent tasks to take
place. Junctions are also used to illustrate alternated paths. Each action is also traced to
functions on the OV-5. Once this product is made, it is easy to validate each action in the
OV-6 with a function from the OV-5. For this research, the language IDEF3 was used to
create this product.
OV-7 - Logical Data Model. The OV-7 describes the structure of an architecture
domain’s system data types and the structural business process rules (defined in the
architecture’s Operational View) that govern the system data. It provides a definition
of architecture domain data types, their attributes or characteristics, and their interrelationships [24:4-62]. While not a specifically required product for the CDD per CJCSM
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3170, the OV-7 is included because of its importance to any system design effort where
software is involved.
The system’s ICOM’s, found in the OV-5, are represented in the OV-7 as either
individual data types, or as attributes within other data types. The OV-7 can be used by the
software development effort, therefore the diagram deals in what types and links of data
must be present for the system to operate. The developers can then use this information
to develop the actual programming and coding of the software portion of the system. For
this research, the language IDEF1x was used to create this product.
Relationships represented in an OV-7 serve to show how one data entity, or data
package, depends on other packages. Attributes in some packages are required by other
packages to identify a specific instantiation of the data. These identifying attributes are
called primary keys. When a data package depends on another package, the primary key
is translated to the depending package as a primary foreign key.

Figure 3.10

OV-7 - Template

There are also relationships of a hierarchical nature, where data packages linked to a
higher-level package contain all of the attributes of the higher package with the addition of
one specifically listed in the lower-level packages. This relationship is represented as the
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lower-level packages bracketing into a circle with a short line over it and a line out of this
symbol goes to the higher-level package. Any relationships to the higher-level package
automatically exist to the lower-level packages.
Required attributes are shown in bold. Multiplicity of certain data packages are
labeled on the relationship links. They indicate the acceptable number of instantiations of
the data package that the relationship supports.
SV-1 - Systems Interface Description. The SV-1 depicts systems nodes and the
systems resident at these nodes to support organizations and/or human roles represented
by operational nodes of the Operational Node Connectivity Description (OV-2). SV-1
also identifies the interfaces between systems and systems nodes [24:5-1]. As the first
product within the systems view, the SV-1 is important because it begins the process of
forming the operational view of the system into an actual physical system. Operational
nodes and activities from the operational view are translated and transformed into systems
and system functions. The SV-1 begins that process through its assignment of system
functional responsibility among the nodes and interfaces.
Several versions of the System Interface Description, as shown in Figures 3.11
through 3.14, can be developed to show various levels of detail for the system under
design. The SV-1 may represent the internodal view of the system showing node to node

Figure 3.11

SV-1a - Internodal Template Showing Node Interfaces

interfaces (Figure 3.11), system to system interfaces (Figure 3.12), interfaces within each
node (Figure 3.13), or an intrasystem view showing hardware and software items within
3-17

Figure 3.12

SV-1b - Internodal Template Showing System Interfaces

Figure 3.13

SV-1c - Intranodal Template

each node (Figure 3.14). While the DoDAF does not distinguish between the various
versions other than by name, for the purposes of this thesis, they will be referred to as an
SV-1a, SV-1b, SV-1c and SV-1d respectively.
The SV-1a provides a generic internodal view that illustrates node to node interfaces.
The applicable systems that make up each node are shown but the system-to-system
interfaces are withheld. Additional information, such as system functions, can also be
included in each of the nodes should the architect find this information useful in clarifying
the view. The SV-1b expands on the SV-1a by providing the interfaces from the node
boundaries to each system contained therein. The intranodal version, or SV-1c, provides
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Figure 3.14

SV-1d - Intrasystem Example

a detailed look at each node by showing interfaces between systems within the nodal
boundaries and can include references to each system if desired. Finally, the SV-1d
intrasystem view shows systems hardware and software that interface within each node
and provides a more detailed view that begins to resemble a physical system.
SV-4 - Systems Functionality Description. The SV-4 documents system functional
hierarchies, system functions and the system data flows between them. Although there is
a correlation between the Operational Activity Model (OV-5) and the system functional

Figure 3.15

SV-4 - Template (Data Flow Diagram)

hierarchy of SV-4, it need not be a one-to-one mapping, hence, the need for the Operational
Activity to Systems Function Traceability Matrix (SV-5), which provides that mapping
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[24:5-25]. In the way that the OV-5 decomposed and related its activities in the operational
view, the SV-4 takes the system functions from the SV-1 and decomposes and relates them.
One difference between the OV-5 and SV-4 is that the former looks at the entire system’s
activities, while the latter’s primary focus is on data exchange.
The view takes one more step in the systems view to assigning functional responsibilities to systems and subsystems. The data that moves between SV-4 functions are more
exact in nature than were found in the operational view. These data links are described
in much detail in the Systems Data Exchange Matrix (SV-6), and will be ultimately used
in the actual design of subsystem interface specifications. Similar to the OV-5, the SV-4
is also hierarchal, so each function can be broken down into its children views. In other
words, unlike the OV-5 where ICOMs enter and leave views without reference to their
origin or destinations, the SV-4 shows the data exchange lines coming from or going to
their external systems or other subsystem functions.
SV-5 - Operational Activity to Systems Function Traceability Matrix. The SV5 provides a specification of the relationships between the set of operational activities

Figure 3.16

SV-5 - Template
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applicable to an architecture and the set of system functions applicable to that architecture
[24:5-35]. This product is useful in ensuring the architecture’s traceability. It serves as a
feedback mechanism to the original requirements and provides a link between the OV-5
and SV-4 products. It is important to ensure that the activities designed in the operational
view are accounted for in the system view in some form of function. This also helps justify
why system functions are present in the system view and to determine any unwarranted
functions.
SV-6 - Systems Data Exchange Matrix. The SV-6 specifies the characteristics
of the system data exchanged between systems and focuses on automated information
exchanges (from OV-3) that are implemented in systems. Non-automated information
exchanges, such as verbal orders, are captured in the OV products only [24:5-41]. This
product gives a great deal of detail about the data exchanges that have been designed in
the system view. This matrix accounts for all of them and will serve as a link to the
technical standards view when actual subsystem and component interface descriptions are
determined.
As with the OV-3 Operational Exchange Matrix, the column headings are generally
tailored to the specific system type being modeled. For this research the column headings
with their meanings as defined by DoDAF [24] have been provided in Appendix N.
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IV. Results
This chapter begins with an analysis of the three mission scenarios (over-the-hill
reconnaissance, battle damage information and local area defense), focusing on the entry
conditions and a typical mission profile for each scenario. Following the mission scenario
analysis are the traceability results that seek to tie the missions, and ensuing architectures,
to specific Air Force tasks. Inherent with the identified tasks are associated measures that
can be used to determine the degree to which MAVs accomplish those tasks. Additionally,
the aforementioned scenarios have potential ties to the Joint Functional Concepts (JFC).
While traceability to JFCs was not performed for this project, the act of performing this
additional analysis can provide additional insights into areas where the use of MAVs
would prove valuable. Chapter III presented the generic format for the Department of
Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) products whereas this chapter presents the
architectural products developed for the ISR MAV. A discussion on the impacts MAVs
have on doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership/education, personnel and
facilities (DOTMLPF) is then presented followed by an examination of future MAV
capabilities related to technology and operational use as constrained by the scope and
architectures used to define ISR MAVs.

4.1

Operational Scenarios
Three operational scenarios were developed that are related to both the applicable

special operations forces core tasks and capability deficiencies outlined in Sections 2.1.2
and 2.1.3. A description of each operational scenario is provided that includes entry
conditions and pertinent information regarding key operational aspects of the employment
of MAVs and their ability to provide unit-level, close proximity, actionable intelligence.
From these scenarios, a list of requirements can begin to be formulated. However,
the MAV architecture provides for more in-depth requirements analysis and refinement.
While this analysis was not specifically performed, a brief discussion of the merits of
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using architectures to develop and refine requirements and their associated measures will
be provided in Chapter V.
4.1.1

Over-the-Hill Reconnaissance.

In this mission, the MAV enhances a

special operations team’s situational awareness of their immediate surroundings. The setup for this mission assumes that a small friendly force is on a patrol mission into uncleared
territory. The patrol moves to a specific location without full advance intelligence of the
area they are moving through. The mission scenario also includes the team reaching their
objective location and performing surveillance while concealed.
The entry condition to this scenario starts with a friendly team members’ decision
to obtain local area reconnaissance above the team’s current location or areas they are
moving into. The MAV is at hand and is launched after its prep time. It is flown either
manually or automatically using a looping area search pattern above the team’s location
(or slightly ahead of the team). The operator observes the video feedback from the MAV
thus enhancing the team’s situational awareness. Should the operator observe an enemy
presence, the video feed with accompanying geo-location information can be relayed to
those requiring the information to possibly attack the enemy location. The decision to
relay this information is purely up to operator discretion (i.e. not an automatic link). A
similar use of the MAV occurs once reaching their objective location and the team decides
to better observe their target.
Throughout the flight time of the MAV, the video feedback should enable operating
personnel a suitable level of target discrimination to positively identify key characteristics
of enemy and their equipment. Examples might be discriminating between major objects,
vehicles, buildings, and weapon systems. Once the MAV obtains sufficient information
in the team’s general vicinity, or the MAV limits are reached, the operator can either
return the MAV to the base or choose to continue loitering the MAV until complete power
failure (i.e. expend the MAV). Assuming the MAV returns and is recovered, the SOF team
refuels/recharges the MAV for immediate further flights or stores the MAV for travel.
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4.1.2

Battle Damage Information.

In this mission, the MAV is used to gather

battle damage information following an attack on an enemy location. The set-up for this
mission assumes that a friendly force patrol already knows the location of an enemy and
has already launched or is currently launching a strike on the enemy. The strike could be a
called-in air strike, a called-in artillery attack, or a direct attack from their current location.
The team is close enough to the enemy location that the MAV is within range.
The entry condition to this scenario starts with a friendly team member’s decision
to obtain Battle Damage Information (BDI) on the enemy location already attacked or
currently under attack. The MAV is at hand and is launched after its initialization
sequence. It is flown either manually or automatically to the attack sight based on enemy
location information. Once in the general vicinity of the enemy location, the MAV
begins an observation pattern over the enemy location (either manually or automatically
controlled). The video feedback from the MAV provides BDI from which the operator
may determine the need to change MAV system parameters to gain more use BDI. The
video feed with accompanying geo-location information is then relayed to those requiring
the information to possibly complete the mission or plan further attack of the enemy
location.
Throughout the flight time of the MAV, the video feedback should be such that
operating personnel can positively identify the enemy and major objects, cars, buildings,
large weapons, etc. Once sufficient BDI is obtained on the enemy location and/or the
MAV has reached its limits, the operator can either return the MAV to the base or choose
to continue loitering the MAV until complete power failure (i.e. expend the MAV).
4.1.3

Local Area Defense.

In this mission, the MAV is used to augment the

Local Area Defense (LAD) mission by providing near immediate airborne intelligence to
the security personnel. The set-up for the mission assumes a fortified position for friendly
forces that is currently guarded by traditional security forces. The position may be near
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populated areas and it may also be near terrain and vegetation which limits the line of
sight capabilities of the security personnel.
The entry condition to this scenario starts with a ground attack launched against
a friendly location or base. Determining where the attack is launched from could be
accomplished either by visible reports or roughly calculating the direction of enemy fire.
The operator then uses this information to initialize and load the MAV flight parameters
or they operate the MAV manually which may enable a quicker launch. The operator
then deploys the MAV and monitors the video stream on the display device. While
deployed, the operator can change the MAVs route by changing navigational waypoints or
command the MAV to return to a pre-defined landing zone. Once in the general vicinity
of the suspected enemy location, the video feedback from the MAV allows the operator
to conduct a visual search for the enemy or threat which may be mobile or stationary,
concealed or exposed. The MAV operator continues to track the enemy position until the
threat is eliminated, the MAV has expended its fuel, or the MAV is beyond its transmitting
range. While available, the video feed, with accompanying geo-location information, is
then used by the appropriate security personnel to launch an attack from the compound or
to plan a later attack on the enemy’s hiding place.
Throughout the flight time of the MAV, the video feedback should be such that the
LAD personnel can positively identify the enemy. Once sufficient information has been
obtained on the enemy location and/or the MAV has reached its limits, the operator can
either return the MAV to the base or choose to continue loitering the MAV until complete
power failure (i.e. expend the MAV).

4.2

MAV Traceability
The purpose of traceability in design is to ensure that the system being designed to

fill an identified capability gap can be traced back to the tasks relevant to the systems
operational concepts and scenarios.

Additionally, traceability is an integral part of

the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and the integrated
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architectures produced to answer the gap. As such, the capability gap initiates the
JCIDS process and ensuing traceability analysis. Two primary parts of the JCIDS process
pertinent to this thesis were the creation of an ISR MAV integrated architecture and the
performance of traceability analysis related to the previously discussed mission scenarios.
However, traceability typically occurs before a solution has been chosen which was not the
case for this effort since MAVs were identified up front as the solution to the tactical ISR
capability gap. Therefore, a quick discussion of the differences between current UAVs and
MAVs is provided which is followed by a discussion of the traceability analysis as related
to the Air Force Task List (AFTL) and special operations core tasks.
What is driving all of the development effort behind MAVs? They surely are not
more capable than their larger brothers; they have shorter mission endurance and they
can not carry the quantity or the quality of sensors that the larger aircraft can. The
allure of MAVs lies in their small operational and logistic footprints and potential for
high availability.
A quick comparison of several important parameters of currently operating UAVs is
presented in Figure 4.1 provides. The larger UAVs such as the Global Hawk and Predator
are more suited to long endurance missions requiring multiple sensors. These are mainly

Figure 4.1

UAV Specification Comparison

used for battlefield-level surveillance and reconnaissance. However, these have a very
large logistic footprint requiring fixed landing fields and dedicated operators [6] [5]. As
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UAVs get smaller, their performance and endurance capabilities are drastically decreased
when compared to their larger brothers. However, the advantage is that these smaller
UAVs are carried into the field with the unit. The term man-packable is pushed to its
limits with the Pointer system as it requires a vehicle for transportation into the theater
and two soldiers carrying 50 lb packs when the unit is on foot. Availability for the Pointer
is medium since their usage is limited to specialized units. The only mini/micro UAV in
the group is the generic MAV. It performs much the same mission as the Pointer; however,
it sacrifices mission endurance to gain extremely small size, light weight and affordability.
All of the previously mentioned systems perform an ISR mission for their users. The
fact that different users have different requirements gives rise to a UAV family of systems.
The DoD currently has the capability to perform battlefield level surveillance with the two
larger platforms. The Pointer system was a start at miniaturizing UAV technologies to
allow individual units to perform tactical surveillance and reconnaissance. However, the
large size of the system and the extensive set-up and tear-down time made it unsuitable for
quick reaction missions. The need for the SOF team is to have a quick reaction system to
gather tactical surveillance and reconnaissance within an operationally significant range
that does not require the team to give up other mission essential equipment. Therefore,
MAVs provide a viable concept that can feel the aforementioned need.
As discussed earlier, traceability begins prior to selecting the concept or alternative
to answer the capability gap. Traceability, as shown in Figure 4.2, ties the scenarios
that describe the capability gap, to both the organizations that perform the missions
and the applicable tasks as defined in the AFTL. The US Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) has a wide range of mission areas; however, two core tasks (mission
areas) match closely with the three missions discussed in this paper. Counter-Terrorism
addresses both the MAV reconnaissance and local area defense missions.

Special

reconnaissance ties into the previous two missions and adds the battle damage information
mission. Two primary tasks and several specific sub-tasks were selected from the AFTL
which relate to the three mission areas. Once this portion of the traceability is completed,
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Figure 4.2

Mission/Scenario to Air Force Task Traceability

some of the (abreviated list of) measures provided in the AFTL and shown in Table
4.1 can be used as discriminators to determine which alternative concept best fills the
gap. Remember that MAVs were provided as the solution to fill the gap which in
essence eliminated the need to perform Functional Area Analysis (FAA), Functional
Needs Analysis (FNA), and Functional Solution Analysis (FSA) as well as an Analysis
of Alternatives (AoA).
Following the selection of a concept (or system) to fill the capability gap, an
integrated architecture is produced. The architecture, along with the mission scenarios,
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Table 4.1
Task
AFT 3.1.1.1.1 Perform
Intelligence Activities

AFTL Measures [40:103-104]

Criterion
Time

Percent

AFT 3.1.1.1.2 Perform
Surveillance

Cost
Time

Percent

AFT 3.1.1.1.3 Perform
Reconnaissance

Cost
Time

Percent

Cost

Measure
To conduct adequate, timely, and reliable
intelligence activities for the USAF and
other agencies.
Of accuracy to which adversary COGs are
identified to accomplish predetermined
objectives.
To Perform tactical intelligence activities.
To systematically observe air, or surface
areas, places, persons, or things by visual,
aural, electronic, photographic, or other
means.
Of accruacy to which air or surface areas,
places, persons, or things can be observed
by visual, aural, electronic, photographic,
or other means.
To perform surveillance.
To obtain, by visual observation or other
detection methods, specific information
about the activities and resources of an
adversary or potential adversary.
Of accuracy to which specific information
about the activities and resources of
an adversary or potential adversary is
obtained.
To perform reconnaissance.

is then be used to develop system requirements. Requirements generated from the initial
ISR MAV architecture will allow the discipline or test engineers the ability to define
the measures needed to evaluate system performance which ultimately ties back to the
ability to fill the capability gap. The ISR MAV architecture requirements will also be
classified into either functional, system, or derived requirements. Once the requirements
are established, measures of effectiveness (MOE) relating to requirements provide a means
for determining the operational effectiveness and suitability of the system. These toplevel measures also embody characteristics such as being quantitative, mission-oriented,
and testable (objectively or subjectively). Traceability, for the purposes of this project,
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was focused on creating the links between scenarios and tasks, and scenarios and the
user organizational structure. Additionally, the architecture provides the groundwork for
identifying and refining system level requirements and their associated MOEs.

4.3

Current ISR MAV Architecture
The following subsections discuss the architectural products that describe an ISR

MAV system in its current state. Each subsection introduces the specific product and
provides its respective diagrams and/or descriptive texts. Areas of note will be highlighted
to help understand each view. A fully expanded version of each product and their
respective integrated dictionaries may be found in the appendices.
4.3.1

AV-1 Overview and Summary Information.

This architectural product

gives the top-level information required to understand the background, purpose, and scope
of the entire architecture. Since it is text-based and relatively short in length, it has been
included here in its entirety. It is also shown in Appendix C.
AV-1: Overview and Summary Information for ISR MAV (AS-IS)
1. Identification
Name: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Micro/Mini Aerial Vehicle (AS-IS)
Short Name: ISR MAV (AS-IS) Architecture
Involved Organizations:
AFRL/MN; Munitions Directorate
AFRL/HE; Human Effectiveness Directorate
ASC/AAP; Aeronautical Enterprise Program Office, System Program Office (SPO)
AFIT/ENY-GSE; USAF Graduate Systems Engineering program; architecture developers.
Date: This version targets the FY05 timeframe. The period for the development of this
version of the architecture was August 2004 to March 2005.
2. Background: Currently, no integrated architecture exists to define the use of the
emerging field of MAVs within the Department of Defense or the US Air Force. MAVs
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are rapidly emerging as a productive subset of the larger category of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAV). They are loosely defined as being small enough in size and weight to be
man-packable for use in austere operational environments by Special Forces personnel.
The MAV’s size and ease of testability allows for rapid development and modification of
design and application.
This architecture is an AS-IS representation of a generic ISR-focused MAV. This
baseline architecture is used to understand the system, track changes to any fielded
systems, and to determine future capability shortfalls that should be addressed.
3.

Purpose: This ISR MAV architecture provides a baseline for the current

capabilities of operational ISR MAVs. The purpose of this version of the architecture
(FY05) is detailed in Table 4.2 below.
4. Scope: The products associated with this architecture depict the AS-IS state
of a generic ISR MAV system. This architecture includes the infrastructure and systems
needed to operate an ISR MAV by US military personnel.
5. Time Frame: The architecture depicts the weapon system in its current state and
certain evolutions expected to be implemented through FY05.
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Table 4.2
Architecture Purpose
Describe a generic
ISR MAV system as a
baseline to fully map
the necessary interfaces
needed to describe the
ISR MAV mission
Support
the
development
of
an ISR MAV Full
Scale
Production
Contract and serve as
a maintained, authoritative decision making
tool after contract
award
Support the design
of tailored ISR MAV
implementations
Provide
traceability
of
requirements
to
architecture
components
Support
the
development of future
test plans
Identify modernization
opportunities

Support
future
acquisition
activities
by contributing to the
refinement of ISR
MAV
requirements
helping identify areas
for modernization
Be an integral part of
the larger ISR and/or
UAV architectures

Architecture Purposes

Architecture Product Implications
Architectural elements are documented that are
common to the ISR MAV mission and can be used
to fully understand the system’s boundaries and
interfaces. Specifically the OV-2, OV-5, and SV-1
depict these interfaces.
Information must be accurate and authoritative.
Products were built with the idea in mind that the
future changes to the mission profile and integrating
advanced technology will need to be reflected in the
baseline architectures prior to implementation

The generic architecture should be extensible to
reflect C2 node or site specific variations of ISR
MAVs without losing linkage and consistency with
the baseline architecture products
To be meaningful, the granularity of the architectural
elements should be small

OV-2, OV-3, SV-1 and SV-6 will aid in determining
system connectivity and interoperability requirements
Certain architecture elements are candidates
for replacement, re-engineering, or additional
capabilities as discussed in the accompanying future
capabilities discussion
Requires significant granularity across a variety of
OV and SV products

Use of same or interoperable toolsets, terminology,
and supporting architecture databases where available
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4.3.2

AV-2 Integrated Dictionaries.

While the Integrated Dictionary can be

represented as a stand-alone product, describing the rest of the architecture in only text,
here it is broken into its respective products. Each product presented in the architecture has
an accompanying AV-2 following it to describe in detail each of the objects, connections,
and other representation of each product. DoDAF provides a basic template for each
product’s AV-2 which was tailored to fit the scope of the ISR MAV architecture. At
a minimum, every representation in a product has an accompanying description, type,
and reference to which other views include it. In this way, many basic questions in
understanding the products and what their elements represent can be answered by referring
to the respective AV-2 in the appendix.
4.3.3

OV-1 High-Level Operational Concept.

Creating the architectures for

each of the previously discussed scenarios begins with the creation of the high-level
operational concept graphic (OV-1) and its associated text description. The over-thehill reconnaissance and battle damage information (BDI) missions were combined due
to the close relationship between these missions and are shown in Figure 4.3. To perform

Figure 4.3

OV-1 for the OTHISR and BDI Scenario
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BDI with the MAV system, a potential target’s location must be known and be within the
MAV’s sensor range. The two MAV nodes shown in the graphic are the combat controller
(or the friendly ground unit in subsequent views) and the MAV (or aerial vehicle). External
systems consist of GPS satellites, the air operations center (AOC) (or headquarters in
subsequent views), and strike assets. In addition to providing internal and external nodes,
the graphic provides a vision of node connectivity and a top-level view for how the MAV
system operates.
The OV-1 for the LAD scenario (Figure 4.4) looks very similar to the over-the-hill
reconnaissance and BDI scenarios with the exception of how the user utilizes the MAV

Figure 4.4

OV-1 for the LAD Scenario

system. All three scenarios require the MAV system to provide information which can
be used to provide better situational awareness for the ground unit and/or to aid in the
engagement of threats and ensuing assessment of the engagements. However, in the overthe-hill reconnaissance and BDI scenarios, concealment was paramount for the ground
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unit. In the LAD scenario, the enemy is attacking a known location or local area which
drives the requirement to quickly obtain information pertaining to the threat.
4.3.4

OV-2 Operational Node Connectivity.

The OV-2 depicts operational nodes

(internal and external) and needlines in order to show a need to exchange information.
Since there is only a single needline between two nodes it can contain many different
types and formats of information. The Operational Information Exchange Matrix (OV3) presented later, breaks apart the different types of information within each needline.
An OV-2 diagram was produced for each of the three operating scenarios and these three
diagrams were then compiled into a Consolidated OV-2 which reflects and integrates all
of the scenarios.
Over-the-Hill Reconnaissance OV-2: The first OV-2 Figure, 4.5, is based on the
over-the-hill reconnaissance scenario. From the scenario, two internal operational nodes
can be picked out based on relative operational function or activity. The Special Ops Unit

Figure 4.5

OV-2 for the Over-the-Hill Reconnaissance Scenario
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node comprises all operations needing to be performed on the ground. This is also referred
to as the ground aspect of the system and includes the operator/user. The MAV node,
however, is referred to as the air aspect of the system thus containing all operations needed
to be done while in flight. These two nodes need to be able to communicate so the operator
can control the airborne node as well as retrieve reconnaissance data from it, hence the
needline Request/Commands, Platform and Human Interface. Based on the scenario, there
are also three external nodes. The first external node, Headquarters, consists of the Special
Ops Units higher headquarters which distributes intelligence, mission tasks, and receives
reconnaissance information once gathered. The second external node, Strike Assets, has
the option to either receive or relay last known enemy positions with the Special Ops Unit.
By receiving the enemy positions the Strike Assets are provided the information needed
to strike the target. In contrast, the Strike Assets are able to send enemy positions to the
Special Ops Unit, thereby increasing the situational awareness of the unit and easing their
reconnaissance operations. The third external node, GPS Satellites, provides the MAV with
navigation data so that both the Special Ops Unit and MAV know where it is located. Note
that the figure helps illustrate these information exchanges through the use of needlines.
Battle Damage Information OV-2: Figure 4.6 is based on the battle damage
information scenario. From the scenario similar internal and external operational nodes
and needlines can be picked out based on the same logic as in the Over-the-Hill
Reconnaissance OV-2. Although similar to the preceding scenario it is important to see
the different information needs (needlines) required by two of the three external nodes
(there was no change with the GPS Satellite node). The Headquarters node consists of
the Friendly Ground Units higher headquarters which places a request for battle damage
information and receives the information once it has been collected. The other change was
in the Strike Assets node which also has the option to request battle damage information,
relay strike status (when scheduled or if it has already occurred), and receive general
feedback on the information gathered.

4-15

Figure 4.6

OV-2 for the Battle Damage Information Scenario

Local Area Defense OV-2: Figure 4.7 is based on the local area defense scenario.
Again, from this scenario similar internal and external operational nodes and needlines
were picked out based on the same logic as in the preceding two scenarios. Unlike the
previous scenarios the need for Strike Assets was not identified. The only other distinct
difference is that the previously discussed Headquarters node was identified as Local
Commander / Headquarters which consists of the Friendly Ground Units commanding
officer or higher headquarters which will receive enemy ground positions once collected.
Scenario Consolidation OV-2: The consolidated OV-2 takes all nodes and
needlines from the three scenarios and compiles them such that all scenarios map to a
single OV-2. Figure 4.8 shows the result of the consolidation. Two internal nodes represent
the ground aspect of the system (Friendly Ground Unit) as well as the airborne part (MAV).
A total of three external nodes are identified in the scenarios and are reflected in this
consolidation: (Headquarters, Strike Assets, and GPS Satellites). However, one external
node was not identified in the scenarios (Maintenance Depot) and was added after the OV-
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Figure 4.7

OV-2 for the Local Area Defense Scenario

5 operational activity model identified a need for external or non-field level maintenance.
This new node handles all maintenance that can not be performed by the operator in the
field.
The different needlines have been compiled into generally named needlines. For
example, all needlines shown between the Friendly Ground Unit or Special Ops Unit
and Strike Assets have been compiled into Communicate with Local Strike Assets. With
the addition of the Maintenance Depot external node a new needline not shown in
the scenarios was drawn to the Friendly Ground Unit. This needline, labeled System
Maintenance Needed/Requested, covers the operator requesting maintenance that cannot
be performed in the field and the maintenance personnel acknowledging when the system
has been repaired.
Throughout the rest of the architecture development (from here forward) all
products are based on the consolidated mission areas. The capability of the MAV in three
mission areas will be collectively described as an ISR MAV.
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Figure 4.8
4.3.5

Consolidated OV-2 (reflecting all scenarios)

OV-3 Operational Information Exchange Matrix.

The OV-3 Operational

Information Exchange Matrix aids in the integration and definition of information
exchanges throughout all operational view products. Essentially, it identifies who is
involved, why the information is necessary, and how it is exchanged. Another way to
look at this product is that it takes information elements, needlines, nodes, activities, and
events from other operational views as well as their corresponding AV-2 dictionaries and
correlates them into a matrix. Due to this integration there is no need for an AV-2 to be
produced for this view for it would be redundant to the matrix.
As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, the OV-3 matrix, as with any defined matrix, is
a set of rows and columns where their intersections contain information. The rows
contain all information contained within a particular information exchange. The columns
show specific information based on the columns heading. Due to the scope and goal
of this research only certain columns will contain data; those shaded columns (i.e. blank
columns) have been left for anyone who wishes to expand on this research (i.e. if applied to
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a specific application). For particular information regarding the rows or column headings
and their contents, refer to the OV-3 matrix figures located within Appendix F (total of 5
figures).
4.3.6

OV-4 Organization Relationships Chart.

This product illustrates the

command structure or relationships among human roles, organizations, or organization
types that are the key players in an architecture [24:4-27]. Figure 4.9 represents the ideal
steady-state use and interaction of the organizations required to produce an ISR MAV
capability. This is how a generic ISR MAV organizational relationship could look.

Figure 4.9

OV-4 Organizational Relationships Chart

Many influences come to bear on how organizations actually are formed and work:
existing organizational structure, politics, command influence, applications of various
organizational theory, etc. This OV-4 was designed on an ideal concept of functional
organizations and their logical interaction with one another in an acquisitions and logistics
environment. In cases of rapid spiral development, working groups and contingency
operations, this ideal could be changed dramatically.
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The ISR MAV OV-4 shows the three main communities that interact - the
developers, the sustainers and the operators. These are shown as the MAV Lab, the MAV
System Program Office (SPO), and the branches of the Special Operations community
respectively.
Other than the two main commands (AF Materiel Command and AF Special
Operations Command), the rest of the organizations and human roles are generically
represented (or named). This was done to allow the architecture to be extensible; able
to be tailored to specific purposes of the generic ISR MAV.
The MAV Lab is responsible for transitioning the technology to the MAV SPO and,
in return, the MAV SPO provides feedback and direction towards future spiral designs
of the MAV. The MAV SPO is then responsible to the operator community to sustain the
MAVs, and in return the operators will provide feedback to the SPO on issues they are
having with the current MAV as well as relay capability requirements.
The MAV Lab and the MAV SPO have similar setups due to the fact that many
of the same technical and program related functions must occur in both development
and sustainment. In development, the organizations are dedicated to integration, test and
research. However, in the SPO where the system is relatively stable, an organization for
logistics management is needed. It is likely, though not required, that contractor support
provided for the development of the ISR MAV plays an important role in the production
contracts as well.
In this construct of the steady state MAV organization, the Special Forces teams
may not interface directly with the SPO for support. They will work through their mission
support function within their command, who would then work with the SPO on and
technical/support issues.
4.3.7

OV-5 Operational Activity Model.

The Operational Activity Model (OV-

5) is a functional decomposition of the system tasks consisting of inputs, controls, outputs
and mechanisms (ICOM). Figure 4.10 is the A minus One, or external systems diagram
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which sets the stage for how the system interacts with its environment as well as where

Figure 4.10

OV-5 External Systems Diagram

the system receives and sends information. The primary function of the system is to
Provide ISR Capabilities as shown in box A0. The system requires a Tasking from either
headquarters/local commander or a strike asset. To accomplish this mission, the system
requires Operational MAVs from the maintenance depot and the Navigation Data provided
by the GPS satellites. Using these elements, the system performs its mission and provides
Fused Target Information as an output to the command and control infrastructure or the
local strike assets. The last line is Repairs Required. External system repairs are necessary
only if something inside the system boundary cannot be repaired in the field.
Next in the decomposition (Figure 4.11) is the A minus Zero or context diagram.
This shows all inputs, outputs, controls and mechanisms (ICOM) for the system. The
system inputs and outputs were discussed previously, but we have new information
regarding the mechanisms and controls for the system.

Flight rules or Airspace

Deconfliction consists of any external influences such as weather, local radio traffic,
proximity to other operating units, etc that have an influence on how or when the MAV is
used. Mission Operating Procedures are any other limitations or guidelines imposed by
4-21

Figure 4.11

OV-5 Context Diagram

the particular mission type. As for the mechanisms, the MAV system requires operational
MAVs, the ground station and the human operator. The parenthesis around the head of the
arrow in the diagram represents that this line is going to be tunneled and will not appear
in subsequent decompositions.
The primary system decomposition, shown in Figure 4.12, is the first diagram
breaking down the particular aspects of how the system will do its job. Shown here
are the inputs and outputs previously discussed, as well as the five primary functions of
the MAV system: Provides Information Processing, Enable Launch MAV, Provides ISR
MAV Platform, Enable Launch/Recover MAV and Provide Field Level Maintenance. The
decompositions for these components follow the A0 diagram. Full descriptions for each
data block and flow line can be found in the AV2 Integrated Dictionary for the OV5 in
Appendix H.

4-22

Figure 4.12
4.3.8

OV-5 Level A0

OV-6C Operational Event Trace Description.

This architectural product

shows a time-ordered view of the actions occurring within the operational nodes of the
system based on a given scenario. This scenario serves as the operational event trace
description and guides the development of the operational event trace diagram.
Operational Scenario (Operational Event Trace Description) The entry
condition to this consolidated scenario, shown in Figure 4.13, starts with a mission
being directed or already in progress [mission directed, 1.1]. A friendly team member
decides to utilize the MAV system to obtain ISR info (decision to launch, 1.2). The
MAV is at hand and is launched after its prep time (system initialized, 1.5, GPS synch
implied, 1.4, 1.3, MAV ready for launch, 1.6, launch MAV, 1.7). The MAV performs the
mission programmed into it during system initialization (perform mission profile, 1.9).
The operator can also update the mission profile or fly it manually (update mission profile,
1.8). The operator observes the sensor feedback from the MAV and reacts accordingly
(collect sensor info, 1.12, transmit sensor info, 1.16, receive sensor info, 1.11, process
info, 1.14, additional mission profile updates, 1.8). If required or necessary, the collected
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ISR info from the MAV may be relayed to a local commander/headquarters or to strike

Figure 4.13

OV-6c Operational Event Trace Description

assets (transmit ISR info, 1.17, receive ISR info, 1.18, 1.19). The decision to relay this
information is left to the operator. Once sufficient ISR information is obtained or the
MAV has reached its limits, the operator can either return the MAV to the base (direct land
sequence, 1.10, perform land sequence, 1.13, recover MAV, 1.15) or choose to continue
loitering the MAV until complete power failure; expending the MAV.
Using this scenario, all units of behavior (or actions) were assigned to the
responsible operational nodes (or swimlanes) and sequencing was added to the diagram.
The references to these actions were then added back into the operational event trace
description. This way the diagram and description are linked and can be used together to
fully represent the scenario.
The flow through the operational event trace diagram is relatively straight forward.
The one alternate path junction, seen in the middle of the diagram, represents the ability
to command the MAV with either new mission profiles, to land, or allow it to perform its
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mission as previously programmed. It should be noted that this diagram is only a timeordered representation of the scenario. It only shows what actions are temporally linked
and dependent upon each other.
4.3.9

OV-7 Logical Data Model.

The logical data model defines the data

domain for a given architecture. Instrumental in creating this model is having access
to a completed operational activity model. The ICOMs from the OV-5 are commonly used
to define data entities or are attributes within another data entity.
The MAV system data model shown in Figure 4.14 revolves around sensor
information, telemetry information, and commands. Additionally, the system requires

Figure 4.14

OV-7 Logical Data Model

GPS satellite lock during all portions of the flight profile for normal operation, however, in
the case that GPS becomes or is not available the system can be manually guided through
the User Commands entity. A status entity is used to capture the various faults that may
occur while using the MAV system.
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Before issuing commands to the air vehicle, a Tasking must exist, and the system
status must be fault free. During system use, the status is continually updated to provide
the operator indications of possible problems. Information sent from the air vehicle is
comprised of raw sensor package data and raw flight telemetry data. These two distinct
pieces are connected to their parent entity known as Raw Data which in turn feeds into the
Fused Target Information entity to produce ISR information.
The view provided by this Logical Data Model is somewhat abstract allowing the
disciplined engineers the flexibility to tailor the entities, either by adding, subtracting or
altering the keys, attributes, or relationships contained within the data model.
4.3.10

SV-1 Systems Interface Description.

This product depicts system nodes,

the systems residing in those system nodes, and the functions performed by those residing
systems. Also identified here are the interfaces between systems.
In order to show the proper amount of detail for an initial baseline architecture, this
research concentrates on the two more detailed versions of the possible four SV-1 versions
identified in section 3.2.3. The versions completed were the SV-1b; internodal depiction
of system-to-system interfaces, and the SV-1c; intranodal depiction of system-to-system
interfaces. Both the SV-1b and the SV-1c views include the functions performed by each
system (with the exception of external systems). The remainder of this section presents
these diagrams and their supporting textual descriptions.
Creation of the SV-1b started with the consolidated OV-2 operational node connectivity diagram (Figure 4.8), where operational nodes became system nodes (shaded circles)
and external nodes became external systems (shaded rectangles outside of the nodes).
The OV-2 diagram establishes the need to communicate between nodes, otherwise known
as needlines. These needlines are used to establish one or more system interfaces in
the SV-1b which are depicted as internal interfaces (solid lines) or external interfaces
(dashed lines). For example, the Platform Communication needline becomes Platform
Interface and Request/Commands, ISR Data interfaces. Interfaces within the SV-1b
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Figure 4.15

SV-1b System-System Interfaces

also correspond to the needline definitions in the OV-2, however, note that the Platform
Communication needline was separated into two interfaces. The Platform Interface
involves any direct contact between the Human Operator and Air Vehicle systems while
the Request/Commands, ISR Data interface includes any communication between the two
system nodes.
The remaining two diagrams are the intranodal versions shown in Figures 4.16 and
4.17 for both the Friendly Ground Unit and MAV system nodes. Although the diagrams
are similar to the SV-1b, the SV-1c shows the interfaces within the system nodes. Since
each interface is defined in the AV-2 dictionary and its purpose is hinted at in the diagrams
above, they will not be described here. The only clarification that will need to be made is
that of the power situation in both system nodes.
Notice in the MAV system node (Figure 4.17) that power is depicted as an interface;
however, in the Friendly Ground Unit node (Figure 4.16) it is not. This is due to the
power (and weight) limitations imposed by the Air Vehicle system. To ensure that the
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Figure 4.16

SV-1c Intranodal Version of the Friendly Ground Unit

Air Vehicle can provide flight all systems within the MAV node need to utilize the power
already provided. If the Air Vehicle cannot provide the power needed then the system
will either be required to find some means to require less power or sacrifice some of its
weight allocation in order to have an internal power supply. Ideally both the Payload
or Sensor Package and MAV Airborne Communication System would use the provided
power supply such that design (or functional) tradeoffs would not have to be made (i.e.
the power supply would take up weight allocation normally allocated by functions). Of
course if these system resident to the MAV node do not require power provided by the Air
Vehicle then this link would not exists. This problem is not addressed within the Friendly
Ground Unit because the weight limitations are a little more relaxed and current hardware
systems being used already come with their own power source. Power will only appear if
the systems within the Friendly Ground Unit are decomposed into subsystems.
Based on Figure 4.16, a total of five systems exist within the Friendly Ground
Unit system node and are depicted as non-shaded rectangles: field communication
system, human-computer interface (HCI), Human Operator, MAV Ground Communi4-28

Figure 4.17

SV-1c Intranodal Version of the MAV

cation System, and Signal/Data Processor. Each system includes a set of functions, where
the system functions define what the system is responsible for. These system functions are
located to the right of the system name in a smaller, italicized font.
The field communication system allows the Human Operator to communicate
gathered ISR information and mission directives with higher Headquarters or Strike
Assets. Examples of such systems include satellite communication radios or a general
purpose field radio.

The Human-Computer Interface includes those items that give

feedback (display, speakers) to the Human Operator as well as those that allow users
to supply input to the system (keyboard, mouse, touch screen, microphone). The Human
Operator is a model of the operator’s role in the system. The operator either affects the
system through direct contact (Platform Interface and Field Communication Interface),
through the HCI system (User Feedback and Inputs Interface), or through the request of
outside maintenance to the Maintenance Depot system. The MAV Ground Communication
System allows all systems within the friendly ground unit to communicate directives with
the airborne systems in the MAV by ensuring that data can be sent to and received from the
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MAV Airborne Communication System. Examples of such hardware equipment include
transmitters, receivers and antennas.

The Signal/Data Processor system processes,

converts, and manipulates data such that the proper data packets can be delivered to the
HCI and the MAV Ground Communication System.
The MAV system node, shown in Figure 4.17, contains three systems that enable the
collection and transmission of ISR data. These systems are also depicted with non-shaded
rectangles within the system node and the system functions are to the right of the system
name.
The Air Vehicle allows other systems within the MAV to operate as airborne
systems. Examples of hardware systems that could perform the system functions are
an aircraft fuselage with wings, autopilot, and propulsion system. The MAV Airborne
Communication System allows airborne systems within the MAV to communicate gathered
data, directives, and status information with the ground systems Friendly Ground Unit
by ensuring that data can be sent to and received from the MAV Ground Communication System. Examples of such hardware equipment include transmitters, receivers and
antennas. The purpose of the Payload or Sensor Package system is to collect and provide
the needed ISR information by utilizing the power source supplied by the Air Vehicle
system. Once the ISR information is obtained, it is sent to the MAV Airborne Communication System for transmission.
4.3.11

SV-4 Systems Functionality Description.

The SV-4 shows the functional

hierarchies and system functions of the ISR MAV. Similar to the OV-5, this product
decomposes the top-level functions and shows their relationships and data exchanges.
This product takes the functions listed in the systems of the SV-1 and shows their interrelationships. The data exchanges are more detailed and are described fully in the SV-6.
While the OV-5 looked at all operational activities of the system, the SV-4 is a data-focused
product; hence the activity of non-field level maintenance was not included.
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The system functional decomposition is shown in Figure 4.18. The primary function
of Providing ISR Capabilities is at the top and is sub-divided into its subsystem functions

Figure 4.18

SV-4 Functional Decomposition

Perform Ground Unit Functions and Perform MAV Functions. From here, the functions
continue to be decomposed until they reach a level that could be assigned to componentlevel design. The following views will show more of the interaction between the sub
functions.
Figure 4.19 shows the top-level interaction of the functions of the system. At this
level of detail, the functions, external systems and data exchanges look very similar to
products in the operational view. That is because at this level, all of the major nodes
and interactions are the same. The true benefits of this product come at the lower levels
of decomposition where specific data exchanges and subfunctions begin to the form the
physical system.
The 0-Level Diagram is decomposed further into levels 1 and 2. Level 1 shows the
break-out of the first major sub-function, Perform Ground Unit Functions. At this level,
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Figure 4.19

SV-4, 0-Level Diagram

many of the functions and interactions are similar to the SV-1c. Level 2 provides the
break-out of the second major sub-function, Perform MAV Functions. The complete set of
functional decomposition diagrams are found in Appendix K. In each diagram, one will
see how the sub-functions interact and the data exchanges are assigned.
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4.3.12

SV-5 Operational Activity to Systems Function Traceability Matrix.

The

SV-5 (Figure 4.20 and 4.21)demonstrates the relationship between operational activities
and system functions to ensure the architecture has traceability (reference Section 3.2.3).
The relationship is rated on support status of the functionality and whether or not the

Figure 4.20

SV-5 page 1

system is fielded. The degree to which a system supports the functionality is defined by
the numerical status code. These status codes are numbered one to three and where there
is no code, a relationship does not exist or is not planned. A status code of one implies full
functionality is provided and the system is fielded. A status of two means the function is
partially provided or fully provided but the system has not yet been fielded. A status code
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of three means functionality is planned but not developed. Status codes were not produced

Figure 4.21

SV-5 page 2

in this research since this is a baseline architecture intended for generic application;
however, the relationships between the operational activities and system functions are
identified. The SV-5 matrices show systems and their system functions related to the
operational activities within a capability and then to the mission capability (in this case the
capability to perform reconnaissance, battle damage information, and local area defense
was used). When this matrix is applied to a particular application, the status codes can
be filled in. This identifies stovepiped systems, redundant/duplicate systems, gaps in
capability, and possible future investment strategies [24].
The systems and system functions used in the SV-5 matrix are pulled from the SV1 systems interface description diagrams while the operational activities and capabilities
are from the OV-5 operational activity model. Not all operational activities are used,
only those lowest level activities are included because, if the low level activity relates
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to a system function, then so does its parent. Essentially, the capabilities are the first
level activities shown in the OV-5. This helps to break down the mission capability while
grouping the activities. Both Figures 4.20 and 4.21 are of the SV-5 traceability matrices
produced for the baseline architecture.
4.3.13

SV-6 Systems Data Exchange Matrix.

The SV-6 Systems Data Exchange

Matrix aids in the integration and definition of system interfaces throughout all system
views. It defines and integrates the system functions involved, data containing elements,
and how data on the interface is exchanged. Normally, this architectural product contains
only automated interfaces, meaning those interfaces that represent machine interaction.
Most of the interfaces within the system views of this research follow this principle;
however, there are four that are considered non-automated. These non-automated links are
included because this is an initial baseline architecture where clarity is essential. These
non-automated interfaces all connect to the Human Operator system and are: Platform
Interface, Field Comm Interface, User Feedback and Inputs, and Maintenance Required.
Just as in the OV-3 operational information exchange matrix, the SV-6 is a matrix
with a set of rows and columns where their intersections contain interface information.
The rows contain all information contained within a particular interface exchange. Since
the relationship between system interfaces and system data exchanges are one-to-many
they are categorized first by the system interface name shown in all versions of the SV1 and then by the system data exchange name which can be SV-6 unique but, in this
case, correlates to the OV-3’s information exchange names. The columns show specific
information based on the column heading. Due to the scope and goal of this research
only certain columns contain data; those shaded columns are left blank for anyone who
wishes to expand on this research (i.e. if applied to a specific application). For particular
information regarding the rows or column headings and their contents, refer to the SV-6
matrix figures located within Appendix N (total of 7 figures).
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4.4

DOTMLPF Considerations
All of the architectural views presented previously refer to the operation of a

material system. Other areas of the ISR MAV system’s operation need consideration
as well. In the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), much
emphasis is given to addressing capability impacts in the areas of doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). These
areas are considered to be outside of the systems physical boundaries; however, they play
a crucial role in the actual capability achieved. As this system architecture is already a
materiel solution to the capability gap identified in Chapter II, this DOTMLPF discussion
will omit the material discussion and assumes it as a given.
4.4.1

Doctrine.

The ISR MAV may have a long term impact on the doctrine of

the ISR community; however, in the near future, the ISR MAV represents another tool for
the special operations forces. The SOF teams will still be employed and be assigned to
missions in the same manner in which they normally are, but the ISR MAV is a new tool
that will enhance their mission effectiveness. Since there is no fundamental change to the
user’s core tasks, the ISR MAV is not likely to affect doctrine in the near future.
4.4.2

Organization.

Organizational impacts may occur in two different levels:

tactical and developmental/sustainment. The changes to the tactical level would be the
decision to make the ISR a dedicated position on the deploying teams, or have every
member become ISR MAV capable. This could lead to ISR MAV specialization within
teams. Then future variants of the MAV would fall that member, however the use of the
MAV would be person dependant. If every member of the team is ISR MAV capable
(trained and equipped) then its use would become more available. This method would
require more assets and likely more repairs due to storage and transport, but it would
make the capability more available when needed.
The other organizational change would require the formation of (if one is not already
present) and development of relationships between a development organization and a
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sustainment organization to handle the ISR MAV. Architectural view OV-4 shows a likely
steady-state view of such organizational relationships.
4.4.3

Training.

Training on the ISR MAV system is necessary in order

to operate it successfully. While many varieties of training delivery can be imagined
(classroom, field, virtual, verbal, written, on-job-training (OJT), etc.) the top-level original
requirement of operable by trained personnel remains.
There are essentially two major systems that an operator must become trained on
and familiar with to operate the system: the ground station, and the MAV. The MAV
is a largely electro-mechanical system and so the operate would need to be trained in
initialization (power on) of the MAV, launch procedures, minor parts-replacement repairs,
recovery of the MAV and storage/transport of the MAV. The ground station is largely
a hardware/software unit and so the operator would need to be trained in initialization
of the system and software program, software navigation, basic/intermediary/advanced
operation of the system through the software program, and storage/transport of the system.
Both systems, as a collective, would require a user to have a basic level of training that
would enable them to initialize the system, program a simple flight plan, launch and
recover the system, and simple manipulation of the data. An intermediate level of training
would include operations such as advanced flight planning, manual flight control, and
advanced data manipulation. The advanced level of training would allow the operator
to manipulate limits on system parameters such as air speed, bank angles, and manual
commands in order to perform complicated flight patterns.
A classroom or virtual environment could hand an introduction of the system and
most of the software operation. Through use of a training software program, the trainee
could virtually fly an MAV through the required training flight programs for certification.
However, due to the flight aspects of the system, a field or OJT training environment would
be preferable. In this method of delivery, the trainee will have instant feedback of their
operating skills. In the field or on a range, the trainee could also simultaneously be trained
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on MAV launch, recovery, storage and transport of the system, and all the other aspects of
the system that make it unique.
4.4.4

Leadership and Education.

Leadership and education would be impacted

in the long term for the ISR MAV. The system would now enable Special Forces to have
a larger local area situational awareness. Leaders would need to realize this and it may
affect how they employ the teams that have the ISR MAV verses those that do not. The
ISR MAV capability will influence the decisions that can be made in each mission. When
planning for and employing the special forces required for each mission, the ability to
see real-time their surrounding beyond line of sight will give them an advantage over
adversaries that only assume line of sight capabilities when no larger aircraft are available.
Employment of forces to areas of unknown conditions may increase since they would now
have independent real-time intelligence gathering assets. Before, teams were limited by
their access to intel gathering assets at the local command level rather than at the team
level itself.
Education of the team, unit, and command leaders will also need to include this new
tactical capability. In much the same way that leaders are aware of the capability that a
sniper or a machine gunner brings to a small tactical team, the awareness of the ability
to see beyond the line of sight would need to be instilled in the emerging leaders of the
Special Forces functional area.
4.4.5

Personnel.

Personnel changes would be dependent on the manner in

which the ISR MAV is to be employed. If the capability is to be assigned to one member of
a tactical team then there is the possibility of a specialty code emerging for the operation
of MAVs (much like a sniper, machine gunner, etc.). The rest of the team would still
be required to be minimally trained on the system in case of contingencies. If, however,
the intent is for every member of a tactical team to have the ISR MAV capability, then
personnel impacts would be minimal. It would simply be considered another part of their
tactical training skill set.
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4.4.6

Facilities.

Facilities for the ISR MAV would be minimal. They would be

largely dependant on how their development, sustainment and logistics are managed. If
their development is absorbed by existing developmental organizations, then the facilities
would already be handled.

The same would apply for a sustainment organization

(dedicated or basket SPO). Parts for the ISR MAV would need to be housed in various
locations. War ready reserves would need to be housed in theater for quick access and
use. Excessive stockpiles of parts are not envisioned as part of the logistics planning, and
so warehouse storage beyond normal programmed supply limits would not be needed. The
production contractor (if a Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) contract is used), the depot
repair facility, or the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) would absorb the necessary parts
to maintain the ISR MAV.

4.5

Future Capabilities and Technologies
4.5.1

Future Capability Discussion.

The MAV concept has the potential to

provide many other mission capabilities outside of those discussed thus far. This section
concentrates on these future mission capabilities and how they influence the baseline
architecture produced in this thesis. These capabilities are grouped into three categories
based on implementation timeline. Short-term is considered within the next five years.
Mid-term is between five to ten years and long-term is greater than ten years. This is
a general timeline in which user needs and technological development will effect which
capabilities will be pursued as well as when they will become available. Some of these
capabilities are already available in other larger UAVs or manned platforms; however,
further technological improvements must occur for the capabilities to meet the unique
payload requirements of the MAV.
These possible future mission capabilities are outlined in Figure 4.22. These future
capabilities and their descriptions are based on general user need trends, current manned
platform capabilities, and the DoD’s UAV Roadmap 2002 [12]. Listed below are the
general descriptions of each future capability. The ISR MAV architecture was reviewed
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for applicability of each of the proposed future capabilities and and changes required are
noted. Most of these future capabilities only require wording changes for the architecture
data links, information exchanges, and needlines. If these future capabilities are pursued,
the baseline architecture products need to be more in depth and the lower system levels
and associated data descriptions need to be refined for component-level design.

Figure 4.22

Future Mission Capability Timeline

Short Term Mission Capabilities:
1. Acquire Precise Target Coordinates
This capability enables the user to obtain more precise coordinates on a target
using an MAV. Currently users can get a general idea of the targets location by
observing the MAVs current position. This current method is not accurate enough
for guided precision munitions or reliable target tracking. Implementation examples
can include measuring the distance and angle of the target relative to the MAV
and then performing calculations using the MAVs GPS position to determine the
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targets location. If using GPS to acquire a targets location, the use of a dual band
receiver is necessary in order to obtain the needed precision. The additional signal
processing for coordinate generation is the primary requirement change for this
capability. The extra signal processing can be handled by either the air platforms
Payload or ground units Signal/Data Processor, therefore this capability will not
require any baseline architectural changes.
2. Biological and Chemical Sniffer Platform
Giving an MAV the ability to detect harmful biological or chemical weapons will
give ground units more time to prepare for protection or even enable the units to
move to a safer location. Termed a sniffer, this biological or chemical detector
could be attached as a payload or even refined to be apart of the air platform such
that other payloads could still be attached. Since this capability could be considered
a simple sensor, it would operate within the current ISR MAV architecture (where
currently the image capture sensor is represented), therefore this capability will not
require any baseline architectural changes. If it is packaged with the air platform
however, a system will need to be added to the MAV operational and system nodes
to reflect the added sniffer system.
3. Communication Eavesdropping
A MAV can be used to eavesdrop on enemy communications by either collecting
transmitted signals (includes directionally transmitted signals), monitoring wired
communications, or collecting voice conversations. The MAV can accomplish this
capability acting as the collector deploying sensors, or both. This allows special
operations units to operate at safe distances and in a more preferred location when
conducting communications intelligence (COMINT). This capability can require
baseline architectural changes depending on the employment method. In general,
the COMINT system used can be included as apart of the Payload system.
4. Mobile Ground Station When MAV Deployed
Having the capability to relocate the ground station while the air platform is
deployed is of great benefit to the user. Current architecture reflects only the MAV
requiring external navigation information, if the ground unit also receives this
information, it could be tied to a digital moving map based on where the ground
unit is while also showing the MAVs location. This added capability enhances
the ground unit’s situational awareness and increases mission effectiveness. It
will require more optimized systems (size, weight, power, etc.) be developed in
order to support the mobile user; however, these systems and interfaces are already
architected in the ISR MAV model. This capability requires little architectural
changes, mainly the addition of an information exchange between the Friendly
Ground Unit and GPS Satellites nodes.
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5. Night or IR Reconnaissance
This capability acts as an improvement to the over-the-hill reconnaissance scenario
in the sense that it enables the user to conduct reconnaissance at night or during
periods of low light. Optimized night vision systems need to be developed to give
the user the capability to conduct reconnaissance when they need it most. Since
this capability is simply the inclusion of a different payload sensor, no architectural
changes are necessary. The system interfaces and data links are already modeled.
6. Psychological Operations
The capability to perform psychological operations is a very broad capability and
spans many different missions. Considered in this thesis is the ability to send a
“message” to the enemy or non-combatants that another military force is present
in the area and that they are being watched. Also considered is the ability to drop
propaganda leaflets as well as to serving as an unknown weapon, meaning ground
observers may be unaware of whether or not it is armed. This capability may
require architectural changes depending on the psychological mission pursued. If
only a message of US forces present is sought, the current ISR MAV capability can
perform that mission in its current configuration. If the mission would require the
delivery of leaflets or other objects, the architecture would need to include a payload
release function and data elements that would transmit the release commands.
7. Target Tracking or Following
The capability for a MAV to accurately track or follow an assigned enemy target
will keep the ground unit up-to-date on enemy movement and increase their
situational awareness. This ability to track or follow a target should be automated
so the user can continue with the mission and remain mobile (in a way ties to
the Mobile Ground Station When Deployed capability). This capability focuses
on tracking only one target, multiple target tracking is addressed in the Target
Identification and Tracking capability. Signal processing and target movement
detection systems would need to be greatly enhanced and refined to meet the
payload size and demands. Assuming the enhanced processing and detection could
be achieved, this capability would not require any baseline architectural changes.
The processing and detection functions would be enabled by the existing signal
processor, payload sensor, and respective data links.
Mid Term Mission Capabilities:
1. Air-to-Air or Anti-MAV
Historically, manned aircraft were utilized as reconnaissance platforms, transformed
to ground attack units and then employed as air-to-air fighters. MAVs and UAVs
have started the same trend as some UAVs are now seeing the air-to-ground attack
role. The capability of air-to-air MAV or Anti-MAV enables force protection
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against enemy MAV capabilities. This includes MAVs designed to attack other
enemy MAVs (air-to-air) or simply ground units attacking enemy MAVs (surfaceto-air). With the rise of MAV interest, the need for this capability is not far off.
Technical issues such as how to quickly locate an enemy MAV, what kind of
weapons would be the most effective, and what air-to-air tactics to use necessitates
further exploration. This capability requires changes to the baseline architecture.
The developed capability needs will determine the necessary changes. Some
basic architecture changes that are foreseen already are the addition of a function
to employ an attack mechanism against the enemy MAV and the associated
data/command links to enable such a function; whether it is on the MAV or the
ground system.
2. Communication Relay
This capability gives the user the ability to increase their communications range
and, if properly implemented, can lower the probability of intercept and detection.
One way to increase the range of a communications device is to send a MAV
into the air to act as a network link which receives data from the ground unit then
transmits it to the receiver. This enhances such communication systems that require
line of sight or that experience degradation due or loss due to terrain. Technical
issues such as how to give the MAV enough power to perform this mission need to
be worked out. Another way to deploy a MAV as a communications relay is to relate
it to a messenger bird such that the MAV stores the data to be communicated and is
instructed where to go for transmission. This keeps the ground unit electronically
concealed from the enemy because the MAV is flying to a safer broadcast area.
This capability will not require architectural changes, mainly the payload system
will pick up the responsibility of storing communication data as well as processing
basic commands and protocols.
3. Distinguish Facial Features
The ability to distinguish human facial features will greatly improve the capability
to detect and track targets as well as search out particular enemies. This capability
includes the MAV searching for a particular person by analyzing facial features
when searching enemy targets and labeling them as ‘possible enemy personnel’.
No architectural changes will be needed; the recognition system or enhanced
processing power can be added as a Payloadto the MAV.
4. GPS Jamming
The capability to deny enemy forces access to GPS data can be accomplished using
a MAV. This capability will also jam the current architected source for navigation
information and would require a coupled secondary navigation capability (improved
inertial navigation system, terrain mapping, etc). The GPS jammer can be added as
a Payload and an INS or other non-GPS dependant navigation system will need to
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be added to the Air Vehicle system. The non-GPS navigation system may require
architecture changes based on what data links are required to perform navigation.
These could include data links to additional sensors in the MAV payload, or data
links to the operator that would perform as a origin point for navigation reference.
5. IR Reconnaissance
The capability to conduct infrared (IR) reconnaissance will greatly improve the
over-the-hill reconnaissance missions, as well as any other operating scenario.
Such thermal imaging systems will enable the MAV to see during the night as
well as in most poor weather conditions. This capability also enhances the ability
to detect, track, and identify critical targets. Current IR systems will first need
to be miniaturized and require lower power to conform to the MAV’s payload
constraints. Since the IR system could be placed in the current ISR MAV payload
sensor construct, no architectural changes are necessary for this capability.
6. Locate Targets Through General Land Obstacles
The capability to locate targets through general land obstacles such as trees is
being pushed as a need from the user community [12]. A MAV with such ability
to see through trees or other general land obstacles greatly increases the chance
of locating an enemy when performing area surveillance or reconnaissance. Such
technological issues like what systems to use, what amount of image processing
is necessary, and possible error sources need to be researched. No architectural
changes are expected, however minimal changes may be necessary based on a more
refined capability description.
7. Small Ordinance Delivery Platform
This capability allows a MAV to serve as an air-to-ground attack vehicle either
through weapon delivery or by itself acting as the ordinance. Users will be able to
search and perform reconnaissance while retaining the option to attack or run into
the enemy. This capability can be implemented currently but to create an adequate
impact on the enemy, the small ordinances must be lighter and more destructive. If
the MAV is to be used as an ordinance itself, no architectural changes are needed,
but a less elaborative Air Vehicle system could be used to decrease costs. If the
MAV is to actually deliver ordinance, then a system function of ordinance release
is needed as well as the data elements to impart the release commands.
8. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
With the SEAD capability, a MAV can help ground units locate an enemy air
defense system by either ‘homing in’ on its active radar or simply performing
visual reconnaissance. The MAV could also act as an anti-radiation missile if
this capability is coupled with the small ordinance delivery platform capability.
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However, this seems to turn the MAV into more of a short range munition rather
than an air platform. If this was added as an optional ‘payload’ then the MAV
still acts as a multi-purpose air vehicle. This capability will not require direct
architectural changes; however certain activity changes and information flows in
the OV-5 and OV-6C will need to be made.
9. Laser Designation of Targets
The term target painting or lasing generally involves a laser pointing to a target
while a weapon delivered from a delivery platform follows the laser to the target.
Currently, ground units pack in equipment to laser designate a target but if a MAV
is also being packed in, it makes sense to have the MAV also complete this task,
thus eliminating a system having to be carried in (if the MAV has the capability to
swap out payloads). This capability keeps friendly ground units at safer distances
from the target. Technical issues to be resolved are developing a sufficiently
powered laser to conform to the MAV form factor. This capability requires minor
architectural changes with the addition of a Target and Ordinance Entity external
node as well as more emphasis on the need for information exchange between the
Friendly Ground Unit and Strike Assets.
10. Weather Intelligence Platform
The capability for an MAV to gather weather intelligence information will aid
ground units that already conduct such missions as well as give other units this
capability as well. As the name states, the capability to gather weather intelligence
includes anything from humidity, temperature, wind speeds, and other information
that would be of use to the user. This capability requires minor architectural
changes, mainly on the OV-5 activity and OV-6C event diagrams to reflect the
sampling and tracking of the weather conditions.
11. Operation in Urban or GPS Denied Environments
This is one of the most challenging missions for the current generation of
MAVs. Urban environments are challenging due to the proliferation of obstacles.
These obstacles prevent line-of-site communication and increase the chance of a
collision. To operate in this environment, MAVs must be equipped with collision
avoidance sensors and some type of communication method that allows line-of-site
communication. Another solution to the line-of-site problem is to implement a
communication relay MAV that could loiter above the urban environment to relay
information to and from MAV. GPS denied areas require MAVs to have a secondary
source of navigation data. This could be something similar to the Digital Terrain
Elevation Database or some kind of intelligent mapping software. The MAV must
have a way of knowing where it is to operate correctly. Adding the capability
to operate in these adverse environments affects the architecture by requiring the
addition of new communication lines and nodes to reflect the additional sensor data
4-45

or navigation processor.

Long Term Mission Capabilities: All long term mission capabilities listed here
will require major technological improvements and breakthroughs as well as a large push
from the user community before they can be pursued. Due to this, no architectural changes
have been listed for any of the long term capabilities because technology and user needs
will drive the changes needing to be made.
1. Electronic Signal Directional Finding
In this capability, a MAV is able to locate enemy broadcasting electronic signals.
Such applications can include searching for enemy jammers, radars, other MAV
operators, or whatever the sensor is tuned to pick up. With this, ground units will
be able to conduct electronic reconnaissance or anti-electronic warfare. There are
many technological improvements that must occur before this MAV capability can
be realized.
2. Land or Sea Mine Scout
This capability allows a MAV to search out either land or sea based. The MAV
would be packaged with sensors capable of locating and identifying possible mines.
Users could deploy the MAV with such capability to scout ahead of the planned
route and relay back information if a mine is discovered.
3. Target Identification and Tracking
The Target Identification and Tracking capability takes the short term Target
Tracking or Following capability and adds target identification to it. This gives the
ground units a more capable and autonomous MAV that is not only able to track the
enemy but also identify it. Identification can be conducted through a wide range
of sensors that detect optical, IR, or acoustic properties. One of the end goals for
any ground unit is to know the location and status of enemy forces, so ideally a
spin-off of this capability is multiple target identification and tracking with a MAV
(or multiple networked MAVs). Such capability helps lift the ‘fog of war’ and gives
friendly forces the upper hand.
4. Localized Deployment with External Control
This capability reflects a fundamental shift in how the information from the MAV
and control of the MAV is handled. This capability enables an external source
(another unit, a forward air controller, Joint STARS, AWACS, etc) to control
the flight plan of the MAV once the ground user launches the MAV. The current
architecture assumes the MAV is only controlled by the user so provisions for
4-46

handing off control of the MAV need to be implemented. A second component
of this capability is to have the data from the MAV be routed directly to external
sources. This baseline architecture assumes the data must pass through the
ground station operator prior to dissemination to external sources. Thus, all of the
communication lines which pass from the MAV to the ground station node must
also be sent to the external user. Implementing this capability affects basically
every diagram in the architecture.

4.5.2

Future Technology Discussion.

After listing the possible future MAV

mission areas it is apparent that some of the key technologies driving the mission need to
be listed. The future technologies were generated by observing and analyzing the users
background and capability deficiencies (Section 2.1), the baseline architectures (Section
4.3), and the future capabilities (Section 4.5.1). Some technologies are not directly
apparent through the analysis and were retrieved from cited sources. These technologies
are placed into two separate categories based on how well they benefit the current and
future mission areas mentioned throughout this research. The first category (Figure 4.23),
lists those technologies that most benefit the future mission areas while the second (Figure
4.24), lists those that are not directly related to the mission areas but are still important
to the development of the MAV and its missions. For the first set of technologies, a brief
description is provided to help demonstrate their importance in enabling or improving a
MAVs mission area.
1. Enhanced Optical Sensor Capabilities
Current MAV applications and capabilities use onboard optical sensors, or
cameras, for reconnaissance. To improve these sensors, new capabilities could
be added such as optical zooming, camera slewing, or automatic focusing. Such
added technologies will improve the MAVs operational effectiveness and suitability.
2. Mobile Ground Station When MAV Deployed
Having GPS, or another navigation source, integrated into the ground station
enables the operator to view their location in respect to the MAVs. This means
that both the location of the operator and MAVs is displayed through the human
interface. With this, a better sense of situational awareness and increased mobility
can be achieved.
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Figure 4.23

Future MAV Technologies

3. Integrated Ground Station
This technology includes integrating all systems needed by the ground station into
a single system that is lightweight and easily packable by a single user. An example
is having the transmitter, receiver, power supply, and human interface integrated
into a single unit that is the size of a PDA. Several technological improvements
in the realm of miniaturization and power supplies will need to occur before such
capability can be pursued.
4. Low Light Emitting Display
Night operations require the operators to remain hidden and avoid disclosing
their position to enemy forces. If a MAV is to operate in night-time or low
light environments, then the user interface needs to conform to the concealment
requirement. To do this, the user interface display unit needs to emit little or no
light beyond what is necessary for the user. Current technologies offer solutions to
enable this capability such as helmet mounted displays used in aircraft or even a
small monocle-type display that fits over the user’s eye.
5. Low Probability of Intercept Communications
In Section 2.1.2, it was mentioned that special reconnaissance teams required
the need for long range and low probability-of-intercept radios to improve their
mission effectiveness. This requirement is intended for transmission between the
ground force and higher headquarters; however, it should also be the case for
ground to MAV communication. Without a communication system having a low
probability-of-intercept, the enemy can triangulate the units location or, at the very
least, know there is a unit in the vicinity - eliminating the element of surprise.
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6. Modular and Swappable Payloads
Modular and swappable payloads involve the operator being able to change a MAVs
payload before or after flight. An example could be that the operator carries an
optical payload, an ordinance delivery payload, and a chemical detection payload
for the MAV. The operator then decides which payload to attach to the MAV before
launching. This technology allows the operator to freely choose the payload based
on the current threat or battlefield situation.
7. Multiple Sensor Payload
Having multiple sensors in a single payload increases mission efficiency while the
MAV is in-flight. A simple example of this is a payload that contains both chemical
detection equipment and optical sensors such as a reconnaissance camera. One
use for such a payload could be to alert the operator of a presence of a harmful
chemical while conducting video reconnaissance. There are many different sensor
combinations possible. Determining which combinations are best suited for the
current mission will be based on the operator and the mission environment.
8. Non-Line-Of-Sight Communications
As the MAV increases its range and maneuverability, especially in urban
environments, communications that do not require line-of-sight will become
a greater user need. With these non-line-of-sight communications, operators
can remain in a concealed area without having to relocate to keep the MAVs
signal. Current technologies can enable such capability but are not yet feasible to
implement on a MAV.
9. Reduce DTED Level 2 in Real-Time
Incorporating the digital terrain elevation database (DTED) into the MAVs
navigation system will allow the system to have a sense of height above ground.
Current architectures assume GPS as the sole input to the navigation system.
However, this could be augmented if both GPS and DTED are implemented to
allows the MAVs position to be calculated (GPS) along with its elevation above
ground (DTED). Due to current payload, signal processing, and power constraints
onboard the air platform, a short term solution could be to keep GPS onboard while
DTED is integrated into the ground station signal processor unit. With this, the air
platforms position would be sent to the ground station and as an acknowledgement
the elevation for that position could be sent back to the air platform. The current
resolution of DTED Level 2 is approximately 30 meters in altitude (highest DTED
level to date), which is good enough for a larger UAV or manned aircraft but,
depending on the MAVs application, may not be good enough. Future DTED levels
such as Level 5 with its proposed 1 meter resolution will better suit the MAV.
However, if resolution increases to this level, the file size is likely to be very large
(requiring more storage space or portable media containing data for a particular
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geographical area). Terrain mapping can be a derived technology once DTED
Level 2 is incorporated, however this mapping technology will be limited based on
resolution available and processing speed.
10. Sensor and/or Image Stabilization
Adding sensor or image stabilization to a MAV will aid the operator by identifying
targets faster and more accurately. Stabilization can either occur onboard the air
platform or at the ground stations signal processor. Results will most likely be
better if stabilization takes place onboard the platform but there are techniques that
could be incorporated into the ground station signal processor. An example of an
onboard stabilization system could include a camera mounted to a pod where the
pod rotated based on the airframes change in pitch, roll, or yaw. For the ground
based system, an example is that a computer could take picture stills from the
incoming video such that the operator does not notice the image bouncing around
as much. Such sensor stabilization aids mainly by reducing operator fatigue while
enabling faster, more accurate target identification.

Figure 4.24

Other Possible Future MAV Technologies
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As discussed, there are ample areas of study and research that provide both nearterm and long-term benefits to the operational MAV community. While an attempt was
made to delineate which areas are more attainable in the various time spaces, it will
ultimately be the operational community along with identified capability gaps that will
guide which technologies are actively pursued.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1

Conclusions
The goal of this thesis was to apply good systems engineering principles to develop

a mini/micro unmanned aerial vehicle (MAV) architecture model describing their use in
three separate but closely related mission areas: Over-the-Hill-Reconnaissance, Battle
Damage Information (BDI), and Local Area Defense (LAD). These mission areas are
derived from the special operations forces (SOF) background, mission tasks, and their
capability deficiencies presented in Chapter II. The general terms of unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) and MAV were introduced to provide insight into the system architecture
used to fulfill the special operations forces capability deficiencies. With an increased
understanding of the user, their operating environment, and the general concepts of both
UAVs and MAVs, this thesis was scoped to architecting a single-man-packable and singleman-operable intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) MAV system that does not
require the carrier to sacrifice normal mission essential gear. Architecturally, the MAV
system was defined to contain two cohesive elements, an airborne and a ground element,
where both elements are required for mission operation.
Such a MAV system is designed to meet current capability needs; however, a
proper system engineering architecture approach is needed since missions and operating
environments often change. Likely changes include systems that are needed to interface
with the MAV as well as updated user requirements. Applying a uniquely designed MAV
to a changing environment is more likely to require a new system rather than modifying
a current one. With the use of the systems architecture approach, the MAV system could
be designed or described in such a way that allows for future refinement, growth and
application.
A comprehensive description of the methodology used in this thesis was put together
in Chapter III to benefit those unfamiliar with the architecture models of systems as
well as the many different forms of models available. This methodology included the
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traceability approach used as well as description of architecture models presented in the
DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF). Throughout this thesis, traceability was a key
element ensuring that the architectures developed would be integrated. This began with
the realization that a capability gap exists and ends by defining specific functional tasks.
The bulk of this thesis is the application of the DoDAF to the MAV system. Using
the methodology formulated, all findings, operating scenarios, system traceability efforts,
and resulting architectures were presented. These results enable the creation of a set of
baseline integrated architecture products for a MAV focused in the ISR realm. To further
expand and make this effort more complete Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership
and Education, Personnel, and Facility (DOTLPF) considerations were addressed, and
plausible future capabilities and technologies were discussed. Through the use of the
systems engineering process, these results met the goal of this thesis by providing an
integrated MAV architectural model describing a general ISR mission with emphasis on
three mission areas: Over-the-Hill-Reconnaissance, Battle Damage Information (BDI),
and Local Area Defense.

5.2

Remarks
Due to the refocus on Systems Engineering in the DoD, integrated architectures are

now required for all current and future acquisition programs. The products presented in
Chapter IV can be applied to any MAV program to be compliant with these regulations.
The developed architecture products also present the first academically constructed set of
architecture products for a real-world capability.
Creating these baseline products also allows the designers and system engineers
to further decompose the system into the key measures which define the trade space for
the MAV system. These key measures for the MAV itself are: weight, size, level of
discrimination, interoperability, area search size and area search rate. For the ground
station, they are portability, size, and level of concealment. Once these key measures are
identified, the designers can then derive applicable requirements for the system that are
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based on the architecture products (interfaces, information exchanges, operational nodes,
etc.) as well as any specific requirements based on the key measures.

5.3

Recommendations
Following this research, the authors recommend that the sponsor and any MAV-

related organizations review and establish this ISR MAV architecture as the baseline for
the current ISR MAV capability. This architecture also needs to be reviewed and iteratively
updated to reflect how ISR MAVs fit into the mission of its users. As with any effort to
model a system, there are several levels of detail that can be achieved to enable a more
refined view of the system.
Now that a baseline structural model has been developed for the ISR MAV, temporal
modeling of the system can, and should, be developed that will better describe the
performance parameters of the system. The static model presented in this research
forms the foundation for the dynamic models that can be used to fully evaluate the
system’s strengths and weaknesses as different designs are tested. Specific instantiations
of this architecture can also be researched to guide development of other members of the
family of systems. While this architecture dealt with the mission areas of ISR, related
architectures for supporting and supported missions performed by MAVs should also be
developed. All of these architectures and the linkages between them will truly enable an
integrated look at the emerging field of MAVs in the DoD.

5.4

Future Areas of Study
This thesis deals mostly with the Concept of Operations and the resulting

architectures for the use of MAVs in the US Air Force. Its scope includes only singleman-packable/launchable systems and is the first of its type to academically architect the
MAV system. The following areas of study are presented either because they fell outside
of the scope of this thesis, they represent further study of threads presented in this thesis, or
simply will help to understand and integrate the use of MAVs in the military of today and
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tomorrow. The future areas of study (FAS) below are presented with the understanding
that they would be completed in and with the focus of a systems engineering approach
unless otherwise stated.
FAS1: Swarming MAV detailed architectures.

This would take any ”to-be”

architectures and/or ConOps developed on the topic and fully explore the ConOps,
architectures, behavior rule models, and challenges facing this area of MAV use.
FAS2: Detailed systems architecture of the miniaturization of remote aerial target
designation (lasing). This requires study and description of the target designation mission,
functions, current technologies, future technologies, and the challenges facing their
miniaturization to a MAV level.
FAS3: DoD integration of MAV use. Since this thesis aimed mostly at USAF
missions and operations to develop capabilities and ConOps, this area of study would
take a higher, and less detailed look at MAV use, but with a purple focus. It would seek
to develop what high level architectures would need to be agreed upon and established in
order to better integrate the use of MAVs between services.
FAS4: MAV observation/targeting stabilization study and analysis. This FAS would
need to be performed by an aeronautical engineering Masters/Doctorate-seeking student.
The study would use the currently fielded MAV systems as a baseline and seek to adjust
various design characteristics to yield the most stable flight platform as possible to provide
useful EO intelligence. Modeling, wind tunnel testing and publishing of results would be
of great benefit to the currently fielded MAV development lab and SPO.
FAS5:

Full To-Be MAV architectures.

The extension would develop full

architectures of proposed future capabilities as presented in Chapter IV of this thesis.
While the future capabilities were all introduced and discussed here, a full compliment of
architecture products are necessary to flush out implications to practical MAV application.

5-4

Appendix A. MAV List of Acronyms
Acronym
AF
AFMC
AFRL
AFSOC
AFTL
AOC
AV
BATCAM
BDA
BDI
C3
C4ISR

CAO
CCT
CDD
CLS
COMINT
COMM
CP
CPD
CT
DA
DBMS
DIS
DLA
DoD
DoDAF
DOTMLPF

DTED
EW
FID

Table A.1 – List of Acronyms
Description
Air Force
Air Force Materiel Command
Air Force Research Laboratory
Air Force Special Operations Command
Air Force Task List
Air Operations Center
All View
Battlefield Air Targeting Camera Autonomous Micro air
vehicle
Battle Damage Assessment
Battle Damage Information
Command, Control, Communications
Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance
Civil Affairs Operations
Combat Controller
Capability Development Document
Contractor Logistics Support
Communications Intelligence
Communications
Counter-Proliferation
Capability Production Document
Counter Terrorism
Direct Action
Database Management System
Daylight Imaging System
Defense Logistics Agency
Department of Defense
Department of Defense Architecture Framework
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and
Education,
Personnel, and Facilities
Digital Terrain Elevation Database
Electronic Warfare
Foreign Internal Defense
Continued on next page
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Acronym
FLIR
FoS
GPS
HCI
HF
I/O
IA
ICD
ICOM
IEEE
IMINT
INS
IO
IR
IRLS
ISR
JCIDS
JFC
LAD
LAN
LISI
LOS
MAV
METL
NIST
OJT
OJT
OTHISR
OV
PSYOP
QRC
Recon
RPV
SAR
SATCOM
SE
SEAD
SIGINT
SOF

Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Description
Forward Looking Infrared
Family of Systems
Global Positioning System
Human Computer Interface
High Frequency
Input or Output
Integrated Architecture
Initial Capability Document
Input, Control, Output and Mechanism
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
Information Intelligence
Inertial Navigation System
Information Operations
Infrared
Infrared Line Scanner
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
Joint Functional Concept
Local Area Defense
Local Area Network
Level of Information Systems Interoperability
Line-Of-Sight
Mini and Micro Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Mission Essential Task List
National Institute of Standards and Technology
On the Job Training
On the Job Training
Over-The-Hill Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance
Operational View
Psychological Operations
Quick Reaction Concept
Reconnaissance
Remotely Piloted Vehicle
Synthetic Aperture Radar
Satellite Communication
Systems Engineering
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
Signals Intelligence
Special Operations Forces
Continued on next page

A-2

Acronym
SoS
SPO
SR
SV
TV
UAV
UHF
UJTL
US
USSOCOM
UW
VHF
WAN
WMD
WWII

Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Description
Systems of Systems
System Program Office
Special Reconnaissance
Systems View
Technical Standards View
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Ultra High Frequency
Universal Joint Task List
United States
United States Special Operations Command
Unconventional Warfare
Very High Frequency
Wide Area Network
Weapons of Mass Destruction
World War II
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Appendix B. MAV Traceability

Figure B.1

Top Level Traceability Diagram
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Appendix C. MAV AV-1
AV-1: Overview and Summary Information
ISR MAV (AS-IS)
1.

Identification

Name:

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Micro/Mini Aerial Vehicle (AS-IS). Short Name: ISR MAV (AS-IS) Architecture.
Involved Organizations: AFRL/MN: Munitions Directorate, ISR MAV developer;
AFRL/HECB: Human Factors Lab, Battlefield Air Operations (BAO) integrator;
ASC/AAP: Aeronautical Enterprise Program Office, System Program Office (SPO);
AFIT/ENY-GSE: USAF Graduate Systems Engineering program, architecture developers.
Date: This version targets the FY05 timeframe. The period for the development of this
version of the architecture was August 2004 to March 2005.
2. Background: There currently does not exist an integrated architecture that
defines the use of the emerging field of Mini/Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAV) within the
Department of Defense, or the US Air Force. MAVs are rapidly emerging as a productive
subset of the larger category of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). They are loosely
defined by being small enough in size and weight to be man-packable for use in austere
operational environments by Special Forces Personnel. The MAV’s size and ease of
testability allows for rapid development and modification of design and application.
This architecture is an AS-IS representation of a generic ISR-focused MAV. It is
based in large part on the design and operations of currently operational MAV systems.
There is a need for a baseline architecture in order to understand the systems, track
changes that are made, and project forward to determine capability shortfalls that should
be addressed.
3.

Purpose: The ISR MAV (AS-IS) architecture will baseline the current

capabilities of operational ISR MAVs. The purpose of this version of the architecture
(FY05) is detailed in the table below.
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4. Scope: The products associated with this architecture depict the AS-IS state
of a generic ISR MAV system. This architecture includes the infrastructure and systems
needed to operate an ISR MAV by US military personnel.
5. Time Frame: The architecture depicts the weapon system in its current state
and certain evolutions expected to be implemented through FY05. Realistically, the
first POM cycle that the completed architecture would be able to influence is FY08.
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Table C.1 Architecture Purposes
Architecture Purpose
Architecture Product Implications
Describe a generic ISR MAV Architectural elements are documented that are
system as a baseline to fully common to the ISR MAV mission and can be used
map the necessary interfaces to fully understand the system’s boundaries and
needed to describe the ISR interfaces.
MAV mission.
Support the development Information must be accurate and authoritative.
of an ISR MAV Full Scale Products should be built with the idea in mind that the
Production Contract and future changes to the mission profile and integrating
serve as a maintained, author- advanced technology will need to be reflected in the
itative decision making tool baseline architectures prior to implementation
after contract award
Support the design of tailored The generic architecture should be extensible to
ISR MAV implementations
reflect C2 node or site specific variations of ISR
MAVs without losing linkage and consistency with
the baseline architecture products
Provide
traceability
of To be meaningful, the granularity of the architectural
requirements to architecture elements should be small
components
Support the development of The SV-1 will provide system to system interoperfuture test plans
ability requirements while various other OV/SVs will
aid in determining system connectivity and interoperability requirements
Identify
modernization Need to be able to tag architecture elements as
opportunities
being candidates for replacement, re-engineering, or
additional capabilities
Support future POM/APOM Requires significant granularity across a variety of
activities by contributing OV and SV products
to the refinement of AOC
requirements helping identify
areas for modernization
Be an integral part of the Use of same or interoperable toolsets, terminology,
larger ISR and/or UAV and supporting architecture databases
architecture
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Appendix D. MAV OV-1
Table D.1 – AV-2 Integrated Dictionary
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Graphical Box Types
Icons
MAV
Description: This icon represents the aerial vehicle
portion of the overall MAV system being
architected.
CCT/MAV Operator
Description: The CCT/MAV Operator is comprised
of any person trained to set up and operate a MAV
system. CCT is shown on the ISR/BDI operational
concept and MAV operator is shown on the Local
Area Defense operational concept. The CCT/MAV
operator is an integral part of the Friendly Ground
Unit or Special Ops Unit described in the OV-2,
OV-6c, and SV-1b views. The operator either
affects the system through direct contact (Platform
Interface, Field Comm Interface, and Hardware
Interface) or through the HCI system (User
Feedback and Inputs interface).
Type: Operational Node, Activity, or System
Views: OV-1
GPS Satellite
Description: The Global Positioning System
consists of a constellation of satellites providing
pseudorange numbers and ephemeris data.
Receivers use this information to calculate their
location. The data provided by GPS satellites is
required by MAVs in order to generate their current
location and perform waypoint navigation.
Type: External system
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-6c, SV-1b/c
Continued on next page
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Table D.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
AOC
Description: The AOC is an external system that
encompasses any unit or group that the operator is
required to report to, or is considered at a higher
level in the operators chain of command. This unit
can be stationed locally in respect to the operator
(in the field) or remote (far away from the operator).
Headquarters can do any number of tasks, including
making decisions based on gathered intelligence,
assigning missions or directives to field units, or
providing intelligence information. The AOC is
synonymous with Local Commanders or
Headquarters on OV-2, OV6c, and SV-1b/c
products.
Type: External system
Views: OV-1
COMM Satellite
Description: COMM satellites provide the
CCT/operator a means to communicate with
decision authorities.
Type: External system (not shown on other
products)
Views: OV-1
Strike Asset
Description: Strike assets are external systems that
are comprised of any operational unit that has the
capability to inflict damage on the enemy.
Examples include aircraft (A-10), ground units
(artillery), or sea based units (cruiser). Strike assets
can be employed as a result of information obtained
via the MAV and communicated to Headquarters or
the local commander.
Type: External system
Views: OV-1, OV-2, SV-1b/c
Threat
Description: Threats are any enemy personnel or
enemy systems that would interfere with friendly
force objectives.
Type: External system
Views: OV-1
Graphical Arrow Types
Continued on next page
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Table D.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Navigation Data
Description: Depending on the view, navigation
data can either be an operational needline (OVs) or
an external interface (SVs). This link includes the
pseudorange numbers and ephemeris data
transmitted by the GPS satellites.
Type: External Interface or Needline
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-5, SV-1b/c
Data and Telemetry
Description: Data and Telemetry is the link
between the operator and the aerial part of the MAV
system that provides both sensor data and necessary
air vehicle information. Data and Telemetry is
synonymous with Platform Communications on
OV-2, Request/Commands, and ISR data on SV-1b,
and Raw Sensor Package Data/Raw Flight
Telemetry on OV-5 (A0 view).
Type: Internal Interface or Needline
Views: OV-1
Comm Link
Description: Comm Links comprise any
communication link used by CCTs/MAV
operators/Friendly Ground Units in order to relay
information to the applicable decision authority or
strike force (to include personnel and aircraft) in the
prosecution of mission objectives. Comm Links are
synonymous with Communicate with Headquarters
and Communicate with Local Strike Assets on the
consolidated OV-2. They represent Information
Gathered, Mission Tasks and Intelligence Info and
BDI request, Scheduled Attack, and Enemy
Position on the SV-1b
Type: External interface or Needline
Views: OV-1
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Figure D.1

OV-1 for the OTHISR and BDI Scenario
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Figure D.2

OV-1 for the LAD Scenario
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Appendix E. MAV OV-2
Table E.1 – AV-2 Integrated Dictionary
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Graphical Box Types:
Operational Nodes
Friendly Ground Unit
Description: The Friendly Ground Unit operational
node includes all systems that make up the ground
piece of the overall system. Synonymous with CCT,
MAV Operator, or Perform Ground Unit Functions.
Type: Operational Node
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-3, OV-6c, SV-1b, SV-1c,
SV-4
MAV
Description: The MAV operational node includes
all systems that make up the airborne piece of the
overall system. Synonymous with Perform MAV
Functions.
Type: Operational Node
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-3, OV-6c, SV-1b, SV-1c,
SV-4
Graphical Box Types:
External Operational Nodes
GPS Satellites
Description: The Global Positioning System
consists of a constellation of satellites providing
pseudorange numbers and ephemeris data. Ground
based receivers use this information to calculate
their location.
Type: External Node
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-3, OV-6c, SV-1b, SV-1c,
SV-4, SV-6
Headquarters
Description: Headquarters encompasses any unit or
group that the operator is required to report to, or is
considered at a higher level in the operators chain
of command. This unit can be stationed locally in
respect to the operator (in the field) or remote (far
away from the operator). Headquarters can do any
number of tasks, including making decisions based
on gathered intelligence, assigning missions or
directives to field units, or providing intelligence
information. Synonymous with AOC or Local
Commanders.
Continued on next page
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Table E.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Type: External Node
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-3, OV-6c, SV-1b, SV-1c,
SV-4, SV-6
Maintenance Depot
Description: The Maintenance Depot includes any
operational unit outside of the system that performs
maintenance or support on the system. Although
the diagram only shows a need to communicate
with the Friendly Ground Unit node, the
Maintenance Depot can actually influence or
perform maintenance on the entire system
(including the MAV). The main purpose of this
node is to perform maintenance that cannot be
performed in the field by the Friendly Ground Unit.
Type: External Node
Views: OV-2, OV-3, OV-6c, SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-6
Strike Assets
Description: Strike assets are any operational unit
that has the capability to inflict damage on the
enemy. Examples include aircraft (A-10), ground
units (artillery), or sea based units (cruiser).
Type: External Node
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-3, OV-6c, SV-1b, SV-1c,
SV-4, SV-6
Graphical Arrow Types:
Needlines
Communicate with
Description: This needline includes sending ISR
Headquarters
information gathered to Headquarters, and receiving
both mission tasks and intelligence information
from Headquarters. Synonymous with ‘Information
Gathered, Mission Tasks, Intelligence Info’.
Information Exchange Direction: Bi-Directional
Operational Node 1: Headquarters
Operational Node 2: Friendly Ground Unit
Type: Operational Needline
Views: OV-2, OV-3, SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-6
Continued on next page
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Table E.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Communicate with Local
Description: Included in this needline are BDI
Strike Assets
request and feedback sent from and to the Strike
Assets. BDI request include the type of strike, last
known enemy positions (or location of strike) using
a standardized coordinate system, and when the
strike is scheduled (if not already occurred). BDI
feedback includes general information sent back to
the strike asset concerning BDI mission results.
Synonymous with ‘BDI Request and Feedback’.
Information Exchange Direction: Bidirectional
Operational Node 1: Strike Assets
Operational Node 2: Friendly Ground Unit
Type: Operational Needline
Views: OV-2, OV-3, SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-6
Navigation Data
Description: This needline represents a need to
receive navigation data from GPS Satellites. The
information needed includes the pseudorange
numbers and ephemeris data which is transmitted
by the satellites.
Information Exchange Direction: Unidirectional
From Operational Node: GPS Satellites
To Operational Node 2: MAV
Type: Operational Needline
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-3, OV-5, OV-7, SV-1b,
SV-1c, SV-4, SV-6
Platform Communication
Description: This needline shows that a need for
communication between the ground (Friendly
Ground Unit) and the airborne (MAV) operational
nodes is required. Such communication includes
request or commands to the MAV, gathered ISR
data sent from the MAV to the Friendly Ground
Unit, and a Platform Interface to allow the Friendly
Ground Unit to directly interact with the MAV.
Synonymous with ‘Data and Telemetry’.
Information Exchange Direction: Bidirectional
Operational Node 1: MAV
Operational Node 2: Friendly Ground Unit
Type: Operational Needline
Continued on next page
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Table E.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-3
System Maintenance
Description: This needline shows that there is a
Needed/Request
need for communication between the Maintenance
Depot and the Friendly Ground Unit nodes.
Included here is the Friendly Ground Units request
for maintenance to be performed on the system and
the Maintenance Depots acknowledgement of
completed maintenance. Such maintenance
requests occur whenever the Friendly Ground Unit
is not capable or it is out of the scope of field level
maintenance.
Information Exchange Direction: Bidirectional
Operational Node 1: Maintenance Depot
Operational Node 2: Friendly Ground Unit
Type: Operational Needline
Views: OV-2
Relationships
Operational Node
Organization Type
Friendly Ground Unit
Any size land based force (personnel and
equipment)
MAV
ISR Gathering and Disseminating
Operational Node
Operational Activity
Friendly Ground Unit
Process Information (A11), Provides Vehicle
Control and Communication (A12), Initialize MAV
(A21), Calibrate MAV (A22), Upload Mission
Profile (A23), Launch MAV (A24), Recover MAV
(A44), Provide Field Level Maintenance (A5)
MAV
Provides Flight Controls (A31), Provides Flight
Vehicle (A32), Enables Sensor Package (A33),
Calculate Flight Plan to Landing Zone (A41), Fly to
Landing Zone (A42), Perform Landing Sequence
(A43)
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Figure E.1

Consolidated OV-2
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Appendix F. MAV OV-3
As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, the OV-3 matrix, as with any defined matrix, is a set of
rows and columns where their intersections contain information. The rows contain all
information contained within a particular information exchange. Since the relationship
between needlines and exchanges are one-to-many they are categorized first by the
operational needline shown in the OV-2 and then by the information exchange identifiers
which are OV-3 unique. The columns show specific information based on the columns
heading. Many times, the column headings are tailored to the specific system type that
is being modeled. A template for a highly complex, secure, and detailed communication
system may have many extraneous columns for a simpler system with few information
exchanges. The tailored list below is the column headings with their meanings as defined
by DoDAF [24]. The columns outside the scope of this initial baseline architecture have
been marked Left Blank. This research will still show these empty columns in order to
allow for future detailed research. Following the column definitions are the OV-3 matrix
figures completed for the Baseline ISR MAV.

Row ID: Contains a unique row number for each row and is used for easier
referencing (instead of having to recite the information exchange identifier).
Needline Identifier: Identifies the needline as shown in the OV-2 operational node
connectivity diagram that carries the information exchange.
Information Exchange Identifier: Identifies the information exchange, based on
and contained within an operational needline, and is unique to the OV-3 matrix.
Information Element Name: Shows the corresponding information element, as
shown in the OV-7, for the information exchange. This column can also include
the information flow from the OV-5 if the OV-7 is not available or does not go into
sufficient depth. For this research this column is based on information flows from
the OV-5.
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Content: Content of the information element, meaning the actual information to be
exchanged.
Scope: Description of the extent or range of the information element content.
Accuracy: Degree to which the information conforms to actual fact as required by
the operational node.
Language: Identifies the codes or natural languages involved in the information
exchange (multinational). Left Blank
Sending Op Node Name: Name of the operational node from the OV-2 that
produces the information.
Sending Op Activity Name and ID: Name and identifier of the operational activity
from the OV-5 producing the information.
Receiving Op Node Name: Name of the operational node from the OV-2 that
consumes the information.
Receiving Op Activity Name and ID: Name and identifier of the operational
activity from the OV-5 consuming the information.
Mission/Scenario, UJTL, METL, or AFTL: Joint Mission Area, cross-mission
area domain, Univeral Joint Task List (UJTL) activity, related specific scenario, Air
Force Task List (AFTL), or other mission/scenario task-related publication. For this
research the AFTL were used as outlined earlier in the traceability section (4.2).
Transaction Type: Contains the type of exchange (in high-level terms).
Triggering Event: Textual description of the event(s) shown in the OV-6C that
triggers the information exchange. If triggering events are not included in the
OV-6C then this column is not required however an example of such a event can be
given as the case with this research.
Interoperability Level Required (from C4ISR WG): Level of Information
Systems Interoperability (LISI), or other interoperability measure. This research
used the C4ISR Working Groups [10] interoperability levels. There are 5 possible
levels of interoperability an information exchange can have, numbered 0 to 4. Level
F-2

0 is termed the Isolated Level and consists of manual access control procedures,
manual infrastructure and private data. Level 1 is termed the Connected Level
and consists of a security profile, two or one way infrastructure, and basic data
formats. Level 2 is termed the Functional Level and consists of a common operating
environment, a local area network (LAN) infrastructure, program models, and
advanced data formats. Level 3 is termed the Domain Level and consists of
domain procedures, a wide area network (WAN), database management system
(DBMS), and domain models. Level 4 consists of enterprise procedures (DoD,
Multi-National), multiple dimensional topologies, and cross enterprise models.
Criticality: The criticality assessment of the information being exchanged in
relationship of the mission being performed, meaning how essential is it to the
overall mission or capability.
Periodicity: How often the information exchange occurs; may be an average or
worst case estimate and can include conditions.
Timeliness: Required maximum allowable time of exchange from node to node.
This research uses in minutes and in seconds to state the order of measurement to
be used for the information exchange.
Access Control: The class of mechanisms used to ensure only those authorized
can access information. Left Blank
Availability: The relative level of effort required to be expended to ensure that the
information can be accessed. Left Blank
Confidentiality: The kind of protection required for information to prevent
unintended disclosure. Left Blank
Dissemination Control: The kind of restrictions on receivers of the information
based on sensitivity of information. Left Blank
Integrity: The kind of requirements for checks that the content of the information
has not been altered. Left Blank
Accountability:
Security principle that ensures that responsibility for
actions/events can be given to an organization willingly or by obligation.
Left Blank
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Protection (Type, Name, Duration): Name for the type of protection and how
long the information must be safeguarded. Left Blank
Classification: Classification code for the information. Left Blank
Classification Caveat: A set of restrictions on information of a specific classification; supplements a security classification with information on access, dissemination, and other types of restrictions. Left Blank
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Figure F.1

OV-3 Operational Information Exchange Matrix 1
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Figure F.2

OV-3 Operational Information Exchange Matrix 2
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Figure F.3

OV-3 Operational Information Exchange Matrix 3
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Figure F.4

OV-3 Operational Information Exchange Matrix 4
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Figure F.5

OV-3 Operational Information Exchange Matrix 5
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Appendix G. MAV OV-4
Table G.1 – AV-2 Integrated Dictionary
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Graphical Box Types:
Organizations
AF Materiel Command
Description: This is the overarching acquisition and
development command for the two main
organizations, AF research labs and the UAV
system program office. While there may be more
levels of command between this organization and
AFMC, it is represented here to show its
comparison to the AF Special Operations
Command level. It is responsible for the cradle to
grave management of the MAV system
(development, acquisition, sustainment, tech
support, and retirement of the system).
Type of Organization: Command Level
Organization
Views: OV-4
AF Special Operations
Description: This is the overarching special
Command
operations command that controls the user for this
system. Other commands may also have users of
the system (i.e. Air Combat Command), however,
for this view, AFSOC will represent any and all
users of the system. It is responsible for training,
supporting, and directing its materiel towards the
goals of the combatant commanders in the realm of
special operations.
Type of Organization: Command Level
Organization
Views: OV-4
AF Research Lab or Munitions Description: This organization is in directorate
Directorate
level control of the developing offices and teams of
the MAV. It is states as either an AF Research Lab
or Munitions Directorate because the intuitive
choice of an AF Research Lab is not the only
possible case. It is responsible for managing its
programs and offices within its given budget,
constraints and directives toward the goals of
developing new and emerging technology.
Continued on next page
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Table G.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Type of Organization: Directorate Level
Organization
Views: OV-4
UAV System Program Office
Description: This organization is either a dedicated
System Program Office (SPO) for Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAV) or is the Basket SPO that would
control the MAV system. It is responsible for the
Operational Safety, Suitability, and Effectiveness
(OSS&E) of all UAV systems under its control.
Type of Organization: Directorate Level
Organization
Views: OV-4
MAV Lab
Description: This organization is responsible for the
actual development of the MAV system and its
capabilities. After technology development and
demonstration, it will transition it to the MAV SPO.
It is responsible for the Operational Safety,
Suitability, and Effectiveness (OSS&E) of the MAV
system.
Type of Organization: Division Level Organization
Views: OV-4
MAV System Program Office
Description: This organization is responsible for the
Operational Safety, Suitability, and Effectiveness
(OSS&E) of the MAV system. It is the single face
to the user that handles new acquisition of the
system, its parts, any technical support issues from
the user, modifications, and maintenance plans/
directives on the system.
Type of Organization: Directorate or Division Level
Organization
Views: OV-4
Mission Support
Description: This organization is responsible for
training, equipping, and supporting the special
operation forces to enable them to perform their
missions. They will maintain the MAV systems,
beyond field repair requirements. They will act as
the user representative to the SPO on any technical
issues regarding the MAV inventory.
Continued on next page
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Table G.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Type of Organization: Directorate Level
Organization
Views: OV-4
Operations
Description: This organization is responsible for
directing the special operations forces in
completing their missions. Its main responsibility is
to execute their directed missions from the
combatant commanders. This organization is
represented as the Local Commander/ Headquarters
on the OV-2 diagram.
Type of Organization: Directorate Level
Organization
Views: OV-4
Engineering
Description: This organization is responsible for the
technical aspects of the system. In the MAV Lab
hierarchy it is responsible for the research, design,
integration, and test of the system. In the SPO
hierarchy it is responsible for the technical orders,
modifications, and technical issues related to the
MAV. It will likely have a chief engineering who
will be the primary advisor the parent organizations
chief officer on any OSS&E issues.
Type of Organization: Branch Level Organization
Views: OV-4
Program Management
Description: This organization is responsible for all
management aspects of the system. In both the
MAV Lab and SPO this organization manages
planning, programming, and budgeting of the
system. It also manages the acquisition cycle
aspects of the system.
Type of Organization: Branch Level Organization
Views: OV-4
Continued on next page
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Table G.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Flight Systems
Description: This organization is responsible for the
MAV flight systems. Specifically it is responsible
for the aircraft portion of the system. In the MAV
Lab this organization develops and demonstrates
designs for the aircraft. In the SPO this organization
handles any issues related to the fielded aircraft
(T.O. changes, field questions, modifications).
Type of Organization: Section Level Organization
Views: OV-4
Ground Systems
Description: This organization is responsible for the
MAV ground systems. Specifically it is responsible
for the portion of the system that remains on the
ground during operation. In the MAV Lab this
organization develops and demonstrates designs for
the ground systems. In the SPO this organization
handles any issues related to the fielded ground
system (T.O. changes, field questions,
modifications).
Type of Organization: Section Level Organization
Views: OV-4
Sensor Systems
Description: This organization is responsible for the
MAV sensor systems. Specifically it is responsible
for the various sensor capabilities used by the MAV
system. In the MAV Lab this organization develops
and demonstrates designs for various sensors. In the
SPO this organization handles any issues related to
the fielded sensors (T.O. changes, field questions,
modifications).
Type of Organization: Section Level Organization
Views: OV-4
Continued on next page
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Table G.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Integration Section
Description: This organization works with the
members of the flight systems, ground system, and
sensor systems sections to produce an integrated,
testable design for demonstration. This
organization likely relies on system engineering
principles and products. As an alternative to this
organization, an integrated team of the mentioned
sections with a single human role of systems
engineer could potentially serve the same function.
Type of Organization: Section Level Organization
Views: OV-4
Test Section
Description: This organization works with all of the
sections to test and evaluate a full MAV design for
technology demonstration. Following successful
test and evaluation, the designs may or may not be
transitioned to the SPO for full system production.
Type of Organization: Section Level Organization
Views: OV-4
Research Section
Description: This organization is responsible for
research related to new or emerging technology
related to the MAV system. It works to integrate
findings from that research into actionable
technology for use by the other sections.
Type of Organization: Section Level Organization
Views: OV-4
Academic Institutions
Description: These organizations operate under
research grants to develop new and emerging
technology as directed through the research section
of the MAV lab. Their findings are then transitioned
into useful technology for inclusion in MAV system
design.
Type of Organization: Consultant Organization
Views: OV-4
Continued on next page

G-5

Table G.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Contractor Support
Description: This organization can be of any size or
level. It is responsible for performing its contractual
obligations to the government in support of the
office it has been contracted to. Various contracts
can be performed. Research contracts with the
MAV Lab seek to develop technology or integrate
existing designs to produce initial design units for
demonstration. Production contracts with the SPO
seek to simply produce already designed systems
for fielding.
Type of Organization: Consultant Organization
Views: OV-4
Logistics Management
Description: This organization is responsible for the
logistical support required to keep the MAV
systems in inventory operational. It acquires,
maintains, and distributes parts as needed to keep
the MAVs operational.
Type of Organization: Branch Level Organization
Views: OV-4
Field Teams
Description: These organizations are the actual
operators of the MAV System. They are organized
by mission, but typically are between 1 and 10
members. They combine with the ground system of
the MAV to represent the Friendly Ground Unit as
displayed in the OV-2 diagram.
Type of Organization: Section Level
Views: OV-4
Development Team
Description: This organization is the combined
team of all member organizations required to
develop the MAV system. It includes all members
of the MAV lab as well as representation from the
Academic Institution and Contractor Support.
Type of Organization: Integrated Team
Views: OV-4
Continued on next page
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Table G.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
SPO Team
Description: This organization is the combined
team of all member organizations required to
perform the role of SPO for the MAV system. It
includes all members of the MAV SPO as well as
representation from Contractor Support.
Type of Organization: Integrated Team
Views: OV-4
Graphical Arrow Types:
Organizational Relationships
Command Relationships
Description: These relationships are represented by
solid lines connecting organizations. They represent
command between the higher organization and its
sub-organizations. It implies reporting
responsibility, budgetary roll-up, and other
considerations regarding a chain of command.
Type: Hierarchical
Technology Transition / Spiral Description: This relationship represents the MAV
Feedback
Lab in general transitions the technology to the
MAV SPO. It also represents that in general the
MAV SPO will provide feedback for future spirals
of the existing design to help focus efforts of the
MAV Lab.
Type: General Responsibilities
Organizations: MAV Lab and MAV SPO
Sustainment / Spiral Feedback Description: This relationship represents the MAV
SPO in general is responsible for sustaining the
MAV system to the Mission Support. In return,
Mission Support will provide feedback to the MAV
SPO for future design spirals.
Type: General Responsibilities
Organizations: MAV SPO and Mission Support
Program Interface
Description: The relationship shows the
communication link between the two program
management organizations. While there will likely
be more inter-sectional communication between the
MAV Lab and the MAV SPO, the Program
Management organizations will have an formal
communication regarding documented milestones,
requirements, etc.
Continued on next page
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Table G.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Type: Communication
Organizations: Program Management (MAV Lab)
and Program Management (MAV SPO)
Research Contracts
Description: This relationship represents the
contractual responsibility of the Contractor Support
to the Program Management (MAV Lab) to work
on a research related contract.
Type: Under Contract
Organizations: Program Management (MAV Lab)
and Contractor Support
Research Grants
Description: This relationship represents the
contractual responsibility of the Academic
Institution to the Research Section to work under a
research grant.
Type: Under Contract
Organizations: Research Section and Academic
Institutions
Production Contracts
Description: This relationship represents the
contractual responsibility of the Contractor Support
to the Program Management (MAV SPO) to work
on a production related contract.
Type: Under Contract
Organizations: Program Management (MAV SPO)
and Contractor Support
Tech Support
Description: This relationship is the act of the
operators working through Mission Support to
request clarification on issues regarding the MAV
system. Mission Support would use this
communication to seek help on T.O. questions,
maintenance deviations, etc.
Type: Communication
Organizations: SPO Team and Mission Support
Supply / Equip
Description: This relationship is the act of the
Mission Support Organization providing
operationally ready MAV systems to the operators
and re-supplying or repairing those systems as
needed.
Type: Physical Interface
Continued on next page
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Table G.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Organizations: Mission Support and Field Teams
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Figure G.1

OV-4 Organizational Relationships Diagram
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Appendix H. MAV OV-5
Data Elements
Graphical Box
Types
Calibrate MAV

Table H.1 – Functional Entities
Example Values/Explanation
ID
(Block A22)

Enable
Land/Recover
MAV

(Block A4)

Enable Launch
MAV

(Block A2)

Enables Sensor
Package

(Block A33)

Fly to Landing
Zone
Initialize MAV

(Block A42)

Launch MAV

(Block A24)

Process
Information

(Block A11)

Provide
Command and
Control

(Block A-2)

(Block A21)

Set home position for MAV and ensure all onboard
navigation systems are getting or sending correct
information.
Similar to Enable Launch MAV where the system
receives the updated mission profile, flies to the
landing zone and performs the landing sequence.
The last action is by the user when the MAV is
physically picked up and inspected for damage
before returning to service.
All activities pertaining to providing the MAV
with a mission and setting it on that mission. This
includes the functions of initialization by the
operator, calibrating the navigation systems,
uploading the mission, and physically launching
the MAV.
Ensures that the desired sensor packages can be
carried onboard. This refers mainly to fuselage
space, cooling, powering the sensor, etc.
The MAV will fly to the landing zone directed by
the landing instructions.
Power on the MAV and make sure all connections
are functioning.
Power on the propulsion system and physically
throw the MAV.
Refers to both the hardware processing via laptop
or other device as well as the human user making
decisions based on the gathered information
The function performed by headquarters or similar
official body.
Continued on next page
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Graphical Box
Types
Provide Field
Level
Maintenance

Table H.1 – continued from previous page
ID
(Block A5)

Provide GPS
System
Provide ISR
Capabilities

(Block A-1)

Provide Non
Field-Level
Maintenance
Provide Strike
Assets
Provides Flight
Controls

(Block A-3)

(Block A0)

(Block A-4)
(Block A31)

Provides Flight
Vehicle

(Block A32)

Provides ISR
MAV Platform

(Block A3)

Provides Vehicle
Control and
Communication

(Block A12)

Recover MAV

(Block A44)

Upload Mission
Profile

(Block A23)

This encompasses any field level repairs done to
the MAV either before or after the mission
including, but not limited to: changing batteries,
changing/repairing wings, swapping out sensor
packages, changing/repair propellers, etc.
The navigation data coming from the GPS
satellites.
The main purpose of the system is to provide an
extension to the tools the SOF teams already
employ in the field.
Any maintenance on the MAV which cannot be
performed in the field, i.e. repairing the fuselage or
sensor packages.
The information provided by the MAV will be
used to direct strike missions by the strike assets.
Autopilot and all relevant sensor hardware
required for autonomous or remotely piloted
control of the MAV.
Refers to the physical air platform which is
capable of carrying the sensor package, navigation
systems, propulsion and batteries necessary for
mission execution.
The other main function of this system is to
provide a usable MAV considering form, fit and
function as it relates to carriage and operation in a
mission scenario.
This can be considered to be the functions
provided by the ground station radio. The data
from the MAV is decoded and sent to the users
computer or display from here. Also, the flight
plan is sent from the users input system to the
MAV via the hardware and communication
methods designed into the system.
The user physically picks up the MAV and inspects
it for damage.
The operator sends the desired mission profile to
the MAV.
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Data
Elements
Graphical
Arrow Types
Actuator
Commands

Table H.2 – Activity Diagram ICOMs
Example Values/Explanation
Origin

Destination

A31

A32

Airframe
Fault

A3

A5

Calibration
Fault

A22

A5

Decoded
Flight
Telemetry
Decoded
Sensor
Package Data
Flight Control
Fault

A12

A12

A12

A11

The sensor package data after it passes
through the ground communication suite.

A31

A5

Flight Control
Feedback

A32

A31

Flight Fault

A41

A5

Flight Plan

A11

A12

Flight Rules
or Airspace
Deconfliction

N/A

A1

A failure in the flight control system.
Includes failures of flight control computer,
servos or attachments to flight control
surfaces.
Feedback from the flight path monitoring
hardware (i.e. gyros, accelerometers, GPS
receiver) to the navigation computer.
Refers to any error encountered after the
landing zone coordinates are given to the
MAV.
The waypoints or mission profile sent from
the user to the autopilot.
Any external limitations such as weather,
terrain or the local airspace condition
which would affect the usage or flight plan
of the system.
Continued on next page

The communication between the flight
control computer/autopilot system and the
actuators or servos.
Generic error reported to the user
comprising of any or all of the following:
flight control fault, flight vehicle fault, and
sensor package fault.
This fault consists of the navigation system
being unable to acquire sufficient satellite
coverage to determine its current position.
The fault can also refer to a failure of the
relative positional sensors or a failure of
the flight control system.
The flight telemetry data after it passes
through the ground communication suite.
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Graphical
Arrow Types
Flight Vehicle
Fault

Table H.2 – continued from previous page
Origin Destination
A32

A5

Fused Target
Information

A11

A-2

Fused Target
Information
Ground
Station

A11

A-4

N/A

A0 Tunneled

Ground
Station Fault

A12

A5

Human
Operator
Initialization
Fault
Land
Decision
Landing Fault

N/A

A0 Tunneled

A21

A5

A12

A41

A4

A5

Launch
Decision
Launch Fault

A12

A21

A24

A5

MAV Landed

A41

A42

Failure in the structure of the flight vehicle.
Can result from impact with foreign
airborne objects or material / construction
defects of the MAV.
The processed information gathered from
the MAV and sent back to headquarters or
decision making authority for further
processing or action.
Any processed information requiring
action from a strike asset.
The communication hardware necessary to
send and receive all pertinent information
as well as the required hardware to display
the information to the user.
Any equipment failure resulting in the
inability of the operator to receive, transmit
or interpret information coming to or from
the MAV. This includes failures in the
display device, the radio equipment or
ground based wiring or requisite batteries.
The human user of the system responsible
for system use and repair.
Failure of the onboard power systems or
other inability to pass built-in internal test.
Either a user directed landing or mission
completion resulting in the need to land.
Generic error comprising of either a flight
fault or a recovery fault.
The decision to launch the MAV.
Any post upload failure resulting in the
MAVs inability to perform the mission.
This is most likely an operator launch error
due to environmental conditions.
MAV arrives at the landing zone and the
airspeed is zero.
Continued on next page
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Graphical
Arrow Types
MAV Launch
Fault

Table H.2 – continued from previous page
Origin Destination
A2

A5

Mission
Operable
Recovery
Mission
Operating
Procedures
Navigation
Data

A42

A11

N/A

A0 Tunneled

A-1

A31

Operational
MAVs

A-3

A0 Tunneled

Power On

A21

A22

Raw Flight
Telemetry
Data
Raw Sensor
Package Data

A31

A12

A33

A12

Recovery
Fault

A42

A5

Repairs
Required
Sensor
Package Fault
Successful
Calibration
Successful
Launch

A5

A-3

A33

A5

A22

A23

A24

A31

Any failure resulting from the onboard
systems inability to power on, be calibrated
or to upload the mission profile.
The desired state for the MAV. It has
performed the mission, has landed and is
prepared to be launched again.
Any specific flight or usage restrictions
imposed by the particular mission.
GPS signal or inertial data required for the
autopilot and user to know where the MAV
is and where it is headed.
These are either resupply or repaired
MAVs coming from the non-field level
MAV repair site.
All systems have power and are prepared
for calibration.
Airborne communication feedback coming
from the guidance system on the MAV to
the ground station communication gear.
Airborne communication which sends the
data from the sensor(s) onboard the MAV
to the ground station communication gear.
Any fault making the MAV unrecoverable.
The main source of this error would be
controlled flight into terrain or impact with
foreign airborne object on-route to the
landing zone.
Systems identified as needed repairs which
cannot be performed in the field.
Any fault resulting the in the inability of
the sensor package to perform its purpose.
All flight required systems have been
successfully calibrated.
MAV is carrying out the uploaded mission.
Continued on next page
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Graphical
Arrow Types
Successful
Upload

Table H.2 – continued from previous page
Origin Destination
A23

A24

System
Repair Status

A5

A11

Tasking

A-2

A11

Upload Fault

A23

A5

User
Commands
User
Commands

A12

A21

A12

A22

User
Commands

A12

A23

User
Commands
User
Commands

A12

A24

A12

A31

User
Commands

A12

A33

User
Commands

A12

A41

The mission profile was successfully
received and interpreted by the navigation
computer.
The status of the system after some fault
has been generated in the system. This
information goes back to the user for
operational impact determination.
Refers either to an internally or externally
generated need for intelligence resulting in
deployment of the MAV system.
Any fault resulting in failure of the mission
profile to be properly received or
interpreted by the navigation computer.
The operator readies the MAV for launch
and turns on power to the onboard systems.
Instructions sent to the MAV which
calibrate the navigation system and/or the
onboard sensor package.
The user sends the autonomous mission
profile to the navigation computer
consisting of waypoints, altitudes,
climb/dive parameters, etc.
Consists of physically launching the
system into the air.
The user can manually control the flight
path of the plane within control surface
limitations.
Provision allowing the user to either
activate or deactivate the sensor package
while in flight.
Updating the mission profile with the
landing zone coordinates and desired flight
path to that landing zone.
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Figure H.1

OV-5 External System Diagram
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Figure H.2

OV-5 Context Diagram
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Figure H.3

OV-5 Initial Decomposition
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Figure H.4

OV-5 Provide Information Processing
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Figure H.5

OV-5 Enable Launch MAV
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Figure H.6

OV-5 Provide ISR MAV Platform
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Figure H.7

OV-5 Enable Land/Recover MAV
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Appendix I. MAV OV-6c
Table I.1 – AV-2 Integrated Dictionary
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Graphical Box Types:
Swimlane/Operational Node
Friendly Ground Unit
Description: See OV-2 Operational Node
Description Concept Graphics.
Type: Swimlane/ Operational Node
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-5, OV-6c, SV-1b
MAV
Description: See OV-1 High-Level Operational
Concept Graphics.
Type: Swimlane/ Operational Node
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-5, OV-6c, SV-1b
Local
Description: See OV-2 Operational Node
Commander/Headquarters
Description.
Type: Swimlane/ Operational Node
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-5, OV-6c, SV-1b
GPS Satellites
Description: See OV-1 High-Level Operational
Concept Graphics.
Type: Swimlane/ Operational Node
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-5, OV-6c, SV-1b
Strike Assets
Description: See OV-1 High-Level Operational
Concept Graphics.
Type: Swimlane/ Operational Node
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-5, OV-6c, SV-1b
Graphical Box Types:
Unit of Behavior/Action
Direct Mission
Description: This action is the initiating action of
the sequence. A mission for the Friendly Ground
Unit is assigned and communicated to it. It occurs
in the external system Local Commander/
Headquarters.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.1
OV-5 Reference: A-2
Views: OV-6c
Decision to Launch MAV
Description: This action can take place once a
mission has been assigned. It is the act of deciding
to employ the MAV system to complete all or part
of the mission. The Friendly Ground Unit performs
this action.
Continued on next page
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Table I.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.2
OV-5 Reference: A11
Views: OV-6c
Receive GPS Signals
Description: This action receives the GPS signals
sent by satellites, converts them into useable
navigation data, and determines the location of the
MAV respectively. This action is performed by the
MAV.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.3
OV-5 Reference: A31
Views: OV-6c
Send GPS Signal
Description: This action sends GPS signals to the
MAV for use in navigation. The external system
GPS Satellites performs this action. In this
architecture it is assumed that the action of Send
GPS Signals is occurring and continues to occur in
a sufficient manner to allow for proper navigation
by the MAV.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.4
OV-5 Reference: A-1
Views: OV-6c
Initialize System
Description: This action is a combination of the
following tasks: 1) unpack and setup all
components of the MAV system to include the
ground station, user interface, MAV, etc., 2)
program initial flight plan if necessary, and 3)
calibrate the MAV. While the first action is
temporally necessary before the other two, the latter
two actions can occur independent of each other.
All of the actions are the responsibility of the
Friendly Ground Unit.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.5
OV-5 Reference: A21
Views: OV-6c
Continued on next page
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Table I.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
MAV Ready for Launch
Description: This action is a systems check and
confirmation of operationally ready status of the
MAV. This action notifies the Friendly Ground Unit
that the MAV is ready for launch. It is in response
to the calibrate function within the previous
Initialize System action. This action is the
responsibility of the MAV.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.6
OV-5 Reference: A2
Views: OV-6c
Launch MAV
Description: This action is the physical act of
lofting the MAV into the air to allow its flight
systems to take over maintaining flight. It is an
action that the Friendly Ground Unit is responsible
for.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.7
OV-5 Reference: A24
Views: OV-6c
Update Mission Profile
Description: This action allows the friendly ground
unit to either re-program a different mission profile
or fly the MAV manually (i.e. real-time mission
profile updating). The Friendly Ground Unit is
responsible for this action.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.8
OV-5 Reference: A23
Views: OV-6c
Continued on next page
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Table I.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Perform Mission Profile
Description: This action encompasses all of the
actions necessary for the MAV to maintain flight in
the manner set forth by the mission profile that it
has been programmed with. It includes flying to set
waypoints, responding to direct navigation
commands (turn, climb, descend, etc.), or any other
flight plan that the Friendly Ground Unit commands
it to perform as allows by the rules of
aerodynamics. This action is the responsibility of
the MAV.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.9
OV-5 Reference: A3
Views: OV-6c
Direct Land Sequence
Description: This action is the act of the Friendly
ground unit commanding the MAV system to enter
into a landing sequence. It includes the initial
command to land the MAV as well as any info
processing and transmittal of that info to the MAV
that it would require to perform the land sequence.
It could be a command to return to base, land at
current location, or another location as specified.
This action is the responsibility of the Friendly
Ground Unit.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.10
OV-5 Reference: A12
Views: OV-6c
Receive Sensor Info
Description: This action is the act of the friendly
ground unit receiving sensor info sent from the
MAV. It is the responsibility of the Friendly Ground
Unit.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.11
OV-5 Reference: A12
Views: OV-6c
Continued on next page
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Table I.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Collect Sensor Info
Description: This action is the MAV sensor system
obtaining information as directed. The sensors
could be many types (still camera, video camera, IR
camera, NBC sniffer, etc.). It is the responsibility of
the MAV to perform this act.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.12
OV-5 Reference: A33
Views: OV-6c
Perform Land Sequence
Description: This action is the MAV responding to
the command of the friendly ground unit to land
and performing that landing. It is the responsibility
of the MAV.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.13
OV-5 Reference: A43
Views: OV-6c
Process Info
Description: This action is the friendly ground unit
processing the collected sensor info from the MAV
into usable ISR info. It includes image processing,
data overlay (GPS coordinates, descriptors, etc),
and formatting for human user interface. It is the
responsibility of the Friendly Ground Unit.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.14
OV-5 Reference: A11
Views: OV-6c
Recover MAV
Description: This is the physical act of retrieving
the MAV from its landing position and preparing it
for either another mission or stowed transport. It is
the responsibility of the Friendly Ground Unit.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.15
OV-5 Reference: A44
Views: OV-6c
Continued on next page
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Table I.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Transmit Sensor Info
Description: This action is the MAV packaging and
transmitting of the collected sensor info back to the
friendly ground unit. It is the responsibility of the
MAV.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.16
OV-5 Reference: A33
Views: OV-6c
Transmit ISR Info
Description: This action is the friendly ground unit
packaging and sending the ISR info as necessary to
either the Local Commander/ Headquarters or
Strike Assets. The Friendly Ground Unit is
responsible for this action.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.17
OV-5 Reference: A11
Views: OV-6c
Receive ISR Info
Description: This action is Local Commander/
Headquarters receiving the ISR info sent from the
friendly ground unit. It is the responsibility of the
external system Local Commander/ Headquarters.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.18
OV-5 Reference: A-2
Views: OV-6c
Receive ISR Info
Description: This action is the Strike Assets
receiving the ISR info sent from the friendly ground
unit. It is the responsibility of the external system
Strike Asset.
Type: Unit of Behavior/ Action
Reference ID: 1.19
OV-5 Reference: A-3
Views: OV-6c
Graphical Arrow Types
Links
Description: All links represent precedence
between actions. All links imply that the task
pointed to cannot occur until the task pointed from
occurs.
Continued on next page
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Table I.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Type: Temporal
Junction
Description: The junction allows alternate paths to
occur. The one junction that occurs in this view
denotes that once Launch MAV has occurred,
Update Mission Profile, Direct Land Sequence, or
Perform Mission Profile can then occur. It also
provides a tie-in to allow Update Mission Profile to
affect the Perform Mission Profile action. In other
words, manual inputs can then affect how the MAV
performs its mission.
Type: NA
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Figure I.1

OV-6c Operational Event-Trace Description
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Appendix J. MAV OV-7
Table J.1 – AV-2 Integrated Dictionary
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Graphical Box Types:
Entities
Navigation Data
Description: Entity that represents positional data
provided by the GPS constellation for use by the
MAV.
Type: Independent Entity
Keys: SatPRN (PK)
Dependent Entities: Raw Data
Attributes: Ephemeris
Tasking
Description: Entity containing information required
to uniquely identify each tasking.
Type: Independent Entity
Keys: TaskID (PK)
Dependent Entities: User Commands
Attributes: Requester, Priority, Instructions
System Status
Description: Entity containing MAV ISR system
fault information.
Type: Dependent
Keys: Status (PK), VehicleID (FK), SensorID (FK),
SatPRN (FK)
Dependent Entities: User Commands
Attributes: MAVLaunch Fault, Airframe Fault,
Ground Station Fault, Navigation Fault
User Commands
Description: Entity containing the information
relevant for the initialization and use of the MAV
ISR collection system.
Type: Dependent
Keys: TaskID (PFK), Status (PFK)
Attributes: Flight Plan
Raw Flight Telemetry Data
Description: Entity containing unprocessed vehicle
telemetry information.
Type: Category
Keys: VehicleID (PK),SatPRN (FK)
Attributes: Vehicle Parameters
Raw Sensor Package Data
Description: Entity containing unprocessed
information gathered by the sensor package.
Continued on next page
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Table J.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Type: Category
Keys: SensorID (PK)
Attributes: Sensor Data
Raw Data
Description: Entity containing unprocessed MAV
ISR platform and sensor information.
Type: Generic Dependent
Keys: VehicleID (PK), SensorID (PK), TaskID
(PFK), Status (PFK), SatPRN(PFK)
Attributes: Decoded Sensor Package Data,
FaultCodes
Fused Target Information
Description: Entity containing the processed MAV
ISR information.
Type: Dependent
Keys: TaskID (PFK), VehicleID (FK), SensorID
(FK), SatPRN(FK)
Attributes: ISR Information
Graphical Arrow Types:
Relationships
Tasking to User Commands
Relationship: Required for
Multiplicity: 1–* to 1
System Status to Navigation
Relationship: Requires
Data
Multiplicity: 1 to 0..*
User Commands to System
Relationship: Requires
Status
Multiplicity: 1 to 1
Raw Data to Navigation Data
Relationship: Uses
Multiplicity: 1 to 1..*
System Status to Raw Data
Relationship: interprets
Multiplicity: 1 to 1
Raw Data to User Commands
Relationship: Requires
Multiplicity: 1..* to 1
Fused Target Information to
Relationship: Requires
Raw Data
Multiplicity: 1 to 1..*
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Figure J.1

Logical Data Model (OV-7)
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Appendix K. MAV SV-1
Table K.1 – AV-2 Integrated Dictionary
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Graphical Box Types:
System Nodes
Friendly Ground Unit
Synonymous with the Friendly Ground Unit
operational node (reference the OV-2 definition
table)
MAV
Synonymous with the MAV operational node
(reference the OV-2 definition table)
Graphical Box Types:
Systems
Air Vehicle
Description: The Air Vehicle system allows other
systems within the MAV system node to operate as
airborne systems. Functions performed by this
system include: Take Flight, Flight Control, Power
Source, and Flight Data Protocol. Examples of
hardware systems that could perform these
functions are an aircraft fuselage with wings,
autopilot, and/or a battery. Synonymous to Perform
Air Vehicle Functions.
Type: System
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Field Communication System
Description: The Field Communication System
allows the Human Operator to communicate
gathered ISR information and mission directives
with higher Headquarters and/or Strike Assets.
Such a system can include items such as SATCOM
or a hand held radio. This system performs the
following functions: Transmit ISR Info, Receive
Directives, Modulate ISR Info, and De-Modulate
Directives. Synonymous to Provide Field
Communication.
Type: System
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
GPS Satellites
Description: The Global Positioning System
consists of a constellation of satellites providing
pseudorange numbers and ephemeris data. Ground
based receivers use this information to calculate
their location.
Continued on next page
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Table K.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Type: External System
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-3, OV-6c, SV-1b, SV-1c,
SV-4, SV-6
Headquarters
Description: Headquarters encompasses any unit or
group that the operator is required to report to, or is
considered at a higher level in the operators chain
of command. This unit can be stationed locally in
respect to the operator (in the field) or remote (far
away from the operator). Headquarters can do any
number of tasks, including making decisions based
on gathered intelligence, assigning missions or
directives to field units, or providing intelligence
information. Synonymous to AOC or Local
Commanders.
Type: External System
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-3, OV-6c, SV-1b, SV-1c,
SV-4, SV-6
Human Computer Interface
Description: The HCI system includes those items
(HCI)
that give feedback (display, speakers) to users, or
Human Operator, as well as those that allow users to
supply input to the system (keyboard, mouse, touch
screen, microphone). Its system functions include
Give Feedback and Accept Input. Synonymous to
Provide Human Computer Interface.
Type: System
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Human Operator
Description: The Human Operator system is a
model of the operators role in the system. The
operator either affects the system through direct
contact (Platform Interface and Field Comm
Interface), through the HCI system (User Feedback
and Inputs interface), or through the request of
outside maintenance to the Maintenance Depot
system. Functions performed by the Human
Operator are Process Info, Influence System, Route
Info, and Maintain System. Synonymous to
Perform Human Operator Functions.
Type: System
Continued on next page
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Table K.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Maintenance Depot
Description: The Maintenance Depot includes any
unit or outside system that performs maintenance or
support on all internal systems. Although the
diagram only shows an interface with the Human
Operator system, the Maintenance Depot actually
interfaces with all systems in both system nodes.
Since this maintenance function is viewed external
its interfaces are not shown. To better define, the
main purpose of this system is to perform
maintenance that cannot be performed in the field
by the Human Operator.
Type: External System
Views: OV-2, OV-3, OV-6c, SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-6
MAV Airborne
Description: The MAV Airborne Communication
Communication System
System allows airborne systems (MAV) to
communicate gathered data, directives, and status
information with ground systems (Friendly Ground
Unit). This system accomplishes this by ensuring
that data can be sent to and received from the MAV
Ground Communication System. System functions
include: Transmit Data, Receive MAV Directives,
Modulate Data, De-Modulate MAV Directives, and
Accept Supplied Power. Examples of such
hardware equipment include transmitters, receivers
and antennas. Synonymous to Provide MAV
Airborne Communication System.
Type: System
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Continued on next page
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Table K.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
MAV Ground Communication Description: The MAV Ground Communication
System
System allows ground systems (Friendly Ground
Unit) to communicate directives with the airborne
systems (MAV). This system accomplishes this by
ensuring that data can be sent to and received from
the MAV Airborne Communication System.
System functions include: Transmit MAV
Directives, Receive Data, Modulate MAV
Directives, and De-Modulate Data. Examples of
such hardware equipment include transmitters,
receivers and antennas. Synonymous to Provide
MAV Ground Communication System.
Type: System
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Payload or Sensor Package
Description: The Payload or Sensor Package
systems purpose is to collect and provide the
needed ISR information. It accomplishes this by
performing the following functions: Enable ISR
Capability, Convert Data, and Payload Data
Protocol. This system utilizes the power source
supplied by the Air Vehicle system to obtain ISR
information and send it to the MAV Airborne
Communication System. Synonymous to Perform
Payload or Sensor Package Functions.
Type: System
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Signal/Data Processor
Description: The Signal/Data Processor system
Processes, Converts, and Manipulates data (those
are the system functions) such that the proper data
packets can be delivered to the HCI and the MAV
Ground Communication System.
Type: System
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Strike Assets
Description: Strike assets are any operational unit
that has the capability to inflict damage on the
enemy. Examples include aircraft (A-10), ground
units (artillery), or sea based units (cruiser).
Type: External System
Continued on next page
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Table K.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-3, OV-6c, SV-1b, SV-1c,
SV-4, SV-6
Graphical Arrow Types:
Interfaces
BDI Request and Feedback
Description: Included in this interface are BDI
request and feedback sent from and to the Strike
Assets through the Field Communication System.
BDI request include the type of strike, last known
enemy positions (or location of strike) using a
standardized coordinate system, and when the strike
is scheduled (if not already occurred). BDI
feedback includes general information sent back to
the strike asset concerning BDI mission results.
Synonymous with Communicate with Local Strike
Assets.
Endpoint 1: Strike Assets
Endpoint 2: Field Communication System
Type: External Interface
Views: OV-2, OV-3, SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-6
Feedback and Input Data
Description: The Feedback and Input Data interface
includes any information sent to or from the
operator through the HCI. Feedback is sent from
the Signal/Data Processor system to the HCI while
Input Data is sent from the HCI to the Signal/Data
Processor.
Endpoint 1: Human Computer Interface
Endpoint 2: Signal/Data Processor
Type: System Interface
Views: SV-1c (Friendly Ground Unit) , SV-6
Field Comm Interface
Description: The Field Comm Interface includes all
information sent to the Human Operator from
external systems or vice versa using the Field
Communication System. This interface can include
audible or visual data.
Endpoint 1: Human Operator
Endpoint 2: Field Communication System
Type: System Interface
Views: SV-1c (Friendly Ground Unit) , SV-4, SV-6
Continued on next page
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Table K.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Information Gathered, Mission Description: As the name implies this link includes
Tasks, Intelligence Info
sending ISR information gathered to Headquarters,
and receiving both mission tasks and intelligence
information from Headquarters. Synonymous with
Communicate with Headquarters.
Endpoint 1: Headquarters
Endpoint 2: Field Communication Interface
Type: External Interface
Views: OV-2, OV-3, SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-6
Maintenance Required
Description: This interface depicts interaction
between the Human Operator and the Maintenance
Depot. Included here is the Human Operators
request for maintenance to be performed on any
system within the system nodes and the
Maintenance Depots acknowledgement of
completed maintenance. Such maintenance
requests occur whenever the Human Operator is not
capable or it is out of the scope of the Maintain
System function (implying field level maintenance).
Endpoint 1: Maintenance Depot
Endpoint 2: Human Operator
Type: External Interface
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c (Friendly Ground Unit), SV-6
MAV Directives and Payload
Description: The MAV Directives and Payload Data
Data
interface encompasses directives to be sent to the
Air Vehicle system and payload data to be sent to
the Signal/Data Processor. Directives primarily
include flight control data and are first sent to the
MAV Ground Communications System. Payload
Data includes any ISR data gathered and sent by the
Payload or Sensor Package system.
Endpoint 1: Signal/Data Processor
Endpoint 2: MAV Ground Communications System
Type: System Interface
Views: SV-1c (Friendly Ground Unit) , SV-6
Continued on next page
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Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Navigation Data
Description: Depending on the view, navigation
data can either be an operational needline (OVs) or
an external interface (SVs). This link includes the
pseudorange numbers and ephemeris data
transmitted by the GPS satellites.
Endpoint 1: GPS Satellites
Endpoint 2: Air Vehicle
Type: External Interface
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-3, OV-5, OV-7, SV-1b,
SV-1c, SV-4, SV-6
Payload Data
Description: The Payload Data interface represents
ISR data collected by the Payload or Sensor
Package system sent to the MAV Airborne
Communication System. This interface includes
data that has been converted and is ready to be
accepted by the MAV Airborne Communication
System.
Endpoint 1: Payload or Sensor Package
Endpoint 2: MAV Airborne Communication
System
Type: System Interface
Views: SV-1c (MAV) , SV-4, SV-6
Platform Interface
Description: The Platform Interface involves any
direct contact between the Human Operator and Air
Vehicle systems. This can include actions to
perform maintenance, set-up, or tear-down
functions.
Endpoint 1: Human Operator
Endpoint 2: Air Vehicle
Type: System Interface
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-6
Power Interface
Description: The Power Interface represents the
link between a power source within the Air Vehicle
system and the Payload or Sensor Package system.
If no power is required by the Payload or Sensor
Package system then this interface does not exists.
Synonymous to Power.
Endpoint 1: Air Vehicle
Continued on next page
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Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Endpoint 2: Payload or Sensor Package
Type: System Interface
Views: SV-1c (MAV) , SV-4, SV-6
Power, MAV Directives, and
Description: The Power, MAV Directives, and
Status Interface
Status Interface represents three links. The first is a
link between a power source within the Air Vehicle
and the MAV Airborne Communication System. If
no power is required by the Airborne
Communication System then the power interface
piece does not exists. The second link is MAV
Directives sent from the Airborne Communication
System to the Air Vehicle. These directives include
mainly flight control data. And the third link
contains flight status information sent from the Air
Vehicle to the MAV Airborne Communication
System; such information includes present location
of the MAV.
Endpoint 1: Air Vehicle
Endpoint 2: MAV Airborne Communication
System
Type: System Interface
Views: SV-1c (MAV) , SV-6
Request / Commands, ISR
Description: The Request/Commands, ISR Data
Data
Interface includes all airborne communications
between the Friendly Ground Unit and MAV
system nodes. This system communication
interface includes request or commands (Raw
Flight Telemetry Data) sent from the MAV Ground
Communication System to the MAV Airborne
Communications System and then gathered ISR
data (Raw Sensor Package Data) sent from the
Airborne to the Ground Communications System.
Primarily this interface represents wireless
communication that has been modulated using a
pre-determined technique (spread spectrum).
Endpoint 1: MAV Ground Communication System
Endpoint 2: MAV Airborne Communication
System
Continued on next page
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Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Type: System Interface
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-6
User Feedback and Inputs
Description: This interface includes any feedback
for the operator or user as well as inputs generated
by the operators actions. User feedback is sent from
the HCI to the Human Operator and can include any
means for a computer to communicate to the
operator (ex: visual, audible signals). User inputs
are generated by the Human Operator and are
gathered by the HCI.
Endpoint 1: Human Operator
Endpoint 2: Human Computer Interface (HCI)
Type: System Interface
Views: SV-1c (Friendly Ground Unit) , SV-6
Non-Graphical Types:
System Functions
Accept Input
Description: This system function is apart of the
HCI system. Its purpose is to allow the user to
supply input to the system in an easy and swift
manner. The input supplied should integrate itself
with the Give Feedback system function such that
the user can see what the system has accepted
before the execution.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Accept Supplied Power
Description: This system function is apart of the
MAV Airborne Communication System. Its
purpose is to consume and utilize the power
supplied by another system within the MAV system
node; in this case it is from the Air Vehicle system.
Note that if no power is needed by the MAV
Airborne Communication System then this function
does not apply.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Continued on next page
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Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Convert/Route Data
Description: This system function is performed by
the Signal/Data Processor; its purpose is to convert
then route data going to other systems as well as to
route then convert data coming from other systems.
Converting implies performing operations on
received data such that it can be processed as well
as on outgoing data such that the gaining system
can read it. Routing, as the name implies, includes
sending the data to the intended gaining unit as well
as moving data internal to the Signal/Data
Processor system.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Convert ISR Data
Description: This system function is performed by
the Payload or Sensor Package system; its purpose
is to covert raw data such that the gaining system
can read it. Examples include a digital to analog
converter.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
De-Modulate Data
Description: This function is apart of the MAV
Ground Communication System; its purpose is to
de-modulate and/or decrypt the Payload Data being
sent from the MAV Airborne Communication
System. There are many de-modulation techniques
and the one that is used is based on the modulation
technique used by the transmitting system. If the
signal is not modulated then this function is void.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
De-Modulate Directives
Description: This function is apart of the Field
Communication System, its purpose is to
de-modulate and/or decrypt the mission directives
being sent from Headquarters or Strike Assets.
There are many de-modulation techniques and the
one that is used is based on the modulation
technique used by the transmitting system. If the
signal is not modulated then this function is void.
Continued on next page
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Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
De-Modulate MAV Directives Description: This function is apart of the MAV
Airborne Communication System; its purpose is to
de-modulate and/or decrypt the MAV Directives
(see MAV Directives and Payload Data) being sent
from the MAV Ground Communication System.
There are many de-modulation techniques and the
one that is used is based on the modulation
technique used by the transmitting system. If the
signal is not modulated then this function is void.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Enable ISR Capability
Description: This system function is performed by
the Payload or Sensor Package system; its purpose
is to gather the needed ISR information. Sensors
are the main items intended to perform this
function, however the kind and type of sensor
should be determined based on the particular ISR
mission. Implied within this function is the ability
to accept supplied power, in this case the power
being supplied is from the Air Vehicle system.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Flight Control
Description: This system function is performed by
the Air Vehicle system; its purpose is to provide the
needed hardware and software to follow the MAV
Directives (flight control data). Such directives can
include left/right turns, altitude level, and flight
patterns. System examples include autopilot, flaps,
ailerons, servo motors, etc.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Continued on next page
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Flight Data Protocol
Description: This system function is performed by
the Air Vehicle system; its purpose is to
send/receive data to/from the MAV Airborne
Communication System based on a set of protocol
rules. One example of a protocol rule is to send a
data type stamp on each set of data such that the
gaining system knows what type of data it is.
Depending on the data bus structure and how the
Power, MAV Directives, and Status Interface is
implemented this function may be very complex,
simple, or not exists.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5
Give Feedback
Description: This system function is apart of the
HCI system. Its purpose is to supply feedback to
the user in an easy and quick to understand method.
The feedback given should use the same terms as
well as integrate itself with the Accept Input system
function such that the user can react quickly and
accurately.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Influence System
Description: The Influence System function is
performed by the Human Operator; its purpose is to
affect other systems through direct operator contact.
This function could contain switching a switch,
performing set-up/tear-down, pressing buttons
resulting in system input, etc.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Continued on next page
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Entities, Attributes, and
Description
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Maintain System
Description: This function is performed by the
Human Operator; its purpose is similar to Influence
System however the Maintain System function
focuses only on field level maintenance actions.
Examples include changing batteries, repairing a
wing, or installing a new item. If the level of
maintenance is outside that of what can be done in
the field then this function acts as a maintenance
request function to notify the Maintenance Depot of
a problem.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Manipulate Data
Description: This system function is performed by
the Signal/Data Processor; its purpose is similar to
the Process Data function however data
manipulation focuses on reprocessing already
processed data. For example, once data is processed
it can be dumped into local memory and then
reprocessed or manipulated to better suit the
operators or systems needs (image zooming).
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5
Modulate Data
Description: This function is apart of the MAV
Airborne Communication System; its purpose is to
modulate and/or encrypt the Payload Data and
status information being sent to the MAV Ground
Communication System. There are many
modulation techniques and the one that is used is
based on the hardware system available or the
system to receive the data (i.e. MAV Ground
Communication System). If the system receiving
the Payload Data is not capable of de-modulating
the modulated signal then this function is void.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Continued on next page
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Entities, Attributes, and
Description
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Modulate ISR Info
Description: This function is apart of the Field
Communication System, its purpose is to modulate
and/or encrypt the ISR information being sent to
Headquarters or Strike Assets. There are many
modulation techniques and the one that is used is
based on the hardware system available, Human
Operator, or the system to receive the ISR
information. If the system receiving the ISR
information is not capable of de-modulating the
modulated signal then this function is void.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Modulate MAV Directives
Description: This function is apart of the MAV
Ground Communication System; its purpose is to
modulate and/or encrypt the MAV Directives being
sent to the MAV Airborne Communication System.
There are many modulation techniques and the one
that is used is based on the hardware system
available or the system receiving the data (i.e. MAV
Airborne Communication System). If the system
receiving the MAV Directives is not capable of
de-modulating the modulated signal then this
function is void.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Payload Data Protocol
Description: This system function is performed by
the Payload or Sensor Package system; its purpose
is to send data to the MAV Airborne
Communication System based on a set of protocol
rules. One example of a protocol rule is to send a
data type stamp on each set of data such that the
gaining system knows what type of data it is.
Depending on the data bus structure and how the
Payload Data Interface is implemented this function
may be very complex, simple, or not exists.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5
Continued on next page
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Description
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Power Source
Description: The Power Source system function is
performed by the Air Vehicle; its purpose is to
provide all airborne systems (MAV) a power
supply. Every airborne system has been architected
to need a power supply, the amount or type of
power needed will be determined by these systems.
Examples of power sources are a battery, liquid
fuel, gas, or fuel cell.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Process Data
Description: This system function is performed by
the Signal/Data Processor; its purpose is to perform
simple or complex operations based on the data
brought into the system. For example after
receiving input data from the HCI system the
Signal/Data Processor outputs a set of MAV
Directives.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Process Info
Description: This function is performed by the
Human Operator; its purpose is to process the
gathered ISR information and mission directives.
Based on this processing, the Human Operator
decides the next state of the system. For example, if
the processing of the gathered ISR information
resulted in an enemy tank location then the operator
could make the decision to forward (or route) the
information to Strike Assets.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Receive Data
Description: This function is performed by the
MAV Ground Communication System; its purpose
is to receive Payload Data and status information
from the MAV Airborne Communication System
for the Signal/Data Processor system.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Continued on next page
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Description
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Receive Directives
Description: This function is apart of the Field
Communication System, its purpose is to provide
the Human Operator with mission directives
derived from Headquarters or Strike Assets. The
hardware and software involved in receiving the
directives should be based on the operators
common scenario and mission.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Receive MAV Directives
Description: This function is performed by the
MAV Airborne Communication System; its purpose
is to receive directives from the MAV Ground
Communication System for the Air Vehicle system.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Route Info
Description: This function is performed by the
Human Operator; its purpose is to route the
processed ISR information or mission directives to
the appropriate system (Headquarters, Strike
Assets, or the HCI). Only the processed data needed
by the gaining system will be routed.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Take Flight
Description: This function is performed by the Air
Vehicle system; its purpose is to utilize the laws of
aerodynamics to ensure that systems with in the
MAV node can become airborne. Take-off, landing,
and flight sustainment are implied within this
system function.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5
Continued on next page
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Transmit Data
Description: The Transmit Data system function is
performed by the MAV Airborne Communication
System; its purpose is to transmit data generated by
the payload (Payload Data interface) as well as
status information generated by the Air Vehicle
system (Power, MAV Directives, and Status
Interface) to the MAV Ground Communication
System.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Transmit ISR Info
Description: This function is apart of the Field
Communication System, its purpose is to provide
Headquarters or Strike Assets ISR information. The
hardware and software involved in transmitting the
information should be based on the operators
common scenario and mission.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Transmit MAV Directives
Description: The Transmit MAV Directives system
function is performed by the MAV Ground
Communication System; its purpose is to transmit
directives for the Air Vehicle system generated by
the Signal/Data Processor system to the MAV
Airborne Communication System.
Type: System Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Referenced Types
Needline
See OV-2 Definition Table
Operational Node
See OV-2 Definition Table
Relationships
Systems Node
Systems
Friendly Ground Unit
Human Operator, Human Computer Interface
(HCI), Signal/Data Processor, Field
Communication System, MAV Ground
Communication System
MAV
Air Vehicle, Payload or Sensor Package, MAV
Airborne Communication System
System (within system nodes) System Functions
Continued on next page
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Air Vehicle
Take Flight, Flight Control, Power Source, Flight
Data Protocol
Field Communication System
Transmit ISR Info, Receive Directives, Modulate
ISR Info, De-Modulate Directives
Human Computer Interface
Give Feedback, Accept Input
(HCI)
Human Operator
Process Info, Influence System, Route Info,
Maintain System
MAV Airborne
Transmit Data, Receive MAV Directives, Modulate
Communication System
Data, De-Modulate MAV Directives, Accept
Supplied Power
MAV Ground Communication Transmit MAV Directives, Receive Data, Modulate
System
MAV Directives, De-Modulate Data
Payload or Sensor Package
Enable ISR Capability, Convert ISR Data, Payload
Data Protocol
Signal/Data Processor
Convert/Route Data, Process Data, Manipulate Data
System Node
Operational Node
Friendly Ground Unit
Friendly Ground Unit
MAV
MAV
System Interface (SV-1b
Operational Needline
only)
BDI Request and Feedback
Communicate with Local Strike Assets
Information Gathered, Mission Communicate with Headquarters
Tasks, Intelligence Info
Maintenance Required
System Maintenance Needed/Request
Navigation Data
Navigation Data
Platform Interface
Platform Communication
Request/Commands, ISR Data Platform Communication
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Figure K.1

SV-1b Systems Interface Description: Internodal Version showing SystemSystem Interfaces
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Figure K.2

SV-1c Systems Interface Description: Intranodal Version of the Friendly
Ground Unit showing System-System Interfaces and System Functions
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Figure K.3

SV-1c Systems Interface Description: Intranodal Version of the MAV
showing System-System Interfaces and System Functions
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Appendix L. MAV SV-4
Table L.1 – AV-2 Integrated Dictionary
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Graphical Box Types:
External System Data Source/Sink
Strike Asset
Description: See OV-1 Definition Table
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-3, OV-5, OV-6c, SV-1b,
SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Headquarters
Description: See OV-1 (AOC) and OV-2 Definition
Tables
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-3, OV-5, OV-6c, SV-1b,
SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
GPS Satellites
Description: See OV-1 Definition Table
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-3, OV-5, OV-6c, SV-1b,
SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Graphical Box Types:
System Function
Accept Input
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 1.2.2
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Accept Supplied Power
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 2.1.4
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Convert/Route Data
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 1.1.2
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Convert ISR Data
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 2.3.3
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
De-Modulate Data
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 1.5.3
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
De-Modulate Directives
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 1.3.4
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
De-Modulate MAV Directives Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 2.1.3
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Enable ISR Capability
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 2.3.2
Continued on next page
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Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Flight Control
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 2.2.1
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Flight Data Protocol
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 2.2.3
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Give Feedback
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 1.2.1
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Influence System
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 1.4.3
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Maintain System
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 1.4.4
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Manipulate Data
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 1.1.1
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Modulate Data
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 2.1.5
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Modulate ISR Info
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 1.3.3
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Modulate MAV Directives
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 1.5.1
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Payload Data Protocol
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 2.3.1
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Perform Air Vehicle Functions Description: This function represents the aggregate
of all lower functions performed by the Air Vehicle
part of the MAV system. It is the sum of the
sub-functions Flight Control, Take Flight, Flight
data Protocol, and Power Source.
Reference: 2.2
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Continued on next page
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Perform Ground Unit
Description: This function represents the aggregate
Functions
of all lower functions performed by the Ground
Unit. It is the sum of the sub-functions Signal/ data
Processing, Provide Human Computer Interface,
Provide Field Communication, Perform Human
Operator Functions, and Provide MAV Ground
Communication.
Reference: 1
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Perform Human Operator
Description: This function represents the aggregate
Functions
of all lower sub-functions performed by the Human
Operator. It is the sum of the sub-functions Route
Info, Process Info, Influence system, and Maintain
System.
Reference: 1.4
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Perform MAV Functions
Description: This function represents the aggregate
of all lower functions performed by the MAV. It is
the sum of the sub-functions Provide MAV
Airborne Communication, Perform Air Vehicle
Functions and Perform Payload/ Sensor Functions.
Reference: 2
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Perform Payload/ Sensor
Description: This function represents the aggregate
Functions
of all lower functions performed by the Payload/
Sensor. It is the sum of the sub-functions Payload
Data Protocol, Enable ISR Capability, and Convert
ISR Data.
Reference: 2.3
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Power Source
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 2.2.4
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Process Data
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 1.1.3
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Process Info
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 1.4.2
Continued on next page
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Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Provide Field Communication Description: This function represents the aggregate
of all lower functions performed by the Field
Communication sub-system. It is the sum of the
sub-functions Transmit ISR Information, Receive
Directives, Modulate ISR Information, and
De-Modulate Directives.
Reference: 1.3
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Provide Human Computer
Description: This function represents the aggregate
Interface
of all lower functions performed by the Human
Computer Interface. It is the sum of the
sub-functions Give Feedback and Accept Input.
Reference: 1.2
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Provide ISR Capabilities
Description: This function represents the aggregate
of all lower functions performed by the ISR MAV
system. It is the sum of the sub-functions Perform
Ground Unit Functions and Perform MAV
Functions. It is the top-level function for the
system.
Reference: Top Level Function
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Provide MAV Airborne
Description: This function represents the aggregate
Communication
of all lower functions performed by the MAV
Airborne Communication sub-system. It is the sum
of the sub-functions Transmit Data, Receive MAV
Directives, De-Modulate MAV Directives, Accept
Supplied Power, and Modulate Data.
Reference: 2.1
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Provide MAV Ground
Description: This function represents the aggregate
Communication
of all lower functions performed by the MAV
Ground Communication sub-system. It is the sum
of the sub-functions Modulate MAV Directives,
Transmit MAV Directives, De-Modulate Data, and
Receive Data.
Reference: 1.5
Continued on next page
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Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Receive Data
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 1.5.4
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Receive Directives
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 1.3.2
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Receive MAV Directives
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 2.1.2
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Route Info
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 1.4.1
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Signal/ Data Processing
Description: This function represents the aggregate
of all lower functions performed by the Signal/
Data Processor sub-system. It is the sum of the
sub-functions Manipulate data, Convert/ Route
Data, and Process Data.
Reference: 1.1
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Take Flight
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 2.2.2
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Transmit Data
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 2.1.1
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Transmit ISR Info
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 1.3.1
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Transmit MAV Directives
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Reference: 1.5.2
Views: SV-1b, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6
Graphical Box Types:

System Data Repository/ Shared Database
Continued on next page
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Processed Data
Description: Repository of gathered and processed
data from the air vehicle’s payload sensor. Data
from this repository may be called by the
manipulate data function to be formatted into
output data at the user’s request. The repository will
contain the images, videos, etc. from the sensor in
their storable format. Operations such as
re-zooming, cropping, image color enhancing, etc.
would be performed by the manipulate data
function.
Within Reference: Signal/ Data Processing, 1.1
Data Flow: Processed Data
Function From: Process Data, 1.1.3
Function To: Manipulate Data, 1.1.1
Views: SV-4
Graphical Arrow Types:
System Data Flow
Commands
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table for Request/
Commands, ISR Data
Function From: Transmit MAV Directives (1.5.2)
Function To: Receive MAV Directives (2.1.2)
Views: SV-1c, SV-4, SV-6
Data Request
Description: This data flow is a call or request for
data from the Processed Data repository. This
request will normally be in response to an Output
Data Request ultimately from the user. This data
request is necessary to manipulate the stored data to
meet the user’s needs.
Function From: Manipulate Data (1.1.1)
Function To: Processed Data (Data Repository)
Views: SV-4
Decision to Communicate
Description: This data flow is active decision by the
human operator (through the Process Info function)
to relay information through the Field
Communication system.
Function From: Process Info (1.4.2)
Function To: Route Info (1.4.1)
Views: SV-4
Continued on next page
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Table L.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Decision to Influence System
Description: This data flow is active decision by the
human operator (through the Process Info function)
to affect influence on the system (e.g. turn system
on, launch, recover MAV, etc.).
Function From: Process Info (1.4.2)
Function To: Influence System (1.4.3)
Views: SV-4
Decision to Maintain System
Description: This data flow is active decision by the
human operator (through the Process Info function)
to perform a maintenance action on the system.
Function From: Process Info (1.4.2)
Function To: Maintain System (1.4.4)
Views: SV-4
Field Comm Interface
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Function From: Route Info (1.4.1) and
De-Modulate Directives (1.3.4)
Function To: Modulate ISR Information (1.3.3) and
Process Info (1.4.2)
Views: SV-1c, SV-4, SV-6
Flight Control Commands
Description: This data flow includes the flight
surfaces commands necessary to affect the flight of
the MAV air vehicle. They will be generated by the
autopilot processor in response to a commanded
flight profile.
Function From: Flight Control (2.2.1)
Function To: Take Flight (2.2.2)
Views: SV-4
Flight Control/ Position Data
Description: This data flow includes feedback of
what the flight control function is performing and
the position information of the air vehicle as a result
of processing the GPS satellite navigation data.
Function From: Flight Control (2.2.1)
Function To: Flight Data Protocol (2.2.3)
Views: SV-4
Continued on next page
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Table L.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Flight Profile
Description: This data flow is the received and
formatted MAV directives that include where and
how the MAV should fly. It will contain desired
position, speed, altitude, loiter and other
information required by the flight controller
function to determine commands to the flight
control surfaces.
Function From: Flight Data Protocol (2.2.3)
Function To: Flight Control (2.2.1)
Views: SV-4
Flight Status Data
Description: This data flow gives feedback and
position data to the ground unit of the air vehicles
location and condition.
Function From: Flight Data Protocol (2.2.3)
Function To: Modulate Data (2.1.5)
Views: SV-4
Formatted Payload Data
Description: This data flow is the formatted and
packaged payload sensor data that the sensor has
gathered.
Function From: Convert ISR Data (2.3.3)
Function To: Payload Data Protocol (2.3.1)
Views: SV-4
Fused Target Information
Description: See OV-5 Definition Table
Function From: Transmit ISR Information (1.3.1)
Function To: Headquarters and Strike Assets
(External Systems)
Views: OV-5, OV-7, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-6
Human Inputs
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table for Inputs
Function From: Influence System (1.4.3)
Function To: Accept Input (1.2.2)
Views: SV-1c, SV-4, SV-6
Input Data
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table for Input
Data
Function From: Accept Input (1.2.2)
Function To: Convert/ Route Data (1.1.2)
Views: SV-1c, SV-4, SV-6
Continued on next page
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Table L.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
ISR/ Flight Status Data
Description: This data flow is the combination of
both the gathered payload sensor data and the flight
status of the air vehicle that is sent to the ground
unit. It’s level of formatting and packaging is only
that which would be necessary for communication
to the ground unit.
Function From: Transmit Data (2.1.1)
Function To: Receive Data (1.5.4)
Views: SV-1c, SV-4, SV-6
MAV Directives
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Function From: Convert/ Route Data (1.1.2) and
De-Modulate MAV Directives (2.1.3)
Function To: Modulate MAV Directives (1.5.1) and
Flight Data Protocol (2.2.3)
Views: SV-1c, SV-4, SV-6
Modulated Directives
Description: This data flow is simply the directives
that are modulated for transmittal to the MAV from
the ground unit.
Function From: Modulate MAV Directives (1.5.1)
Function To: Transmit MAV Directives (1.5.2)
Views: SV-4
Modulated ISR Data
Description: This data flow is simply the ISR info
that is modulated for transmittal to either
headquarters or the strike assets from the ground
unit.
Function From: Modulate ISR Info (1.3.3)
Function To: Transmit ISR Information (1.3.1)
Views: SV-4
Modulated ISR/ Flight Status
Description: This data flow is simply the ISR/
Data
Flight Status Data modulated for transmittal to the
ground unit from the MAV.
Function From: Modulate Data (2.1.5)
Function To: Transmit Data (2.1.1)
Views: SV-4
Modulated MAV Directives
Description: This data flow is simply the MAV
directives modulated for transmittal from the MAV
communications system to the air vehicle flight
control.
Continued on next page
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Table L.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Function From: Receive MAV Directives (2.1.2)
Function To: De-Modulate MAV Directives (2.1.3)
Views: SV-4
Modulated Payload Data
Description:
Function From: Receive Data (1.5.4)
Function To: De-Modulate Data (1.5.3)
Views: SV-4
Modulated Taskings
Description: This data flow is the taskings
modulated for transmittal from Headquarters or
Strike Assets to the Human Operator.
Function From: Receive Directives (1.3.2)
Function To: De-Modulate Directives (1.3.4)
Views: SV-4
Navigation Data
Description: See OV-1 Definition Table
Function From: GPS Satellites (External System)
Function To: Flight Control (2.2.1)
Views: OV-1, OV-2, OV-3, OV-5, OV-7, SV-1c,
SV-4, SV-6
Output Data
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table for
Feedback
Function From: Manipulate Data (1.1.1) and
Convert/ Route Data (1.1.2)
Function To: Convert/ Route Data (1.1.2) and Give
Feedback (1.2.1)
Views: SV-1c, SV-4, SV-6
Output Data Request
Description: This data flow is a call or request for
data to be manipulated. It can also carry commands
on how the data is to be manipulated (e.g. resize,
zoom, etc.).
Function From: Convert/ Route Data (1.1.2)
Function To: Manipulate Data (1.1.1)
Views: SV-4
Payload Data
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Function From: Payload Data Protocol (2.3.1)
Function To: Modulate Data (2.1.5)
Views: OV-5, OV-7, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-6
Continued on next page
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Table L.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Payload/ Flight Status Data
Description: This data flow includes all information
transmitted from the MAV to the ground unit. It is
unprocessed information to be transformed and
used by the ground unit.
Function From: De-Modulate Data (1.5.3)
Function To: Convert/ Route Data (1.1.2)
Views: OV-7, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-6
Platform Interface
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Function From: Influence System (1.4.3) and
Maintain System (1.4.4)
Function To: Take Flight (2.2.2)
Views: SV-1c, SV-4, SV-6
Power
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Function From: Power Source (2.2.4)
Function To: Enable ISR Capability (2.3.2) and
Accept Supplied Power (2.1.4)
Views: SV-1c, SV-4, SV-6
Processed Data
Description: This data flow is the processed,
formatted, and packaged data from the MAV.
Images and/or videos are saved in acceptable file
formats.
Function From: Process Data (1.1.3) and Processed
Data (Data Repository)
Function To: Processed Data (Data Repository) and
Manipulate Data (1.1.1)
Views: SV-4
Raw Payload Data
Description: This data flow is the basic electronic
signals generated by the payload sensor in response
to the target of its sensor gathering function.
Function From: Enable ISR Capability (2.3.2)
Function To: Convert ISR Data (2.3.3)
Views: SV-4
Repair/ Fault Status
Description: See OV-5 Definition Table for System
Repair Status
Function From: Maintain System (1.4.4)
Function To: Process Info (1.4.2)
Views: OV-5, OV-7, SV-4
System Status
Description: See OV-7 Definition Table
Continued on next page
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Table L.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Function From: Influence System (1.4.3)
Function To: Process Info (1.4.2)
Views: OV-7, SV-4
Taskings
Description: See OV-5 Definition Table
Function From: Headquarters and Strike Assets
(External Systems)
Function To: Receive Directives (1.3.2)
Views: OV-5, OV-7, SV-1c, SV-4, SV-6
Unprocessed Data
Description: This data flow is the data that has been
received by the ground unit communications system
from the MAV.
Function From: Convert/ Route Data (1.1.2)
Function To: Process Data (1.1.3)
Views: SV-4
User Feedback
Description: See SV-1 Definition Table
Function From: Give Feedback (1.2.1)
Function To: Process Info (1.4.2)
Views: SV-1c, SV-4, SV-6
Functional Decomposition
Super Function
Sub-Functions
Provide ISR Capabilities
1. Perform Ground Unit Functions
2. Perform MAV Functions
1. Perform Ground Unit
1.1 Signal/ Data Processing
Functions
1.2 Provide Human Computer Interface
1.3 Provide Field Communication
1.4 Perform Human Operator Functions
1.5 Provide MAV Ground Communication
2. Perform MAV Functions
2.1 Provide MAV Airborne Communication
2.2 Perform Air Vehicle Functions
2.3 Perform Payload/Sensor Functions
1.1 Signal/ Data Processing
1.1.1 Manipulate Data
1.1.2 Convert/ Route Data
1.1.3 Process Data
1.2 Provide Human Computer 1.2.1 Give Feedback
Interface
1.2.2 Accept Input
Continued on next page
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Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
1.3 Provide Field
1.3.1 Transmit ISR Information
Communication
1.3.2 Receive Directives
1.3.3 Modulate ISR Information
1.3.4 De-Modulate Directives
1.4 Perform Human Operator
1.4.1 Route Info
Functions
1.4.2 Process Info
1.4.3 Influence System
1.4.4 Maintain System
1.5 Provide MAV Ground
1.5.1 Modulate MAV Directives
Communication
1.5.2 Transmit MAV Directives
1.5.3 De-Modulate Data
1.5.4 Receive Data
2.1 Provide Airborne
2.1.1 Transmit Data
Communication
2.1.2 Receive MAV Directives
2.1.3 De-Modulate MAV Directives
2.1.4 Accept Supplied Power
2.1.5 Modulate Data
2.2 Perform Air Vehicle
2.2.1 Flight Control
Functions
2.2.2 Take Flight
2.2.3 Flight Data Protocol
2.2.4 Power Source
2.3 Perform Payload/ Sensor
2.3.1 Payload Data Protocol
Functions
2.3.2 Enable ISR Capability
2.3.3 Convert ISR Data
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Figure L.1

Functional Decomposition
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Figure L.2

SV-4 Context Diagram

L-15

Figure L.3

SV-4 Level 0 Diagram

L-16

Figure L.4

SV-4 Level 1 Diagram
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Figure L.5

SV-4 Level 1-1 Diagram
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Figure L.6

SV-4 Level 1-2 Diagram
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Figure L.7

SV-4 Level 1-3 Diagram
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Figure L.8

SV-4 Level 1-4 Diagram
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Figure L.9

SV-4 Level 1-5 Diagram
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Figure L.10

SV-4 Level 2 Diagram
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Figure L.11

SV-4 Level 2-1 Diagram
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Figure L.12

SV-4 Level 2-2 Diagram
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Figure L.13

SV-4 Level 2-3 Diagram
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Appendix M. MAV SV-5
Table M.1 – AV-2 Integrated Dictionary
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Reference Types
Capabilities
See OV-5 Definition Table
Systems
See SV-1 Definition Table
Operational Activities
See OV-5 Definition Table
System Functions
See SV-1 Definition Table
Relationships
Supporting System Function Operational Activity for a Capability
Accept Input
Operational Activity: Process Information
System Name: Human Computer Interface
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Accept Supplied Power
Operational Activity: Provides Flight Controls,
Enables Sensor Package
System Name: MAV Airborne Communication
System
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Convert/Route Data
Operational Activity: Provides Vehicle Control and
Communication, Initialize MAV, Calibrate MAV,
Upload Mission Profile
System Name: Signal/Data Processor
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Convert ISR Data
Operational Activity: Enables Sensor Package
System Name: Payload or Sensor Package
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
De-Modulate Data
Operational Activity: Provides Vehicle Control and
Communication
System Name: MAV Ground Communication
System
Continued on next page
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Table M.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
De-Modulate Directives
Operational Activity: Process Information
System Name: Field Communication System
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
De-Modulate MAV Directives Operational Activity: Provides Flight Controls,
Enables Sensor Package
System Name: MAV Airborne Communication
System
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Enable ISR Capability
Operational Activity: Enables Sensor Package
System Name: Payload or Sensor Package
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Flight Control
Operational Activity: Provides Flight Controls,
Calculate Flight Plan to Landing Zone, Fly to
Landing Zone, Perform Landing Sequence
System Name: Air Vehicle
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Flight Data Protocol
Operational Activity: Provides Flight Controls
System Name: Air Vehicle
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Give Feedback
Operational Activity: Process Information
System Name: Human Computer Interface
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Continued on next page
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Table M.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Influence System
Operational Activity: Initialize MAV, Calibrate
MAV, Upload Mission Profile, Launch MAV,
Recover MAV
System Name: Human Operator
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Maintain System
Operational Activity: Provide Field Level
Maintenance
System Name: Human Operator
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Manipulate Data
Operational Activity: Provides Vehicle Control and
Communication, Initialize MAV, Calibrate MAV,
Upload Mission Profile
System Name: Signal/Data Processor
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Modulate Data
Operational Activity: Provides Flight Controls,
Enables Sensor Package
System Name: MAV Airborne Communication
System
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Modulate ISR Information
Operational Activity: Process Information
System Name: Field Communication System
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Modulate MAV Directives
Operational Activity: Provides Vehicle Control and
Communication, Calibrate MAV
System Name: MAV Ground Communication
System
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Continued on next page
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Table M.1 – continued from previous page
Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Payload Data Protocol
Operational Activity: Enables Sensor Package
System Name: Payload or Sensor Package
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Power Source
Operational Activity: Provides Flight Vehicle
System Name: Air Vehicle
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Process Data
Operational Activity: Provides Vehicle Control and
Communication, Initialize MAV, Calibrate MAV,
Upload Mission Profile
System Name: Signal/Data Processor
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Process Info
Operational Activity: Process Information
System Name: Human Operator
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Receive Data
Operational Activity: Provides Vehicle Control and
Communication
System Name: MAV Ground Communication
System
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Receive Directives
Operational Activity: Process Information
System Name: Field Communication System
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Receive MAV Directives
Operational Activity: Provides Flight Controls,
Enables Sensor Package
Continued on next page
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Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
System Name: MAV Airborne Communication
System
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Route Info
Operational Activity: Process Information
System Name: Human Operator
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Take Flight
Operational Activity: Provides Flight Vehicle, Fly
to Landing Zone, Perform Landing Sequence
System Name: Air Vehicle
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Transmit Data
Operational Activity: Provides Flight Controls,
Enables Sensor Package
System Name: MAV Airborne Communication
System
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Transmit ISR Information
Operational Activity: Process Information
System Name: Field Communication System
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Transmit MAV Directives
Operational Activity: Provides Vehicle Control and
Communication, Calibrate MAV
System Name: MAV Ground Communication
System
Capability Name: Perform Reconnaissance, BDI,
and LAD
Support Status Code: Application Specific
Implementing System
Operational Activity
Function
Accept Input
Process Information
Continued on next page
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Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Accept Supplied Power
Provides Flight Controls, Enables Sensor Package
Convert/Route Data
Provides Vehicle Control and Communication,
Initialize MAV, Calibrate MAV, Upload Mission
Profile
Convert ISR Data
Enables Sensor Package
De-Modulate Data
Provides Vehicle Control and Communication
De-Modulate Directives
Process Information
De-Modulate MAV Directives Provides Flight Controls, Enables Sensor Package
Enable ISR Capability
Enables Sensor Package
Flight Control
Provides Flight Controls, Calculate Flight Plan to
Landing Zone, Fly to Landing Zone, Perform
Landing Sequence
Flight Data Protocol
Provides Flight Controls
Give Feedback
Process Information
Influence System
Initialize MAV, Calibrate MAV, Upload Mission
Profile, Launch MAV, Recover MAV
Maintain System
Provide Field Level Maintenance
Manipulate Data
Provides Vehicle Control and Communication,
Initialize MAV, Calibrate MAV, Upload Mission
Profile
Modulate Data
Provides Flight Controls, Enables Sensor Package
Modulate ISR Information
Process Information
Modulate MAV Directives
Provides Vehicle Control and Communication,
Calibrate MAV
Payload Data Protocol
Enables Sensor Package
Power Source
Provides Flight Vehicle
Process Data
Provides Vehicle Control and Communication,
Initialize MAV, Calibrate MAV, Upload Mission
Profile
Process Info
Process Information
Receive Data
Provides Vehicle Control and Communication
Receive Directives
Process Information
Receive MAV Directives
Provides Flight Controls, Enables Sensor Package
Route Info
Process Information
Take Flight
Provides Flight Vehicle, Fly to Landing Zone,
Perform Landing Sequence
Transmit Data
Provides Flight Controls, Enables Sensor Package
Continued on next page
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Entities, Attributes, and
Description
Relationships
Transmit ISR Information
Process Information
Transmit MAV Directives
Provides Vehicle Control and Communication,
Calibrate MAV

Figure M.1

SV-5 Operational Activity to System Functions Traceability Matrix 1
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Figure M.2

SV-5 Operational Activity to System Functions Traceability Matrix 2

M-8

Appendix N. MAV SV-6
As outlined in Section 3.2.3, the SV-6 is a matrix with a set of rows and columns
where their intersections contain interface information. The rows contain all information
contained within a particular interface exchange. Since the relationship between system
interfaces and system data exchanges are one-to-many they are categorized first by
the system interface name shown in all versions of the SV-1 and then by the system
data exchange name which can be SV-6 unique but in this case correlates to the OV-3s
information exchange names. The columns show specific information based on the
columns heading. Many times, the column headings are tailored to the specific system
type that is being modeled. A template for a highly complex, secure, and detailed
communication system may have many extraneous columns for a simpler system with
fewer interfaces. The tailored list below is the column headings with their meanings
as defined by DoDAF [24]. The columns outside the scope of this initial baseline
architecture have been marked Left Blank. This research will still show these empty
columns in order to allow for future detailed research. Following the column definitions
are the SV-6 matrix figures completed for the Baseline ISR MAV.

Row ID: Contains a unique row number for each row and is used for easier
referencing (instead of having to recite the system data exchange name).
System Interface Name: Identifies the system interface as shown in the SV-1
system interface description diagram that carries the system data exchange.
System Data Exchange Name: Name of the system data exchange, based on the
relevant operational needline, system interface, and information element. This
research will correlate this column with the information exchange name in the OV-3
matrix.
Data Element Name and ID: Name of the system data element, primarily based on
the SV-4 system data flow and can correlate to the OV-3 information element. The
MAV baseline architecture will correlate this column with the OV-3 information
N-1

element, which ends up mapping back to the OV-5 and OV-7 diagrams.
Content: The system data that is carried by the exchange.
Format Type: Application level format (e.g., XML/DTD, EDI, ASCII Text) with
parameters and options used, or other relevant protocol. Left Blank
Media Type: Type of media. Left Blank
Accuracy: Description of the degree to which the system data conforms to actual
fact as required by the system or system function. Left Blank
Units of Measurement: Units used for system data. Left Blank
Data Standard: An example is DoD XML Registry, can reference TV-1 or TV-2
definition tables if produced (this research does not produce any TV’s). Left Blank
Sending System Name: Name of the system from the SV-1 that produces the
system data.
Sending System Function Name: The name of the system function, as shown in
the SV-1, producing the system data.
Receiving System Name: Name of the system from the SV-1 that consumes the
system data.
Receiving System Function Name: The name of the system function, as shown in
the SV-1, consuming the system data.
Transaction Type: Descriptive field that identifies the type of exchange.
Triggering Event: Brief textual description of the event that triggers the system
data exchange as shown in the SV-10. If triggering events are not included in the
SV-10 or no SV-10 exists (in this case none exists) then this column is not required
however an example of such a event can be given as the case with this research.
Interoperability Level Required (from C4ISR WG): Level of Information
Systems Interoperability (LISI), or other interoperability measure. This research
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used the C4ISR Working Groups [10] interoperability levels. There are 5 possible
levels of interoperability an information exchange can have, numbered 0 to 4. Level
0 is termed the Isolated Level and consists of manual access control procedures,
manual infrastructure and private data. Level 1 is termed the Connected Level
and consists of a security profile, two or one way infrastructure, and basic data
formats. Level 2 is termed the Functional Level and consists of a common operating
environment, a local area network (LAN) infrastructure, program models, and
advanced data formats. Level 3 is termed the Domain Level and consists of
domain procedures, a wide area network (WAN), database management system
(DBMS), and domain models. Level 4 consists of enterprise procedures (DoD,
Multi-National), multiple dimensional topologies, and cross enterprise models.
Criticality: The criticality assessment of the information being exchanged in
relationship of the mission being performed, meaning how essential is it to the
overall mission or capability.
Periodicity: Frequency of system data exchange transmission, may be an average
or worst case estimate and can include conditions.
Timeliness: How much delay this system data can tolerate and still be relevant to
the receiving system. This research uses in minutes and in seconds to state the order
of measurement to be used.
Throughput: Bits or bytes per time period, may be expressed in terms of maximum
or average throughput required. Left Blank
Size: Size of system data. Left Blank
Access Control: The class of mechanisms used to ensure only those authorized
can access a specific system data element. Left Blank
Availability: The relative level of effort required to be expended to ensure that the
system data can be accessed. Left Blank
Confidentiality: The kind of protection required for system data to prevent
unintended disclosure. Left Blank
Dissemination Control: The kind of restrictions on receivers of system data based
on sensitivity of system data. Left Blank
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Integrity: The kind of requirement for checks that the content of the system data
element has not been altered. Left Blank
Non-Repudiation Producer: The requirements for unassailable knowledge that
the system data received was produced by the stated source. Left Blank
Non-Repudiation Consumer: The requirements for unassailable knowledge that
the system data sent was consumed by the intended recipient. Left Blank
Protection (Type, Name, Duration, Date): The name for the type of protection,
the code that represents how long the system data must be safeguarded, and the
calendar date on which the designated level of safeguarding discontinues for a
specific system data element. Left Blank
Classification: Classification code for the system data element. Left Blank
Classification Caveat: A set of restrictions on system data of a specific classification. Supplements a security classification with system data on access,
dissemination, and other types of restrictions. Left Blank
Releasability: The code that represents the kind of controls required for further
dissemination of system data. Left Blank
Security Standard: Defined by completed TV architectural views. Left Blank
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Figure N.1

SV-6 Systems Data Exchange Matrix 1
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Figure N.2

SV-6 Systems Data Exchange Matrix 2
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Figure N.3

SV-6 Systems Data Exchange Matrix 3
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Figure N.4

SV-6 Systems Data Exchange Matrix 4
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Figure N.5

SV-6 Systems Data Exchange Matrix 5
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Figure N.6

SV-6 Systems Data Exchange Matrix 6
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Figure N.7

SV-6 Systems Data Exchange Matrix 7
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